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ABSTRACT
HUME’S CONCEPTION OF TIME AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR HIS
THEORIES OF CAUSATION AND INDUCTION

Daniel Esposito, B.A., M.A.

Marquette University, 2010

I begin the dissertation by elucidating Hume’s
conception of time as a compound abstract idea and explain
why Hume believes time must be discrete and atomistic. I
then explore the ways in which Hume’s theory of causation
rests upon this atomistic conception of time, and place
special emphasis on Hume’s argument that all causes qua
causes must precede their effects in time. I claim that
this argument is inconsistent with Hume’s critique of the
causal maxim, a principle which states that whatever begins
to exist must have a cause. After exposing and examining
this inconsistency, I investigate the degree to which
Hume’s account of the process of induction also depends
upon his discrete, discontinuous conception of time. I end
the dissertation by summarizing what I accomplished in
earlier chapters, and by discussing potential areas for
future research.
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Chapter One
The Nature and Existence of Time in Hume’s Treatise
Introduction
Hume’s critiques of causation and inductive reasoning
are some of the best known – and most widely studied –
aspects of his philosophy. In contrast, his views of the
existence and nature of time are perhaps the most obscure
and least studied aspects of his philosophy. The primary
purpose of this dissertation is to prove that Hume’s
theories of causation and induction presuppose and require
a certain conception of time, and that a thorough
understanding of the former necessitates a solid grasp of
the latter.
I will present my argument for this claim over the
course of five chapters.1 The current chapter, Chapter One,
will explore what exactly time is for Hume, and whether the
process by which we form the idea of time violates the Copy
Principle, one of the most important principles in Hume’s
epistemology. Throughout this chapter, I will argue that
time for Hume is a compound abstract idea, and that all

1

My sixth chapter will consist in a brief summary of the previous chapters.
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concerns that this idea violates the Copy Principle are
unfounded.
A compound idea for Hume is an idea that contains
other ideas as its parts. This means that the idea of time
as Hume describes it consists of parts. Hume insists that
these parts are not and cannot be infinitely divisible. In
my second chapter, I will analyze the arguments Hume
provides to support this claim, and defend them from the
various objections that have been raised against them in
the literature on this subject. These objections reveal
significant misunderstanding not only of Hume’s arguments
themselves, but also of his overall purpose in developing
them. According to my interpretation, this overall purpose
is primarily phenomenological. In other words, Hume is far
more interested in studying the experience of time than he
is in engaging in metaphysical speculation about the nature
of time, although some consideration of the latter is
obviously unavoidable.
Hume’s phenomenological approach to time leads to what
I call the Temporal Priority Argument, the argument by
which Hume attempts to prove that all causes must precede
their effects in time. My third chapter will consist in a
thorough explanation as to why Hume thinks “the utter
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annihilation of time” results from a denial of the temporal
priority of causes to their effects. I will argue that some
of the reasoning Hume employs in his arguments against the
infinite divisibility of time also plays a key role in the
Temporal Priority Argument, and that the latter argument
depends upon the former.
While my third chapter will focus on the Temporal
Priority Argument, my fourth chapter will concentrate on
another aspect of Hume’s theory of causation – his critique
of the causal maxim. The causal maxim states that whatever
begins to exist must have a cause. Hume rejects this maxim
by making a strong distinction between the idea of a
beginning of existence and the idea of a cause of
existence. I will argue that Hume’s rejection of the causal
maxim is logically inconsistent with his Temporal Priority
Argument.
One of the consequences of the Temporal Priority
Argument is that distinguishing between causes and effects
requires temporal minima. Hume’s reason for thinking so, if
followed to its logical implications, allows one to
conclude that Hume’s account of induction also requires
temporal minima. The purpose of my fifth chapter is to
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explain why the process of induction as Hume characterizes
it necessitates the discreteness of time.
The only Humean text I will discuss throughout my
entire dissertation is A Treatise of Human Nature
(hereafter referred to as Treatise).2 This is because
Treatise is the only text out of all of Hume’s published
works that contain detailed and in-depth discussions of
time. Hume wrote next to nothing about the topic in all of
his subsequent works. Hume’s most extensive discussions
about time appear in Book One, Part Two of Treatise, but he
does briefly mention time again sporadically in later
sections of that work, such as when he explains what effect
time has on the passions in Book Two, Part Three, Section
Seven. Even his comments there, however, are based upon his
arguments featured in Book One, Part Two. Any thorough
exploration of Hume’s theory of time, therefore, must
clearly focus on Book One, Part Two of Treatise. According
to my interpretation, this part of Treatise describes time
as a compound abstract idea.

2

Hume, David. David and Mary Norton, ed. A Treatise of Human Nature. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000.
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Necessary Preliminaries
Before attempting to prove that time for Hume is a
compound abstract idea, however, I must briefly summarize
what Hume thinks impressions and ideas are, and how they
relate to each other. For Hume, the term “impression”
includes “all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as
they make their first appearance in the soul” (T 1.1.1.1)3.
These impressions are strong, vivacious, and lively.
Ideas, in contrast, are much weaker. Ideas are “the faint
images” of impressions “in thinking and reasoning” (T
1.1.1.1).
Hume claims that both impressions and ideas can be
further divided into simple and complex. The latter are
divisible into smaller, distinct parts; the former are not.
Complex impressions and ideas are composed of simple ones.
For example, perceiving or experiencing an apple involves
experiencing its color, taste, smell, and texture. Each of
these alone is a simple impression, but all of them

3

The “T” in this citation stands for A Treatise of Human Nature, the only work in which Hume discusses
time. Each citation of a passage from the Treatise in this dissertation will consist of four numbers: the
first is the book number, the second is the part number, the third is the section number, and the fourth is
the paragraph number. This is the standard method of citing the Treatise, and is used by most Hume
scholars.
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combined constitute the experience of the apple as a whole
(T 1.1.1.2).
Because complex ideas and impressions are composed of
simple ideas and impressions, the mind cannot experience
complex ideas and impressions unless it first experiences
simple impressions and ideas. Hume believes that the mind
cannot form a simple idea until it first perceives a simple
impression that corresponds to and resembles that idea.
The idea copies, or resembles, the simple impression, and
is derived from it. Every simple idea has a correspondent
impression, and vice-versa. This principle, which Hume
scholars call the “Copy Principle,” is an essential aspect
of Humean epistemology, and presupposed throughout the
Treatise. Hume formulates the Copy Principle in this way:
“all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d
from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them,
and which they exactly represent” (T 1.1.1.7).
When providing arguments to convince readers that the
Copy Principle is true, Hume discusses the fact that
impressions are both temporally and causally prior to
ideas, meaning that they always precede ideas in time, and
cause the ideas that resemble them. People always
experience impressions before they experience ideas; they

7

never experience ideas prior to experiencing impressions.
Whereas experiencing impressions always involves
experiencing their corresponding ideas, merely thinking of
the ideas will not cause one to experience the impressions
they resemble. If one wanted to give a child an idea of the
color orange, for example, one must actually show the child
something that is orange, so that the child can have an
impression of the color orange. If the child has never
perceived the color orange before, it would obviously be
absurd to attempt to make the child perceive orange merely
by discussing the idea of orange with the child (T
1.1.1.8). Likewise, “we cannot form to ourselves a just
idea of the taste of a pine-apple, without having actually
tasted it” (T 1.1.1.9). Hume thinks these examples clearly
show the causal dependency of ideas on impressions. The
causal relationship between impressions and ideas is
strictly unidirectional, with impressions serving as the
cause, and ideas serving as the effect.
Thus there is a causal and a temporal relationship
that obtains between impressions and ideas – impressions
cause ideas and always precede them in time. There are also
specific causal and temporal relationships that obtain
between two different types of impressions, which Hume
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refers to as “impressions of sensation” and “impressions of
reflection.” Hume describes the relationships between these
two kinds of impressions by providing a more detailed
account of how the process mentioned in the Copy Principle
works:

An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes
us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure
or pain of some kind or other.4 Of this impression
there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after
the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This
idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the
soul, produces the new impressions of desire and
aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be call’d
impressions of reflection because deriv’d from it.
These again are copy’d by the memory and imagination,
and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give
rise to other impressions and ideas. So that the
impressions of reflection are only antecedent to their
correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of
sensation, and deriv’d from them (T 1.1.2.1).

As described above, the process mentioned in the Copy
Principle clearly involves a temporal sequence. The mind
experiences impressions of sensation first, which lead to
corresponding ideas of sensation. These ideas of sensation
then produce impressions of reflection, which in turn
generate corresponding ideas.
4

These are impressions of sensation.
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While explaining and defending the Copy Principle,
Hume thinks of a counterexample to it. Suppose a man, who
has seen multiple colors of various shades throughout his
thirty years of life, encounters an arrangement of several
shades of blue with one particular shade missing – a shade
of blue that this man has never previously seen. Hume
claims that, despite never having perceived any impression
of this shade of blue, the man’s imagination can still form
of an idea of what that missing shade of blue must look
like. Hume believes this counterexample is too trivial to
cast the Copy Principle into doubt (T 1.1.1.10).
In addition to explaining what ideas are and
describing the processes by which they are formed, Hume
also discusses what the possible content of ideas could be.
He firmly believes “that the mind cannot form any notion of
quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of the
degrees of each” (T 1.1.7.3)5. The arguments Hume uses to
defend this claim employ two other principles that play a
crucial role in his thought.
One of these principles is often called the
Separability Principle. This principle states “that

5

This passage is italicized in the original text.
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whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the
thought and imagination……these propositions are equally
true in the inverse……whatever objects are separable are
also distinguishable, and that whatever objects are
distinguishable are also different” (T 1.1.7.3). This
principle challenges the Lockean theory of abstract ideas.
Locke’s view is that we form an abstract idea by
encountering many things that are similar, determining what
they all have in common, and then developing an idea which
has only those features and not the ones which distinguish
them from each other. For Locke, abstraction involves
separation; it involves forming an idea that has only the
common qualities that enables it to represent other
particular things that have the same features, and
separating these common qualities from all the features
that distinguish the thing in question from all of the
other things which share the common qualities.6 Hume,
following Berkeley, argued that it is impossible to form an
idea of an object that has only those qualities it has in
common with other objects, and none of the qualities that
distinguish it from those other objects. The distinguishing

6

Locke discusses his theory of abstract ideas in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
particularly at 2.11.9, 2.12.1, 3.3.6-9, and 3.6.32.
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qualities an object possesses, argues Hume, cannot be
separated from it, and so any idea of that object must
contain those qualities as well.
Another principle that plays a crucial role in Hume’s
thought is often known as the Conceivability Principle.
According to the Conceivability Principle, what is
conceivable is possible. If something is conceivable, then
it is possible. When Hume applies this principle to
abstract ideas, he puts a Cartesian spin on it. He claims
that if something is “absurd in fact and reality, it must
also be absurd in idea; since nothing of which we can form
a clear and distinct idea is absurd and impossible” (T
1.1.7.6). It is not possible for an object with only
indeterminate qualities to exist. Therefore, it is not
possible to conceive of such an object. Since abstract
ideas as Locke describes them are ideas of objects with
only indeterminate qualities, it is impossible for such
ideas to exist or to be conceived. This is especially the
case since, as Hume argues, forming an idea of an object
and forming an idea are one and the same act; there is no
distinction between them (T 1.1.7.6).
The Conceivability Principle and the Separability
Principle are closely connected. For example, Hume claims

12

that a line cannot be separated from its particular length.
A line and its precise length are indistinguishable; they
cannot exist separately in reality. Consequently, it is
also impossible to conceive of a line that has no
determinate length (T 1.1.7.3).
It is important to note, however, that none of the
arguments Hume advances against the Lockean conception of
abstract ideas prove that abstract ideas are impossible
simpliciter. Hume does believe that abstract ideas exist;
he just does not think it is possible to form abstract
ideas that imply a separation from distinct, determinate
qualities. Hume, following Berkeley,7 says that “all general
[abstract] ideas are nothing but particular ones, annex’d
to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive
signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other
individuals, which are similar to them” (T 1.1.7.1).
Hume has a theory to explain how we are able to form
ideas of things that represent many other things. We
experience many particular things that share certain
qualities. We form a habit of using the same term to refer
to all of these particular things, even though they differ
7

For more information on Berkeley’s theory of abstract ideas, see his introduction to his A Treatise
Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.
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in some ways. When the habit becomes strong enough, merely
hearing the term generates an idea of one of these objects,
and the mind quickly recalls other particular things that
share the same qualities (T 1.1.7.7).
If one uses the term “triangle,” for example, one
might think of an equilateral triangle. The distinguishing
characteristic of an equilateral triangle is that all of
its angles are equal. If the mind attempts to identify this
characteristic as one that belongs to all triangles qua
triangles, it will also recall scalene and isosceles
triangles, which lack this property yet are still
triangles. This process causes one to use the same term
“triangle” to refer to those kinds of triangles as well (T
1.1.78). In order for the mind to think of a triangle, it
must think of a particular kind of triangle, one that will
have features that distinguish it from all other kinds of
triangles. The mind is aware of these distinguishing
features, but ignores them whenever it thinks of a triangle
qua triangle. Under a Lockean conception of abstract ideas,
however, the abstract idea of a triangle qua triangle lacks
any characteristics that distinguish it from any other kind
of triangle; these distinguishing characteristics are
separated from the common properties that all triangles
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share, and the idea of triangle qua triangle contains only
these common properties. Hume thinks the distinguishing
characteristics cannot be separated from the common
properties; instead of separating the distinguishing
characteristics, the mind simply chooses not to pay
attention to them (Baxter 18-19).
Three Different Definitions of Time
After discussing abstract ideas, Hume dedicates Part
Two of the first book of the Treatise to the ideas of space
and time and how we form them. Many of his comments
regarding time strongly suggest that time is an abstract
idea. Consider, for example, the following passage:

The idea of time, being derived from the succession of
our perceptions of every kind, ideas as well as
impressions, and impressions of reflection as well as
sensation, will afford us an instance of an abstract
idea, with comprehends a still greater variety than
that of space, and yet is represented in the fancy by
some particular individual idea of a determinate
quantity and quality (T 1.2.3.6).

Hume reinforces this view of time in the very next
paragraph:
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As ‘tis from the disposition of visible and tangible
objects we receive the idea of space, so from the
succession of ideas and impressions we form the idea
of time, nor is it possible for time alone ever to
make its appearance, or be taken notice of by the
mind……whenever we have no successive perceptions, we
have no notice of time, even tho’ there be a real
succession in the objects……time cannot make its
appearance to the mind, either alone, or attended with
a steady unchangeable object, but is always discover’d
by some perceivable succession of changeable objects
(T 1.2.3.7).

Notice the use of the Separability Principle here; time
cannot be separated from particular successions. It is just
as impossible to conceptualize time without successive
perceptions as it is to conceptualize a line without any
particular length.
Thus far, Hume is characterizing time as an abstract
idea derived from succession of impressions of every kind.
This is not the only way he describes time, however. Some
of his comments cast doubt on the notion that time is an
abstract idea at all. While he repeatedly insists that the
idea of time cannot be separated from successive
perceptions, he also claims that “The idea of time is not
deriv’d from a particular impression mix’d up with others,
and plainly distinguishable from them; but arises
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altogether from the manner, in which impressions appear to
the mind, without making one of the number [of
impressions]” (T 1.2.3.10). To clarify in what sense time
can be conceived of as a “manner,” Hume uses an example
that is very well known to those who study Hume’s theory of
time:

Five notes play’d on a flute give us the impression
and idea of time; tho’ time be not a sixth impression,
which presents itself to the hearing or any of the
senses. Nor is it a sixth impression, which the mind
by reflection finds within itself……here it [the mind]
only takes notice of the manner, in which the
different sounds make their appearance; and that it
may afterwards consider without considering these
particular sounds, but may conjoin it with any other
objects. The ideas of some objects it certainly must
have, nor is it possible for it without these ideas
ever to arrive at any conception of time; which since
it appears not as any primary distinct impression, can
plainly be nothing but different ideas, or
impressions, or objects dispos’d in a certain manner,
that is, succeeding each other” (T 1.2.3.10).

Here Hume clearly identifies time with the manner in which
ideas, impressions, and objects appear to the mind, a
manner which is successive. Later, Hume makes the same
point even more bluntly when he asserts that “time is
nothing but the manner, in which some real objects exist”
(T 1.2.5.28).
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The passages quoted above pose considerable
interpretative difficulties for scholars attempting to
study Hume’s theory of time, because Hume appears to work
with three different definitions of time. He seems to
believe that all of the following definitions of time are
correct:
1. Time is an abstract idea derived from successions of
every kind.
2. Time is different ideas, impressions, and objects
appearing in a certain successive manner.
3. Time is the manner in which some real objects exist.
Hume scholars tend to argue that one of these definitions
articulates Hume’s conception of time more effectively than
the others, but as one would expect, they disagree as to
which definition is the best one.
Baxter’s Interpretation of Hume
In what is probably the most extensive and detailed
study of Hume’s theory of time to date, Hume’s Difficulty:
Time and Identity in the Treatise,8 Baxter mentions these
disagreements, and then argues that conceptualizing time as
8

Baxter, Donald. Hume’s Difficulty: Time and Identity in the Treatise. New York: Routledge, 2008.

18

an abstract idea comes closer to capturing Hume’s thought
than conceptualizing time as a manner.
According to Baxter, many well-known Hume scholars,
such as Kemp Smith, tend to describe the idea of time as
the idea of “the manner in which successions are arrayed”
(Baxter 21).9 Baxter claims that viewing time as “the idea
of succession in general” is more consistent with Hume’s
theory of abstract ideas than viewing time as a manner
(Baxter 21).
Baxter writes,
For Hume, time is an abstraction from the successions
we experience (T 1.2.3.6-11, 1.2.4.2). That is to say,
the idea of time is an abstract idea of any succession
qua many things in succession. Likewise I will propose
that the idea of a moment is the idea of a member of a
succession qua member (Baxter 17).

We develop the idea of time the same way we develop
abstract ideas about anything. We encounter many particular
successions, and we use the term “succession” to refer to
them. Whenever we hear the term “succession,” we call to
mind many other particular successions. We can use the
Separability Principle and the Conceivability Principle to
9

See Kemp Smith, Norman. The Philosophy of David Hume. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1941, p.
274.
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show that time cannot be separated from the idea of
successiveness. Just as it is impossible to form an idea of
a line with no particular length, so it is impossible to
conceptualize time in isolation from a particular
succession (Baxter 19).
In addition to claiming that viewing time as an
abstract idea “of any succession qua many things in
succession” is more consistent with Hume’s theory of
abstract ideas, Baxter also argues that his interpretation
has an additional advantage over the more common view that
time for Hume is best thought of as the manner in which
perceptions appear to the mind. Baxter’s interpretation
enables time to consist of parts, but other interpretations
do not. This is important because, according to Hume, “’tis
evident, that time or duration consists of different parts:
For otherwise we cou’d not conceive a longer or shorter
duration” (T 1.2.3.9). Baxter claims that successions have
parts called moments (Baxter 20), but manners do not have
parts (Baxter 21). Thus viewing time primarily as a manner
– any kind of manner – makes it difficult to conceptualize
time consisting of parts10.

10

Conceptualizing time as the

I think Baxter is wrong about this. Hume can very easily explain how manners can have parts. The
parts of a manner are the objects arranged in that manner. I am surprised that Baxter does not consider
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abstract idea of any succession qua successiveness, which
Baxter’s interpretation requires, can easily enable one to
form ideas of parts of time.
When Hume asserts that “time or duration consists of
different parts,” he seems to be using the terms “time” and
“duration” interchangeably. He continues to use these terms
synonymously in several places in Part Two as well. Baxter
also uses them synonymously, with one minor qualification:

Hume seems to use “time” and “duration”
interchangeably within T 1.2.3.6-11……This makes sense
when speaking of a duration. Thus “time,” “a
succession,” and “a duration,” when used generally,
are interchangeable for Hume. However “duration” can
also be used to convey more the manner than the sort,
more successiveness than a succession. Hume tends not
to use it in this sense but commentators often read it
this way, perhaps influenced by Kemp Smith (Baxter
19).

Whenever the mind thinks of a succession, it is thinking of
something that has duration. Based on the way both Baxter
and Hume conceive of duration, it follows from this that

this possibility, since he claims, “For Hume, there is no distinction between the idea of a manner and the
general idea of objects arrayed in that manner” (Baxter 21). Such a distinction would violate Hume’s
theory of abstraction. Claiming that the parts of a manner are the objects arrayed in that manner,
however, would be perfectly consistent with Hume’s notion of abstract ideas. Hence Baxter needs a
stronger argument against the “time is a manner” interpretation that he opposes.
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all successions are temporal. After all, “since the idea of
duration is the idea of a succession qua successive,” says
Baxter, “it applies to any succession” (Baxter 21).
This idea of duration also implies that nothing can
have duration except for successions. Anything lacking
successiveness cannot be said to have duration.
Consequently, unchangeable objects, which Hume calls
steadfast objects, cannot and do not serve as the basis for
the idea of duration. Unlike changeable objects, which are
really multiple things in succession, steadfast objects are
just single objects that only exist for one moment. Since
they are not successions themselves and lack
successiveness, steadfast objects lack duration, and the
idea of duration can never be derived from or applied to
them (Baxter 21). Hume goes so far as to say that applying
the idea of time to a steadfast object involves a fiction
(T 1.2.3.11).
The problem, however, is that we very often do apply
the idea of duration or time to steadfast objects.
Whenever we make mistakes of this sort, we confuse two
similar ideas and apply the wrong idea to the object we
perceive or contemplate. In this particular case, Baxter
thinks the two ideas that get confused are the idea of the
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steadfast object and the idea of “a succession of things
exactly resembling the steadfast object” (Baxter 44). Only
successions of changeable objects can have duration (T
1.2.3.11), so to attribute duration to steadfast objects,
which are unchangeable by definition, always involves a
mistake.
“Because we are constantly experiencing succession,”
Baxter claims, “we tend to think of an object experienced
at one time……and that object experienced at a later
time……not as one steadfast thing but as many things in
succession” (45). No steadfast object can be many things in
succession, however, because that would make the steadfast
object a changeable object, which it cannot be by
definition. Baxter thinks that what we really experience is
a single steadfast object coexisting with several moments
of a succession, not a succession of objects that exactly
resemble this steadfast object. The act of experiencing a
single steadfast object coexisting with some or all of the
members of a succession of changeable objects is
phenomenologically very similar to experiencing a
succession of changeable objects, and the failure to
distinguish between these two types of experiences leads to
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the misapplication of the idea of duration to a steadfast
object (Baxter 44-45).
Baxter is well aware that the idea of a steadfast
object coexisting with some or all members of a succession
is esoteric, so his book contains lengthy and detailed
explanations of and defenses for this position. His overall
argument appears to be as follows. Steadfast objects, by
definition, do not change. All changeable things are many
things in succession. Since only successions can have
duration, and steadfast objects are not successions,
steadfast objects do not and cannot have duration. Hume
believes that both successions and steadfast objects exist.
Therefore, successions coexist with steadfast objects.
Baxter expands upon this basic argument to arrive at
far more radical and counterintuitive conclusions, namely,
that moments of time can coexist with other moments of
time, and that a single moment of a certain length can
coexist with several briefer moments. These
counterintuitive notions are consequences of his claim that
successions coexist with steadfast objects. After all,
anything that exists in time must exist at least one
moment. Since steadfast objects are not successive, they
cannot exist at more than one moment. Thus they only can
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only exist at a single moment. Once one adds the premise
“if things coexist, then the moments they exist at
coexist,” one must conclude that the single moment at which
a steadfast object exists happens to coexist with several
distinct successive moments (Baxter 31). Put simply, the
crux of Baxter’s interpretation of Hume’s theory of time is
that moments of varying lengths of time can coexist with
each other.
To clarify his ideas, Baxter provides several examples
of steadfast objects coexisting with successions. For Hume,
the term “object” often includes perceptions. Hence
“steadfast object” can easily mean “steadfast perception.”
Baxter thinks there are many places in the Treatise where
Hume discusses steadfast perceptions coexisting with a
succession. One such place is T 1.2.3.7, where Hume says
that a man preoccupied with a single thought is not aware
of the passage of time. This must mean that the man is not
aware of any successions. Baxter claims that successions
are still occurring, however – the man just is not aware of
them. These successions coexist with the single thought,
which entails that the moment at which the thought exists
happens to coexist with the moments of all of the
successions taking place at the same time (Baxter 32).
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Baxter also believes that successions themselves, and
not just the moments that compose them, can coexist as
well. He claims that “a temporal succession coexists with
another just in case each moment in one coexists with some
moment in the other, and vice versa” (Baxter 41). As an
example of coexisting successions, he invites the reader to
imagine Hume experiencing a change in mood while he listens
to a bird singing (Baxter 38). The sounds of the bird
singing constitute one succession; the various moods Hume
feels constitute another, and he experiences both
successions simultaneously.
Coexistent successions play such an important role in
Baxter’s interpretation of Hume that he claims they are the
source of the idea of time. He states that “we experience
time by experiencing various coexistent successions of
objects. It is the ideas of these we use to form the
abstract idea of time” (Baxter 37).
I strongly disagree with this claim, for two main
reasons. I very highly doubt that we do, in fact,
experience coexistent successions. Even if we do, I think
one can argue, on Humean grounds, that we can never derive
the idea of time from them.
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Hume’s description of coexistence, and the process by
which the mind experiences coexistent things, lead to a
problem for Baxter’s belief that we experience coexistent
successions. At T 2.3.7.5, Hume contrasts the process of
experiencing space with the process of experiencing time,
and asserts,

……space or extension consists of a number of coexistent parts dispos’d in a certain order, and
capable of being at once present to the sight or
feeling. On the contrary, time or succession,
tho’ it consists likewise of parts, never
presents to us more than one at once; nor is it
possible for any two of them ever to be coexistent. These qualities of the objects have a
suitable effect on the imagination. The parts of
extension being susceptible of an union to the
senses, acquire an union in the fancy, and as the
appearance of one part excludes not another, the
transition or passage of the thought thro’ the
contiguous parts is by that means render’d more
smooth and easy. On the other hand, the
incompatibility of the parts of time in their
real existence separates them in the imagination,
and makes it more difficult11 for that faculty to
trace any long succession or series of events.
Every part must appear single and alone, nor can
regularly have entrance into the fancy without
banishing what is suppos’d to have been
immediately precedent.

11

This word is italicized in the original text.
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I will discuss this passage in more detail in later
chapters. For my purposes here, however, I will concentrate
on Hume’s claim that the experience of coexistent things is
easier for the mind than the experience of successive
things. The nature of coexistence makes whatever is
coexistent easier to experience than something which is not
coexistent.
Consequently, if Baxter is right, coexistent
successions must be easier to experience than ordinary,
non-coexistent successions. Unfortunately for Baxter, this
is not the case. An examination of some very common kinds
of experiences shows that the more intensely the mind
focuses on one succession, or member(s) of a succession,
the less aware it becomes of any other members of any other
successions. Many people have had the experience of driving
to a familiar location, one they have driven to countless
times, and arriving at their destination without
remembering the drive there. While they were driving, they
obviously experienced a constant succession of impressions
from the other cars on the road, traffic lights, road
signs, and all of the other myriad impressions necessarily
associated with the act of driving. Yet, because they were
preoccupied the succession of thoughts or feelings they had
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while driving, they were not fully aware of those
impressions; if they were, they would have been able to
remember the trip.
A similar phenomenon is well known to students of all
ages, and often occurs while reading a page from a textbook
or some other material required for class. Students
frequently engage in a train of thought as they begin to
read the page, and then arrive at the bottom of that page
without knowing or remembering anything that they read. In
this case, the sequence of thoughts students engage in as
they read constitute one succession, and the perceptions of
the words they read constitutes another. If people can
experience coexistent successions, it is hard to understand
why these types of examples – the one discussed here and
the driving example discussed above – occur at all, let
alone why they occur so often. A much more plausible
explanation for these very common phenomena is that the
mind’s concentration on one succession prevents it from
experiencing other successions.
Hume’s remark that “A man in a sound sleep, or
strongly occupy’d with one thought, is insensible of time”
(T 1.2.3.7) strongly suggests he would deny the possibility
of experiencing coexistent successions. If it were truly
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possible to experience coexistent successions, then there
is no reason why being preoccupied with a single thought or
a succession of thoughts would prevent a person from being
aware of a temporal succession. Obviously, if preoccupation
with one thought makes awareness of a single succession
difficult, then it would make awareness of two or more
coexistent successions even more difficult.
People in sound sleep are not conscious, and hence
cannot have any successive perceptions. Concentration on a
single thought precludes one from perceiving, or even being
aware of, any succession. If it were truly possible to
experience coexistent successions, then the mind must be
able to experience at least two moments simultaneously, as
well as the thoughts, impressions, ideas, or perceptions
which exist at those moments. Obviously, if the mind could
accomplish such a feat, contemplating just one item in
consciousness – which it does whenever it becomes
preoccupied with a single thought – would not prevent it
from also being aware a part or multiple parts of a
succession which coexists with it. Hume’s denial that the
mind can be aware of successions while it focuses on a
single thought strongly suggests, therefore, that Hume
would also deny the possibility of experiencing coexistent
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successions. It also strongly suggests that experiencing
coexistent successions is much more difficult than Baxter
seems to think it is.
Another problem facing Baxter follows from his
description of coexistent successions. Recall that,
according to Baxter, “a temporal succession coexists with
another just in case each moment in one coexists with some
moment in the other, and vice versa” (Baxter 41). Thus if X
and Y are distinct coexistent temporal successions, it is
impossible for some moments of one succession to fail to
coexist with any moment or moments of the other succession.
This means that only completed successions can coexist. A
succession is complete when its last moment will not be
followed by another moment; no more moments can be added to
a complete succession.12 If a moment is added to succession
X, for example, and that new moment does not coexist with
any of the moments in Y, then X and Y are no longer
coexistent successions.

12

To clarify this notion of a completed succession, consider the years 2009 and 2010. Since it is currently
August of 2009 as I write this, there are several more days, weeks, and months left to 2009. At the time
of this writing, the temporal succession that we refer to as the year 2009 has not yet been completed.
st
Once December 31 of 2009 ends, however, the year 2009 will be complete, and there will be no more
days, weeks, and months left to 2009, since all of them would have already transpired. Once December
st
31 2009 ends, the temporal succession we refer to as the year 2010 will begin. The year 2010 will not be
st
complete until December 31 2010 ends, at which point 2010 would become a completed succession.
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Incomplete successions lack some of their moments. For
this reason, such incomplete successions fail to conform to
Baxter’s definition of coexistent successions. Since they
lack some of their moments, it is obviously not the case
that “each moment in one [succession] coexists with some
moment in the other, and vice versa.”
The problem, however, is that whether or not one can
be accurately described as experiencing completed
successions depends upon how one interprets one’s
experience. Consider Baxter’s example of Hume experiencing
a change in mood as he listens to a singing bird. Suppose
for the sake of argument that one bird chirps for a while,
flies away, and is replaced by another bird that chirps for
a while. Is that one succession of birdsong, or two?
Should we consider the song of each bird as a completed
succession in itself, or is only the singing of both birds
taken together a completed succession? Clearly, similar
questions could be raised about virtually any succession.
By acknowledging that successions are able to have
sub-successions (Baxter 46), Baxter unknowingly strengthens
this objection to his own position. It is very easy to
conceive of many, if not all, successions as being members
of a larger succession. A succession that lasts a minute,
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for example, could be part of an hour-long succession,
which could be part of a day-long succession, etc. Baxter
leaves himself vulnerable to this possibility when he
claims that, although “all coexistent successions flow
relative to each other……we can take some external
successions, like the ticking of clocks, to be the standard
by which we judge the rate of other successions” (Baxter
42). The “ticking of clocks” involves an intersubjective
standard consisting of measurable units of time. Since for
any finite, measurable unit of time that humans can
experience it is possible to conceive of a longer unit of
time (a century is longer than a decade which is longer
than a year, etc) the length of time for which a certain
set of coexistent successions exist can be considered part
of a much longer succession, meaning those coexisting
successions would be members of a single, longer
succession.
If sets of coexisting successions are all members of a
larger succession, however, they cannot be coexistent.
This consequence follows from Hume’s insistence that the
parts of time cannot be coexistent, since coexistence is
the distinguishing characteristic of extension, not
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duration.13 Baxter acknowledges this fact, but claims Hume
only prohibits members of the same succession from
coexisting with each other, not one succession coexisting
with another (Baxter 43).14 Obviously, then, if all
coexistent successions are actually members of a single,
longer succession, then they would be moments of that
single succession, and hence could not coexist with
anything.
While Baxter does directly address the issue of the
means by which one can determine which moments belong to
which succession, his comments on the subject fail to
liberate him from the possibility of interpreting any pair
of coexistent successions as constituting a part of a
larger succession, which would preclude them from being
coexistent. After posing the question, “What makes moments
members of the same succession of moments?” Baxter claims,

13

14

I will explore Hume’s reason for thinking this way in my next chapter.

See also page 41, where Baxter writes, “A succession of moments is several moments such that for any
two, one of them is later than the other, and such that for any two, either no moment is between them or
any moment between them is one of the several. Thus distinct coexistent moments are not in the same
succession, though in principle they could be in different successions which otherwise have all the same
moments.”
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The experienced unity of successions of objects is a
result of the principles of associations of ideas……In
all cases, temporal contiguity plays a role. Sameness
of place helps unify some successions. The successions
of things in no place, however, must be united by the
help of resemblance or causation. So, if Hume enjoys
the succession of tastes in a sip of a complex claret,
their resemblance as tastes and their having a common
cause helps unify the succession. If Hume
simultaneously listens to a birdsong and feels a
change in mood, each of these two successions of
perceptions likewise are unified without appeal to
sameness of place. (Though, it must be said, Hume will
naturally attribute place to each to ‘compleat the
union’ [T 1.4.5.12; SBN 237]-he will hear the song as
in the bird’s throat and feel the moods as in his own
breast.) The abstract idea of time abstracts from the
particular natural relations unifying a succession,
just retaining their being unified some way or other
(Baxter 37 -38).

In the passage from the Treatise that Baxter references,
Hume claims that the taste, smell, color, and tangibility
of a fruit are inseparable qualities, and always coexist in
their appearance to the mind. These qualities are related
to the fruit via the relations of causation and contiguity
in the time and place of their appearance, but the
qualities themselves do not exist in any place. The fruit
exists in a particular place, of course, but the qualities
do not. Hume thinks that the coexistent qualities of any
extended object should not be attributed to the extended
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object.15 Although the coexistent qualities do not exist in
any part of the extended object, or in any place at all, we
have a tendency to attribute a new relation, a “conjunction
in place” to the other relations, to make it easier for us
to transition from the thought of the extended object to
the thought of the qualities. It is much easier for the
mind to understand how the coexistent qualities of the
extended object relate to the extended object if it
conceptualizes the qualities as belonging to, that is,
contained in, the extended object.
Hume claims “’tis a quality, which I shall often have
occasion to remark in human nature……that when objects are
united by any relation, we have a strong propensity to add
some new relation to them, in order to compleat the union”
(T 1.4.5.12). The mind’s experience of the qualities of a
fruit, mentioned above, is one example of this principle.
As another example, Hume says that “from the relations of
causation and contiguity in time betwixt two objects, we
feign likewise that of a conjunction in place, in order to
strengthen the connexion” (T 1.4.5.12). Based upon these
comments, it seems that Baxter’s speculation as to how Hume
would opt to unify the succession of birdsong and the
15

For his arguments in support of this position, see T 1.4.5.13-14.
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succession of moods – by somehow attributing place to them
– is plausible.
There are other ways of unifying the successions,
however. By using the philosophical relations Hume
discusses,16 one can compare the length of the coexistent
successions to a longer succession. Some of Hume’s comments
enable one to unify the successions in this manner.
Consider, for example, Hume’s remark that “‘Tis evident,
that time or duration consists of different parts. For
otherwise we cou’d not conceive a longer or shorter
duration” (T 1.2.3.8). The coexistent successions of
birdsong and moods obviously have a particular duration.
One can surely conceive of a duration being longer than the
duration of those coexistent successions. One can also say
that the moments of the successions resemble each other
insofar as they all belong to the same succession – the
longer succession.
Suppose, for instance, that Hume really did hear birds
singing one day, and also felt a simultaneous change in
mood. Obviously, if Hume did have an actual experience like
16

According to T 1.3.1.1, the seven philosophical relations are resemblance, identity, relations of time
and place, proportion in quality or number, degrees in any quality, contrariety, and causation. The natural
relations Baxter mentions in the passage I quoted are resemblance, contiguity, and causation (T 1.1.4.1). I
will mention these relations again briefly in Chapter Four.
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that, then it must have occurred during one of the years he
was alive. Suppose that Hume had this experience in the
year 1737. The year 1737, like any year, is clearly a
temporal succession; it is temporal succession of 365 days.
As Hume himself makes clear, the year 1737 cannot coexist
with another temporal succession:

‘Tis a property inseparable from time, and which in a
manner constitutes its essence, that each of its parts
succeeds another, and that none of them, however
contiguous, can ever be co-existent. For the same
reason, that the year 1737 cannot concur with the
present year 1738, every moment must be distinct from,
and posterior or antecedent to another” (T 1.2.2.4).

The year 1737 cannot coexist with the year 1738 because
1738 cannot begin to exist until 1737 is complete, and
therefore no longer existent; the very existence of any
part of 1738 presupposes that every part of 1737 has
already passed. The “parts” of a year are the days, weeks,
and months which compose the year. In the above passage,
Hume explicitly denies that the parts of time can ever be
coexistent. I have shown above how one can “unify”
coexistent successions by conceiving a longer duration
which contains both successions, thus making both
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successions components of that longer succession. One way
to do this is to interpret one’s experience as occurring
within a specific year, but in principle the longer
succession could be much, much shorter as well. In all
cases, the parts of the longer succession – which would
include the successions Baxter would label as coexistent –
cannot coexist.
Even if Baxter could successfully defend himself from
these objections, and could prove that we do experience
coexistent successions, he would still need to provide a
Humean explanation of how we derive the abstract idea of
time from these coexistent successions. I am not confident
that any such Humean explanation can be provided. Hume
believes the idea of time cannot be divorced from the idea
of a succession. The idea of time can easily be separated
from the idea of coexistence, though, because coexistence
is a feature of extension, not time. If the mind repeatedly
experiences many particular coexistent successions,
however, what will prevent it from focusing on the
coexistence of the successions instead of their
successiveness? All coexistent successions would exhibit
both coexistence and successiveness, yet only the latter is
necessary for the idea of time; the former is not necessary
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for the idea of time at all, and is far more likely to make
the mind think of extension instead of time.

While the

mind can easily form the idea of time even if no coexistent
successions ever existed, it could never form the idea of
time if no successions of any sort existed. Thus it is very
difficult to understand how the mind could ever form the
idea of time from the experience of coexistent successions.
Despite my criticisms of Baxter’s position, I agree
with him that Hume’s conception of time is best thought of
as an abstract idea. Even in the passages where Hume
defines time as a manner, he emphasizes that the idea of
time cannot be separated from a succession of changeable
objects. Merely thinking of a manner in which something
exists will not generate the idea of time unless that
manner is successive in nature. Hume equates time with “the
manner in which some real objects exist” because he thinks
real objects exist in succession. It seems to be impossible
to avoid the conclusion that the idea of time for Hume must
be the idea of a particular succession that brings to mind
other successions one has experienced, with a special
emphasis placed on what these successions have in common –
successiveness.
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I also agree with Baxter that Hume uses the terms
“time” and “duration” interchangeably. Many commentators,
however, claim not only that “duration” has some meanings
that are not synonymous with “time,” but also that the very
idea of duration is itself a fiction for Hume!
McRae and the Two Types of Fictions
One of these commentators is McRae. McRae’s “The
Import of Hume’s Theory of Time”17 mentions some of the
difficulties involved with determining precisely what Hume
means by “duration” and whether or not “duration” is
synonymous with “time.” Whereas Baxter argues for
conceiving time as an abstract idea, McRae thinks it is
more accurate to view time as “the manner in which
impressions appear to the mind” (McRae 26). He bases his
interpretation on the well-known passage from the Treatise
in which Hume discusses the five musical notes of a flute,
a passage which McRae thinks also proves that the idea of
time violates the Copy Principle (McRae 26). As for
“duration,” McRae claims that Hume sometimes treats “time”
and “duration” as synonyms, and sharply distinguishes them
at other times. When duration is thought to be “an object
17

McRae, R. “The Import of Hume’s Theory of Time” Hume Studies 6,2 (1980) in Tweyman, Stanley (ed).
David Hume: Critical Assessments vol. III. New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. 25-34.
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qua continuing or persevering or enduring, whether or not
undergoing successive changes,” duration is not a synonym
for time. Instead, that understanding of duration involves
a fiction (McRae 26).
McRae devotes the rest of his essay explaining
precisely how duration is a fictitious idea, and what
implications this idea has for the rest of Hume’s
philosophy. For Hume, time consists of parts.

These parts

are not and cannot be coexistent, because coexistence of
parts is a feature of extension, not duration. Therefore,
the idea of time cannot come from unchangeable objects.
The idea of duration (understood in its correct sense) can
only be produced by “a succession of changeable objects”
(McRae 26). It cannot ever be applied to or derived from
unchangeable objects. Applying the idea of duration to
unchanging and unchangeable objects always involves a
fiction.
There are two kinds of fictions. The first occurs when
the mind confuses one idea with another and then
incorrectly applies it to an object. It consists in “the
misapplication of an idea derived from some original
impression to something other than its proper object”
(McRae 29). The second type of fiction is “a pure invention
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of the imagination designed to resolve a contradiction – a
contradiction to which the first type of fiction gives
rise” (McRae 29).
According to McRae, duration is a fiction of the first
type. The two ideas that are confused are number and unity.
Recall that the idea of duration can only be derived from a
succession of changeable objects. There are two ways the
mind can interpret its experience of this succession (McRae
29). First, the mind can interpret the succession as
consisting of multiple changeable objects – i.e., as there
being a changeable object at each moment, with there being
as many objects as there are moments in the succession.
This way of interpreting the succession of changeable
objects produces the idea of number (McRae 30). The mind
can also interpret the succession as there being only one
object that continues to exist unaltered at each of the
moments in the succession. This gives us the idea of unity
(McRae 30).
The idea of duration results from the failure to
distinguish between these two ways of interpreting the
experience of a succession of changeable objects. The mind
actually experiences multiple changeable objects during the
succession, but thinks it is experiencing a single object
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existing unaltered at each moment in the succession.
Obviously, however, no object can exhibit both number
(plurality) and unity simultaneously, and thinking
otherwise leads to a contradiction. The mind attempts to
reconcile this contradiction by inventing the idea of
identity, which is a fiction of the second type (McRae 30).
McRae then explains how the fictitious idea of
identity generates the idea of substance. He interprets
Hume as claiming the mind encounters an interrupted
succession of appearances of an object and applies the idea
of identity to it. The idea of substance arises when the
mind confuses a succession of changeable objects and an
interrupted succession of appearances of an object. The
mind thinks that the object that appears at a certain
moment after the interruption is the same as – that is,
identical to – the object that appeared prior to the
interruption. A contradiction arises between the identity
of an object and the interrupted appearances of it. In
other words, the mind experiences a contradiction between
number and identity. To resolve this contradiction, the
mind forms the idea of substance (McRae 31-32). The idea of
substance is a fiction of the second type.
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McRae argues that the same kind of process from the
first type of fiction to a contradiction to the second type
of fiction back to the first type again leads to the ideas
of soul, self, power, necessary connection, and agency.
All of these fictions, McRae claims, derive from the idea
of duration (McRae 34). McRae seems to think that there is
a steady progression in the Treatise from one fiction to
the other, and that each fiction is derived from the
previous ones, with duration being the very first and
primary fiction. For example, the contradiction between the
fictitious ideas of simplicity and identity give rise to
the fictions of soul and self, and the same sort of process
through various fictions causes the mind to interpret power
“as a quality in a substance which endures as the same
substance, through undergoing change” (McRae 34). Based on
the way McRae uses the italicized terms, he clearly
interprets them as being Humean fictions, hence showing how
one fictitious idea – in this case, power – arises out of
many others. McRae goes so far as to say that if we
eliminated all these fictions, all that would be left would
be perceptions (McRae 34).
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Pappas’ Response to McRae
In “On McRae’s Hume,” Pappas raises three objections
to McRae’s arguments.18 The first objection is that, on
McRae’s interpretation of Hume, Hume is not consistent.
According to this interpretation, Hume claims that we have
an idea of time, but not an idea of duration. We cannot
have an idea of duration because it cannot be derived from
any impression. Yet the idea of time, according to Pappas,
cannot be derived from an impression either. “To be
consistent,” Pappas writes, “Hume would have to conclude
either that there is not an idea of time after all, or that
the reason for the lack of an idea of duration would have
to be withdrawn” (Pappas 36-37). Pappas claims that time,
along with the well-known missing shade of blue example, is
another exception to Hume’s Copy Principle. The idea of
time is invented by the imagination; it is not derived from
any impression (Pappas 37).
While the first objection Pappas raises reveals an
inconsistency in McRae’s interpretation of Hume, his second
objection exposes an apparent inconsistency in McRae’s own
position regarding the two types of fictions. McRae claims
18

Pappas, G.S. “On McRae’s Hume” Hume Studies 7,2 (1981) in Tweyman, Stanley (ed). David Hume:
Critical Assessments vol. III. New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. 35-38.
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that duration is a type one fiction, in which one idea is
incorrectly applied to another. McRae also claims that we
have no idea of duration. If we have no idea of duration,
how can we confuse the idea of duration with another idea?
McRae cannot consistently assert both that we have no idea
of duration and that duration is a type one fiction (Pappas
37).
Pappas’ third objection is that there is no room in
Hume’s ontology for the second type of fiction. Such
fictions cannot be ideas, impressions, mental acts, or
dispositions. There is nothing else that Hume could
possibly allow them to be, so Hume would have to deny that
they exist (Pappas 37).
A closer examination into the reasoning Pappas
presents to support this argument reveals a flaw that
undermines the argument’s effectiveness. When Pappas
constructs this argument at the very end of his paper, he
uses duration as an example of a second kind of fiction,
because he thinks it is impossible for it to be a type one
fiction. A second type fiction cannot be an impression,
since impressions are not invented, and the second type of
fiction as McRae describes it is something that is
invented. It is very difficult to understand how duration
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can be construed as a mental act or disposition. Pappas
also claims – and this is where he makes a mistake – that
duration cannot be an idea, because Hume denies that there
is an idea of duration. Both McRae and Pappas are wrong to
think that Hume believes we lack an idea of duration. As I
will argue later in this chapter, duration itself is not a
fiction; the fiction consists in believing steadfast or
unchanging objects have duration.
Miller’s Interpretation of Hume
In “Hume’s Impression of Succession (Time),” Miller
also responds to McRae, and does so in a way that attempts
to render the idea of time consistent with the Copy
Principle.19 When discussing the five notes of the flute
passage, Miller claims McRae failed to understand a very
important aspect of that principle. Most commentators on
Hume, McRae included, interpret Hume as asserting merely
that every simple idea derives from a simple impression,
and that for every simple impression, there is an idea that
corresponds with it. Miller argues that “not only do all
simple ideas derive from simple impressions, but that both
the idea and the impression are also always present in the

19

Miller, Jon. “Hume’s Impression of Succession (Time)” Dialogue XLVII (2008): 603-617.
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mind as successive pairs” (Miller 605). He calls this
principle the “Pair Principle” (Miller 605).
Miller elucidates the Pair Principle and its
implications by examining the process by which Hume thinks
ideas are formed. Hume’s remark that an idea “remains after
the impression ceases” (T 1.1.2.1) seems to suggest that
impressions and ideas cannot exist together, that the
impression must perish before the idea

can come to be.

This would seem to falsify the Pair Principle.
Miller disagrees. He bases his defense of the Pair
Principle on Hume’s insistence that the only significant
distinction between impressions and ideas is that the
former are much stronger and more vivid than the latter.
At T 1.1.7.5, Hume claims that “an idea is a weaker
impression.” These types of comments lead Miller to
conclude that it is not necessary for the impression to
cease simpliciter for an idea to form, but only that the
vivacity of the impression cease. The idea that is retained
in memory “is one in which the impression has remained with
the idea to form a successive couplet with a shared level
of vivacity. Consequently the impression ceases only in the
sense that it stops being a fully vivacious uncopied
perception” (Miller 606).
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In general, Miller’s interpretation of the Humean idea
formation process seems to be as follows. The senses
receive an impression.

The mind copies the impression,

thus causing the impression to lose some of its vivacity.
This weakened impression is the idea that resembles the
impression. To help illustrate his interpretation of the
process, he returns to the musical notes example. Suppose
that the first note is C-sharp and the second is B-flat.
Obviously, the notes come in a certain order in a
succession; C-sharp is first, B-flat is second, et cetera.
Miller, however, focuses on the fact that the mind would
have both an impression and an idea of each note within the
succession. Thus, the impression of C-sharp gets stored in
memory, loses some of its vivacity, and becomes the idea of
C-sharp. Likewise, the impression of B-flat weakens and
becomes the idea of B-flat, and so on for the other notes.
Hence just perceiving a single note involves a succession,
namely, the succession from the impression of that note to
the idea of note (Miller 606).
Miller points out that McRae’s interpretation of the
musical notes example is not completely wrong:
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McRae is still correct in his observation that
individual perceptions do not have successiveness
within them. But the parts of time of which both Hume
and McRae speak are not simply the individual flute
notes; they are also the individual impressions and
ideas of the flute notes as they are retained within
the memory (Miller 607).

In this passage, Miller makes a link between the memory and
the parts of time. Miller elaborates on this link in much
greater detail in the second half of his paper. Before he
does so, however, he tackles another issue that McRae
discussed: why Hume uses “duration” and “time” synonymously
when he also claims that the idea of duration is fictional.
On McRae’s reading of Hume, time is succession, not
duration. They are not the same thing, nor should they be
used interchangeably. Why, then, does Hume use the two
terms interchangeably? Miller claims Locke’s conception of
succession strongly influenced Hume’s. The former
conceptualizes duration “as something that happens between
the parts of succession” (Miller 608). Miller argues that
Hume’s ontology has no place for anything that occurs
between parts of a succession. The parts of successions are
perceptions, and Hume believes that perceptions are the
only objects that appear to the mind. The idea of duration
cannot be derived from anything, so it is a fiction. The
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idea of succession, however, can be derived from the
impression of the manner in which perceptions appear to the
mind (Miller 608-609).
Miller’s interpretation of duration clearly differs
from that of Baxter. In fact, Miller raises four objections
to Baxter’s position.20 The first of these, unsurprisingly,
is that Baxter overlooked the fact that time and duration
are two different things for Hume, for reasons discussed
earlier. The second objection argues that there cannot be
different rates of successions. Because time and succession
are one and the same for Hume, different rates of
succession necessitates different times that can be used to
rate them, which is incoherent. Furthermore, coexistent
successions, as Baxter characterizes them, could not exist
in Hume’s philosophy of time. The only thing Humean
ontology would allow them to be is space, since coexistence
is a distinguishing property of the parts of space, not of
time, which is always successive.21 Miller’s final objection
to Baxter follows from the first. One cannot coherently

20

Miller uses these objections to attack the arguments Baxter develops in an article entitled “Hume on
Steadfast Objects and Time,” but since they are the same arguments Baxter presents in Hume’s Difficulty
– the latter is actually an expanded and more detailed version of the former – the objections will apply
just as well to Hume’s Difficulty as they do to “Hume on Steadfast Objects and Time.”
21

I will explain Hume’s reasons for thinking this way in my next chapter.
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speak of steadfast perceptions coexisting with several
briefer moments without employing the fictional idea of
duration (Miller 612). In other words, Baxter’s
interpretation of Hume cannot possibly be accurate because
his interpretation requires the use of the fictional idea
of duration, which renders the idea of steadfast
perceptions coexisting with several briefer moments
fictitious as well.
The remainder of Miller’s article consists in a series
of arguments which provide reasons for thinking that the
idea of time is consistent with the Copy Principle. Miller
mentions some remarks Hume makes in the Treatise to the
effect that we can perceive extension, but not the
countless perceptions that constitute the extension. It is
impossible for the mind to perceive the individual parts of
extension in isolation from the extension. With time,
however, the reverse is true: the mind can perceive the
parts of the succession, but not the succession itself in
isolation from its parts. The fact that the mind cannot
perceive the parts of extension does not mean no impression
of the individual parts exists. Simply put, Miller believes
Hume argues as follows: the idea of extension is real. The
idea of extension is composed of many parts that the mind
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cannot divide or perceive. If these parts did not exist,
extension, which is real, would be composed of entities
which did not exist. This is logically impossible.
Therefore the parts of extension (i.e., the individual
impressions that compose it) are real. Miller argues that
the same reasoning applies to time. Although we cannot
perceive succession separated from its parts, there is
still an impression of succession (Miller 610).
Miller uses Hume’s conception of memory to explain how
we can have an impression of succession. According to Hume,
“the memory preserves the original form in which its
objects were presented……the chief exercise of the memory is
not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and
position” (T 1.1.3.3). Of course, the “original form” in
which the perceptions appear to the mind is a successive
order – a successive order in which ideas follow
impressions (Miller 613).
Hume thinks the idea of time is always with us because
there is always a constant succession of perception in our
minds. Miller, basing his argument on T 1.4.6.20,
emphasizes that only memory can make us aware of this
constant succession. Miller argues that “the succession of
perceptions, when first encountered by the memory, cannot
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be a succession of distinct perceptions” because “it is the
imagination alone that separates perceptions into distinct
entities, not the memory” (Miller 613).22
This interplay between the imagination and the memory
is crucial for Miller’s argument that we can experience
impressions of successions. Miller explains the process as
follows:

At the earliest stage of awareness, perceptions are in
successive pairs of impressions and their idea copies.
The……memory becomes aware of an impression of a
succession. The impression of succession is the
succession of impressions to ideas. This is possible
because the perceptions in succession (the impression
and the idea) are not fully distinguished as distinct
perceptions. The only fully distinct perception at
this early stage of awareness is the impression of the
succession of the impressions and ideas. Afterwards
the imagination separates the impressions and ideas
into distinct perceptions. In this way Hume’s
empiricism shows how time can exist as a distinct
impression of succession (Miller 615).

Based upon how Miller describes it, the “impression of
succession” must be a complex impression. The parts of this
22

Miller interprets several of Hume’s comments about imagination – especially T 1.1.3.4, where Hume
asserts, “Wherever the imagination perceives a difference among ideas, it can easily produce a
separation” and T 1.2.4.3, where Hume writes, “wherever objects are different, they are distinguishable
and separable by the imagination” – as supporting the idea that only imagination can separate
perceptions into distinct entities.
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complex impression are clearly the impressions and ideas
that successively present themselves to the mind. It is
very unclear, though, whether the impression is an
impression of sensation or of reflection. If the simple
impressions that compose it are impressions of sensation,
then it would have to be a complex impression of sensation.
If, however, the simple impressions that compose it are
impressions of reflection, then the impression of
succession must be a complex impression of reflection.
Clearly, the impression of succession as Miller
describes it is indeterminate and non-particular. As his
objections to Locke’s theory of abstract ideas illustrates,
Hume cannot allow such indeterminate, non-particular
impressions into his epistemology. Hume thinks it is
impossible for the mind to experience unspecified
impressions and ideas. The mind always experiences
particular impressions and particular ideas. Miller
believes that the imagination separates the perceptions
into impressions and ideas. Merely separating them in this
way, however, is not sufficient to make them truly
distinct; every impression and idea must have particular,
specific content. The impression of the succession of the
impressions to ideas lacks such specific, particular
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content. As Miller explains the process, the members of the
impression of succession of impressions to ideas are not
distinct, determinate, or particular when the mind becomes
aware of them. The mind cannot distinguish between them.
This means that the mind has a fully distinct impression of
the succession, but no distinct impression of any of the
members of that succession. The problem is that the mind’s
ability to have a distinct, particular impression of a
succession without having a distinct, particular impression
of the members of that succession is inconsistent with
Hume’s rejection of the Lockean notion of abstract ideas.
Obviously, therefore, the impression of the succession of
impressions to ideas is not the kind of impression Hume’s
philosophy could allow.
Another problem with Miller’s position concerns his
argument that duration is a fiction. Hume may have received
his conception of succession from Locke, but there is no
textual evidence in the Treatise that he uses “duration” to
refer to what happens between the parts of a succession.
What Miller – as well as McRae and Pappas – fail to realize
is that, whenever Hume speaks of the idea of duration being
a fiction in the Treatise, the fiction always consists of
attributing duration to unchangeable objects. In other
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words, the mistake involves thinking that the idea of time
can be derived from objects that are not members of a
succession, or that the idea of time can be separated from
a succession of changeable things. At no point in the
Treatise does Hume ever claim that duration itself is a
fiction. These reflections show that duration and
succession are inseparable for Hume. Consequently, every
succession has duration, which means that every succession
is temporal.23 This seems to suggest that duration for Hume
just is succession, since it is impossible to separate them
conceptually.
Time and the Copy Principle
As the previous pages have shown, many of the
commentators who have written on Hume’s theory of time have
expressed concern that his conception of time might violate
his Copy Principle. I think the best way to respond to this
concern in a Humean way is to interpret time as a compound
abstract idea. A compound idea seems to be another term for
a complex idea, since Hume uses the terms “compound ideas”
and “complex ideas” in a way that very strongly suggests

23

This implication of Hume’s conception of duration – that all successions are temporal – will play a
major role in the arguments presented in later chapters.
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that the two words have exactly the same meaning, and could
be used interchangeably.
There are several good reasons for thinking that time
is a compound or complex idea. Hume has claimed repeatedly
that the idea of time cannot be separated from the idea of
a succession of changeable objects. He also claims that
time consists of parts. Every succession, by definition,
must have more than one member. Having any idea of any
succession must involve having an idea of the members of
that succession, which are the parts of the succession.
Hence the idea of time must be divisible into parts, which
would make it a complex or compound idea in Humean
terminology. Just as the complex idea of an apple can be
divided into the ideas of the apple’s color, smell, and
taste, so can the compound idea of time be divided into the
ideas of the members (parts) of a succession.
While “compound idea” and “complex idea” are
semantically equivalent terms, Hume tends to use only the
former when discussing the ideas of space and time. In T
1.2.3.12, for example, immediately after explaining why the
idea of duration can never be derived from unchangeable
objects, Hume writes:
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There is another very decisive argument, which
establishes the present doctrine concerning our ideas
of space and time, and is founded only on the simple
principle, that our ideas of them are compounded of
parts, which are indivisible.
In the next two paragraphs, Hume explicitly refers to the
idea of extension as a compound idea more than once. He
then proceeds to argue that the compound impression that
represents extension consists of impressions of colored,
tangible atoms. After doing so, he claims that “the same
reasoning will prove that the indivisible moments of time
must be fill’d with some real object or existence, whose
succession forms the duration, and makes it be conceivable
by the mind” (T 1.2.3.17).24
When understood as a compound abstract idea, there is
no Humean reason to expect time to show up as a distinct
impression or idea distinct from the ideas of the members

24

Hume does not explicitly write out the argument as it would apply to time. Based upon how he argues
for the tangibility and color of the atoms of extension, however, it is clear that “the same reasoning”
when applied to time must be something like what follows: The whole of something has the same
properties as its parts. The moments which compose the idea of succession must be filled with a real
object in order to give us the idea of succession. If moments are not filled with or occupied by a real
object, the idea of time would not exist. If the idea of time exists, its parts must also exist. The idea of
time exists. Therefore, the ideas of moments, the parts of time, exist. These ideas, the ideas of moments,
must be filled with real objects. This argument reinforces the idea that we could never even conceptualize
time if we never perceived objects and events occurring within successions, and thus seems to rely on
Hume’s theory of abstract ideas. Since the argument also requires the idea of time to consist of parts –
this is such an essential aspect of the reasoning involved that it must be a feature of any reconstruction of
this argument for it to even be intelligible at all – it also reinforces my claim that Humean time is a
compound abstract idea.
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of the succession, just as there is no Humean reason to
expect the idea of an apple to appear to the mind in
isolation from the ideas of the apple’s color, smell, and
taste. There is also no reason to worry about whether such
a compound idea violates the Copy Principle, since Hume
states that the Copy Principle only applies to simple
impressions and ideas. The following passage makes this
point explicitly clear:
……I must make use of the distinction of perceptions
into simple and complex, to limit this general
discussion, that all our ideas and impressions are
resembling. I observe, that many of our complex ideas
never had impressions, that corresponded to them, and
that many of our complex impressions never are exactly
copy’d in ideas……I perceive, therefore, that tho’
there is in general a great resemblance betwixt our
complex impressions and ideas, yet the rule is not
universally true, that they are exactly copies of each
other. We may next consider how the case stands with
our simple perceptions……I venture to affirm, that here
the rule holds without any exception, and that every
simple idea has a simple impression which resembles
it; and every simple impression a simple idea” (T
1.1.1.4-5).

Complex (or compound) impressions and ideas may conform to
the principle, but Hume’s realization that they often fail
to do so compels him to restrict the principle to simple
impressions and ideas. The Copy Principle does not apply to
time or to any other compound ideas. Hence all concerns
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about the idea of time violating the Copy Principle are
unnecessary and unfounded.
Concluding Remarks
Obviously, if time for Hume is a compound abstract
idea, it must be divisible, since it consists of parts.
Hume fiercely insists, however, that these parts are not
and cannot be infinitely divisible. The division of time,
whether real or imaginary, actual or potential, must
eventually stop at brief moments that are indivisible
temporal minima. These indivisible temporal minima are so
crucial to Hume’s theory of time that it would collapse
without them. My next chapter will analyze why and how Hume
argues against the infinite divisibility of time and for
the existence of temporal minima.
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Chapter Two
Hume’s Arguments for Temporal Minima
Introduction
As I made clear in the first chapter, successiveness
is an essential feature of time for Hume. In the present
chapter, I will explore another essential feature Hume
attributes to time – its discreteness. Hume believes time
must consist of discrete, atomistic moments.
Consequentially, he also believes that time cannot be
infinitely divisible.
Throughout the second part of the first book of the
Treatise, Hume employs two main strategies to support his
atomistic conception of time. The first involves
approaching time from a phenomenological perspective, one
that concentrates on our experience of time and the
necessary conditions required for this experience. The
second strategy defends an atomistic theory of time by
proving that the very concept of time as continuous and
infinitely divisible leads to logical contradictions.
Hume’s attempts to derive contradictions from the concept
of continuous, infinitely divisible time take the form of
reductio ad absurdums. He constructs four reductio ad
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absurdum arguments to prove that space cannot be infinitely
divisible. As Hume himself asserts, the first three of
these arguments also show that time is not infinitely
divisible. Since my project here concerns Hume’s theory of
time, I will not discuss the fourth reductio, which
pertains exclusively to space.25
Before developing his reductio arguments, however,
Hume begins his attack on temporal continuity by
introducing two thought experiments, one involving a grain
of sand, the other involving a spot of ink. Both of these
thought experiments constitute a major component of Hume’s
phenomenological approach to the divisibility of time.
The Grain of Sand Thought Experiment
The grain of sand thought experiment proceeds as
follows:
‘Tis therefore certain, that the imagination reaches a
minimum, and may raise up to itself an idea, of which
it cannot conceive any subdivision, and which cannot
be dimminish’d without a total annihilation. When you
tell me of the thousandth and ten thousandth part of a
25

The fourth reductio argument occurs at T 1.2.2.7-10. Hume uses his Conceivability Principle to argue
that mathematical points – here understood to be the most fundamental, indivisible components of
extension – are conceivable, and therefore possible. If extension were infinitely divisible, such indivisible
points of extension would not be possible. Thus the assumption that extension is infinitely divisible
contradicts the fact that indivisible points of extension are possible and conceivable. Dale Jacquette
provides a detailed analysis of this argument in the fourth chapter of his David Hume’s Critique of Infinity.
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grain of sand, I have a distinct idea of these numbers
and of their distinct proportions; but the images,
which I form in my mind to represent the things
themselves, are nothing different from each other, nor
inferior to that image by which I represent the grain
of sand itself, which is suppos’d so vastly to exceed
them. What consists of parts is distinguishable into
them, and what is distinguishable is separable. But
whatever we may imagine of the thing, the idea of a
grain of sand is not distinguishable, nor separable
into twenty, much less into a thousand, ten thousand,
or an infinite number of different ideas (T 1.2.1.3).

Hume does not ask his readers to divide the idea of a grain
of sand. Instead, he wants his readers to form an image of
a grain of sand, replace that idea with an idea of a
smaller part of the grain of sand, replace that idea with
an idea of a smaller part of the original grain, and to
repeat this process until the mind cannot go any farther.26
Hume argues that the mind will eventually arrive at an idea
of one of the parts of the grain that represents the
absolute minimum size of the grain that it can conceive.
Any piece of the grain smaller than that minimum will be
indistinguishable to the mind from any other piece smaller
than that minimum. The mind would not be able to
distinguish between a piece a thousand times smaller than
the original grain of sand and a piece ten thousand times
26

For a similar interpretation of this passage, see the footnote on page 47 of Jacquette’s David Hume’s
Critique of Infinity.
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smaller than the original grain. The mind can obviously
understand what the numbers one thousand and ten thousand
are, and it can know many mathematical properties that
these numbers possess, but it cannot imagine a physical
thing that corresponds to them, such as something ten
thousand times smaller than a grain of sand.
Although Hume does not explicitly say so, it is easy
to see how this argument also applies to time. The mind can
easily conceptualize many distinct units of time, such as a
second. The mind can even conceptualize and comprehend some
units of time shorter than a second, since people
consciously experience such short durations.27 Beyond a
certain point, however, the mind loses its ability to
distinguish between extremely brief moments of time. For
example, it is impossible for the mind to distinguish
between a nanosecond (a billionth of a second), a
picosecond (a trillionth of a second) and a femtosecond (a
quadrillionth of a second). The mind obviously understands
what the terms “billionth,” “trillionth,” and
“quadrillionth” mean, but it cannot conceptualize or
imagine anything corresponding to those numerical values.
27

For example, many athletic contests – especially at the professional and Olympic levels – are decided
on events that occur in a fraction of second. Highly skilled athletes can win or lose competitions based on
what they do in a tenth of a second or less.
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The Inkspot Thought Experiment
Hume’s comments regarding the divisibility of an
inkspot in the very next paragraph have very similar
implications for the mind’s ability to conceptualize and
experience extremely brief durations of time. Hume writes:
Put a spot of ink upon paper, fix your eye upon that
spot, and retire to such a distance, that at last you
lose sight of it; ‘tis plain, that the moment before
it vanish’d the image or impression was perfectly
indivisible. ‘Tis not for want of rays of light
striking on our eyes, that the minute parts of distant
bodies convey not any sensible impression; but because
they are reduc’d to a minimum, and were incapable of
any farther diminution. A microscope or telescope,
which renders them visible, produces not any new rays
of light, but only spreads those, which always flow’d
from them; and by that means both gives parts to
impressions, which to the naked eye appear simple and
uncompounded, and advances to a minimum, what was
formerly imperceptible (T 1.2.1.4).

This inkspot discussion has received considerable attention
in the literature on Hume’s theory of time. Some of the
commentators on the passage have misunderstood it. In
Hume’s Philosophy of Human Nature, for example, Laird asks,
“What is the ‘spot’ if the ‘impressions’ form a series? If
the ‘image or impression’ were perfectly indivisible, how
could a pair of binoculars ‘spread’ it?” (Laird 68-69). In
response to Laird’s questions, Flew asserts that “quite
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clearly the spot is the spot of ink, which is the cause of
the whole series of impressions; and the minimum is the
last impression in the series” (Flew 261). As for the
Laird’s question about the binoculars, Flew interprets Hume
– correctly, in my opinion – as claiming that physical
devices do not act on the impressions, but rather spread or
magnify the rays of light that are already there. Doing so
makes the impressions visible (Flew 261).
One might be tempted to ask why someone could not just
move in closer to get a better look at the spot. After all,
it seems that Hume’s inkspot experiment only works when one
refuses to move in for a closer look. Jacquette explains
the problem with this objection:
The idea is that for the subject to change position
defeats the purpose of the inkspot experiment, which
is to reveal the existence of sensible extensionless
indivisibles in every visual field. Indivisibles are
always present, according to Hume, but are ordinarily
not discernible, because at certain distances they
blend in perfectly with their backgrounds (Jacquette
49).

In other words, the subject would still have the same
limitation regardless of how close the subject gets to the
inkspot. There will always be minimum sensibilia. There is
a sensible threshold that impressions must pass in order to
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be sensible or perceived by people. When impressions are at
the threshold, they will always appear to the mind as
indivisible. Beneath that threshold, they are not sensible
or perceivable at all.
Many of Hume’s comments about time strongly suggest
that there must be a similar threshold for the experience
of time. Consider, for example, the following passage:
It has been remark’d by a great philosopher28 that our
perceptions have certain bounds in this particular,
which are fix’d by the original nature and
constitution of the mind, and beyond which no
influence of external objects on the senses is ever
able to hasten or retard our thought. If you wheel
about a burning coal with rapidity, it will present to
the senses an image of a circle of fire; nor will
there seem to be any interval of time betwixt its
revolutions; merely because ‘tis impossible for our
perceptions to succeed each other with the same
rapidity, that motion may be communicated to external
objects. Whenever we have no successive perceptions,
we have no notion of time, even tho’ there be a real
succession in the objects. Time cannot make its
appearance to the mind, either alone, or attended with
a steady unchangeable object, but is always discover’d
by some perceivable succession of changeable objects
(T 1.2.3.7).

A contemporary example which illustrates the same point
Hume makes here is the act of watching a movie. The
movements of characters in motion pictures seem to be
28

John Locke.
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continuous and smooth. In reality, however, a motion
picture consists of a succession of individual motionless
pictures that are projected onto a screen at a rate too
rapid for the mind to notice the individual frames. The
mind does not notice the temporal interval between each
frame because that interval is too short for the mind to
experience. That interval is below the threshold required
for the experience of time. The mind cannot distinguish
between temporal intervals that occur too quickly to reach
the threshold, just as it cannot distinguish between a
thousandth and a ten thousandth part of a grain of sand.
When one watches a movie, one thinks one perceives
continuous motion, not individual frames being projected at
a high rate of speed. When one watches a burning coal being
spun very rapidly, one thinks one sees a steady wheel of
fire, not one burning coal changing location very rapidly.
The mind cannot subdivide a movie into its individual
frames, or the wheel of fire into the different spatial
locations the coal occupies, because these phenomena happen
so quickly that they fail to reach the minimum threshold
required for the mind to experience them.
That threshold is the temporal equivalent of minimum
sensibilia. Due to its very nature, the human mind needs
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temporal minima in order to experience time. Experiencing
time involves distinguishing between the different parts of
time, and the mind’s ability to do this is finite and
limited. From a phenomenological standpoint, it is
impossible for the mind to divide time infinitely; it will
inevitably encounter temporal minima. Clearly, then,
temporal minima must exist for the experience of time to be
even remotely possible.29
The arguments presented up to this point only
establish that a cognitive, or phenomenological, kind of
temporal minima exist. Merely proving that the mind cannot
be aware of or experience any duration that is briefer than
a certain perceptual and cognitive threshold, however, is
not sufficient to construct the robust refutation of the
infinite divisibility of time that Hume desires. In T 1.2,
Hume also provides purely logical reasons for holding that
time must be only finitely divisible, and that the very
concept of time being infinitely divisible leads to

29

Various scientific studies have confirmed that there is indeed a minimum threshold for any conscious
experience. These studies have shown that this minimum threshold is roughly between 100 and 200
milliseconds, or thousandths of a second. The human brain cannot be consciously aware of, or consciously
process information about, any duration briefer than this 100 – 200 millisecond threshold. For detailed
discussions of these experiments, please see chapter 13 of Paul Davies’ About Time: Einstein’s Unfinished
Revolution and chapter 9 of Jeffrey Schwartz’s The Mind and The Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of
Mental Force.
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contradictions. These reasons take the form of three
reductios, to which I now turn.
First Reductio
Hume’s first reductio argument appears at T 1.2.2.2.
There he writes:
Everything capable of being infinitely divided
contains an infinite number of parts; otherwise the
division wou’d be stopt short by the indivisible
parts, which we shou’d immediately arrive at. If
therefore any finite extension be infinitely
divisible, it can be no contradiction to suppose, that
a finite extension contains an infinite number of
parts: And vice versa, if it be a contradiction to
suppose, that a finite extension contains an infinite
number of parts, no finite extension can be infinitely
divisible. But that this latter supposition is absurd,
I easily convince myself by the consideration of my
clear ideas. I first take the least idea I can form as
a part of extension, and being certain that there is
nothing more minute than this idea, I conclude, that
whatever I discover by its means must be a real
quality of extension. I then repeat this idea once,
twice, thrice, &c, and find the compound idea of
extension, arising from its repetition, always to
augment, and become double, triple, quadruple, &c,
till at last it swells up to a considerable bulk,
greater or smaller, in proportion as I repeat more or
less the same idea. When I stop in the addition of
parts, the idea of extension ceases to augment; and
were I to carry on the addition in infinitum, I
clearly perceive, that the idea of extension must also
become infinite. Upon the whole, I conclude, that the
idea of an infinite number of parts is individually
the same idea with that of an infinite extension; that
no finite extension is capable of containing an
infinite number of parts; and consequently that no
finite extension is infinitely divisible.
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For Hume, a finite extension is one that contains a finite
number of parts. An infinite extension is one that contains
an infinite number of parts. Anything that is infinitely
divisible must contain an infinite number of parts,
according to his conception of infinite divisibility. If a
finite extension is infinitely divisible, then it must also
have an infinite number of parts, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, no finite extension can be infinitely divisible.
Another way of stating Hume’s insight here is that it is
impossible to distinguish between an infinite extension
that is infinitely divisible and a finite extension that is
infinitely divisible. Both of them have an infinite number
of parts, so what distinguishes them? If Hume’s reasoning
in the first reductio is sound, the answer is that nothing
distinguishes them.
Hume explicitly claims two paragraphs later that the
reasoning he employs here and in the second reductio apply
directly to time,30 but he never gives the temporal version
of this argument. Clearly, however, the temporal equivalent
of the argument must be something like this:

30

“All this reasoning takes place with regard to time” (T 1.2.2.4).
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1. Anything that is infinitely divisible contains an
infinite number of parts.
2. If any finite duration is infinitely divisible, then
the assertion “this finite duration contains an
infinite number of parts” must not involve a
contradiction.
3. If the assertion, “this finite duration contains an
infinite number of parts” does entail a
contradiction, then no finite duration can be
infinitely divisible.
4. I can start with the shortest moment of duration I
can think of, and then think of the other parts of
the duration, adding the ideas of them to my
original idea.
5. If I repeated this process ad infinitum, I would end
up with the idea of an infinite number of moments.
6. The idea of an infinite number of moments is
identical to the idea of infinite duration.
7. Supposing that a finite duration consists in an
infinite number of moments entails a contradiction.
8. No finite duration is infinitely divisible. (3,7)
In this argument, Hume claims that it is not possible
to distinguish between a finite duration being divided
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infinitely and an infinite duration being divided
infinitely, because they are the same concept. This is why
the contradiction arises. The finitude or infinitude of a
duration depends upon the number of parts it has; if a
duration has a finite number of parts, it is a finite
duration, and if it does not have a finite number of parts,
it is an infinite duration. Since dividing something
involves dividing it into parts, dividing a finite duration
infinitely implies that it contains an infinite number of
parts, which would make it an infinite duration by
definition.
Many commentators think the first reductio is flawed
on multiple levels. Flew strongly disagrees with the first
premise, which both the spatial and temporal versions of
the argument share. Flew thinks this principle is false for
several reasons:
First……to say that something is divisible into so
many parts is not to say that it consists of –
that it is, so to speak, already divided into –
that number of parts. A cake may be divisible
into many different numbers of equal slices
without its thereby consisting in, through
already having been divided into, any particular
number of such slices. Second……to say that
something may be divided in infinitum is not to
say that it can be divided into an infinite
number of parts. It is rather to say that it can
be divided, and sub-divided, and sub-sub-divided
as often as anyone wishes: infinitely, without
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limit. That this is so is part of what is meant
by the saying, ‘Infinity is not a number!’ (Flew
259-260).

Jacquette criticizes Flew’s objection. Jacquette
claims that Hume’s first reductio does not require anyone
to regard infinity as a number (Jacquette 139).

The

division process is purely abstract, not something done in
real time to an actual entity, so Flew’s discussion of the
cake is irrelevant. The mathematical process of dividing
space or time is not the same kind of division that is
involved with dividing an actual physical cake.
According to Jacquette, Flew’s description of infinite
divisibility suffers not only from a failure to appreciate
the abstract nature of the divisibility process, but also
from a faulty conception of infinity. Flew’s assertion that
an infinitely divisible thing can be subdivided “as often
as one wishes” is inaccurate, says Jacquette, because
The wishes of finite beings in dividing physical
things in real finite time cannot approximate the
infinite divisibility of extension in the
abstract sense to which traditional mathematics
is committed. The added clause that these wishes
may extend ‘without limit’ also falls short of
infinity, since that description applies as well
to indefinite, indeterminate, or inexhaustible,
but still finite moments of time or wishinstances, yielding at most indefinite,
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indeterminate, or inexhaustible, but still finite
sets and series of mathematical objects
(Jacquette 140).

Jacquette could have made his argument more persuasive if
he had provided examples of truly inexhaustible, limitless
things that are still finite. It appears that the “finite
moments of time or wish instances” to which he refers are
inexhaustible only insofar as they lack any known limit,
but this is not the same type of inexhaustibility exhibited
by infinity.
Jacquette also claims that Flew does not completely
understand Hume’s conception of infinite divisibility. The
belief that infinite divisibility involves sub-division
into an infinite number of parts did not originate with
Hume, but was an assumption held by the mathematicians of
Hume’s day. Hume directed his first reductio proof against
these mathematicians (Jacquette 140). This does not mean
that Hume rejects that understanding of infinite
divisibility – his claim at T 1.2.1.2 that this principle
is “obvious” indicates that he agrees with it – but the
fact that his philosophical opponents accept the principle
demonstrates that Flew clearly misunderstood a crucial
aspect of Hume’s argument.
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Baxter also challenges Flew’s argument. Baxter calls
the idea that divisibility entails having parts the
“Divisibility Assumption” and the idea that infinite
divisibility entails possessing an infinite number of parts
the “Infinite Divisibility Assumption.” The Divisibility
Assumption implies the Infinite Divisibility Assumption; if
the former is true, the latter must also be true (Baxter
23-24).
Baxter argues that there is a difference between
something having numerically distinct parts and something
being divided into parts. Flew’s objections to Hume fail to
acknowledge the possibility that “undivided parts can be
numerically distinct” (Baxter 24). These undivided parts
are not just potentially numerically distinct, but actually
numerically distinct. Baxter supports this claim by
starting with an idea he got from Bayle, which is that it
is possible to predicate something about one side of an
undivided whole that can be denied about the other.

Baxter

asserts that if one divided a whole in half, some of it
would become the left half of the whole; the rest would be
the right half. The left half is actually on the left and
the right half is actually on the right. What can be
asserted about one half can be denied about the other and
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vice-versa. This means that they must be actually
numerically distinct from each other; otherwise, a logical
contradiction would result. The two halves are actually
parts of the whole. Consequently, the Divisibility
Assumption is true (Baxter 23).31
I agree with Baxter’s criticisms of Flew. I also have
my own objection to Flew that resembles Baxter’s, but goes
a step beyond it. As the above passage from Flew indicates,
Flew’s premises presuppose that “consists of x number of
parts” and “already divided into x number of parts” are
equivalent concepts. In other words, claiming that F
consists of x number of parts implies that F has already
been divided into x number of parts, and vice-versa. Flew
clearly thinks that the parts something has result from the
process of division. This is not correct, however. It is
much more accurate to claim that having parts is a
necessary condition for the possibility of being divided.
If something does not have certain parts, it cannot be
divided into those parts. For example, if I never had any
arms or legs, it would be impossible to divide my body into
my arms and legs. Also, because I am a human being and not
31

In “Hume on Infinite Divisibility,” Baxter provides a much shorter defense of the Divisibility Assumption
that uses “the difference between the top half and bottom half of a whole piece of paper” as an example
of the same type of reasoning employed here. See page 136.

79

a tree, I cannot be divided into roots, leaves, and
branches; human beings do not possess such parts, which
properly belong to plant life. If something never had any
parts at all, it is extremely difficult to understand how
it would be possible to divide it into anything, even if
the division process is purely abstract and not one that
occurs in real time. Parts do not result from a process of
division; they make that process possible. Consequently,
Flew’s argument against the Divisibility Assumption rests
upon a faulty understanding of the relationship between
parts and the process of dividing something into parts.
Clearly, the reasons Flew provides for rejecting
Hume’s Divisibility Assumption leave much to be desired.
Since the first reductio relies upon that assumption, and
the rest of the argument follows if that assumption is
true, there is good reason to accept Hume’s conclusion that
no finite duration can be infinitely divisible. Hume’s
second reductio, however, cannot be defended as easily as
the first – in fact, the reasoning it employs suffers from
a significant fallacy!
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Second Reductio
The second reductio appears at T 1.2.2.3, where Hume
argues
‘Tis evident, that existence in itself belongs
only to unity, and is never applicable to number,
but on account of the unites, of which the number
is compos’d. Twenty men may be said to exist; but
‘tis only because one, two, three, four, etc are
existent; and if you deny the existence of the
latter, that of the former falls of course. ‘Tis
therefore utterly absurd to suppose any number to
exist, and yet deny the existence of the unites;
and as extension is always a number, according to
the common sentiment of metaphysicians, and never
resolves itself into any unite or indivisible
quantity, it follows that extension can never at
all exist……the unity which can exist alone, and
whose existence is necessary to that of all
number……must be perfectly indivisible, and
incapable of being resolv’d into any lesser
unity.

Norton provides a concise explanation as to how this
particular argument is a reductio. According to Norton,
“Hume claims that many metaphysicians hold, at the same
time and inconsistently, that extension is an aggregate of
units and that, because any putative unit is divisible into
further units, there are no such units” (Norton 436).
The contradiction Norton articulates arises out of an
important assumption Hume makes in this reductio: whatever
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is divisible is many things, not one.32 For something to be
truly unitary, it must be indivisible. Whatever is
divisible is a plurality of things, not just one single,
unitary thing. Unitary, single, indivisible things are
ontologically basic; pluralities of things are dependent
upon unitary things for their existence. Given this
assumption, it is easier to understand why Hume thinks his
philosophical opponents hold inconsistent beliefs regarding
extension. They claim that extension is always a plurality
of units and that these units are infinitely divisible, but
units by definition are indivisible, and are ontologically
prior to any plurality of anything. Hence extension cannot
consist of a plurality of infinitely divisible units.
Hume’s opponents cannot consistently assert both that
extension exists as a plurality of units and that no
indivisible units exist, not only because units are
indivisible by definition, but also because all pluralities
are ontologically dependent upon indivisible units.
Hume believes that his second reductio, like the
first, is directly applicable to time as well (T 1.2.2.4).
Precisely how it does so, however, is not entirely clear,
32

In Hume’s Difficulty, Baxter phrases this assumption as “anything with parts is many things, not a single
thing” and refers to it as the Plurality Assumption. See page 25.
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and requires some degree of speculation. I propose that a
temporal version of this reductio would look something like
this:
1) Only indivisible things exist.
2) Pluralities depend for their existence on the
indivisible parts which compose them.
3) Duration exists as a plurality of infinitely
divisible moments.33
4) If duration exists as a plurality of infinitely
divisible moments, then no indivisible moments
of time exist.
5) Duration does not exist as a plurality of
infinitely divisible moments.

(1,3,4)

6) Duration both exists and does not exist. (3,5)
Of course, the idea that duration both exists and does not
exist is contradictory. Because this absurd conclusion is a
consequence of the idea that duration is infinitely
divisible, it follows that time is not infinitely
divisible.

33

This is an assumption made by the metaphysicians and mathematicians whom Hume opposes.
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In “Achievements and Fallacies in Hume’s Account of
Infinite Divisibility,” Franklin disagrees with Hume’s
reasoning in the second reductio because
Hume’s bottom-up perception of the world as a
heap of atoms blinds him to the opposite
possibility. This mistake vitiates the whole
section. The possibility that the world is a
whole arbitrarily divided by the mind into parts
is symmetrical in all a priori respects with
Hume’s opinion that the world consists of
particles arbitrarily grouped into wholes……his
[Hume’s] a priori atomism is wrong, since its
consequence, the denial of even the possibility
of infinite divisibility, provides a reductio of
it (Franklin 96).

In other words, Hume begs the question by presupposing the
very atomism he needs to prove. The reductio requires the
premise that only indivisible things exist, yet this is the
same claim Hume wishes to defend. According to Franklin,
while it is logically possible that only indivisible things
exist and wholes are fictitious, it is equally possible
that only wholes exist and indivisible things are
fictitious.

Hume assumes the former obtains without even

considering the latter. Such question-begging undermines
his argument, thus rendering the second reductio
ineffective.
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While Hume’s third reductio does not commit the same
fallacy the second does, it preserves a crucial assumption
of the second reductio: the idea that no unitary, single
things are divisible, because whatever is divisible is a
plurality of things, not a single thing. In the third
reductio, Hume uses this assumption to argue that infinite
divisibility is logically and phenomenologically
inconsistent with successiveness, which is essential to
time.
Third Reductio
The third reductio occurs at T 1.2.2.4, where Hume
asserts
All this reasoning [from the first two reductio
arguments] takes place with regard to time; along
with an additional argument, which it may be
proper to take notice of. ‘Tis a property
inseparable from time, and which in a manner
constitutes its essence, that each of its parts
succeeds another, and that none of them, however
contiguous, can ever be co-existent. For the same
reason, that the year 1737 cannot concur with the
present year 1738, every moment must be distinct
from, and posterior or antecedent to another.
‘Tis certain then, that time, as it exists, must
be compos’d of indivisible moments. For if in
time we cou’d never arrive at an end of division,
and if each moment, as it succeeds another, were
not perfectly single and indivisible, there wou’d
be an infinite number of co-existent moments, or
parts of time; which I believe will be allow’d to
be an arrant contradiction.
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Immediately after this passage, Hume claims that “the
infinite divisibility of space implies that of time, as is
evident from the nature of motion.

If the latter,

therefore, be impossible, the former must be equally so” (T
1.2.2.5).
Very few commentators even mention Hume’s odd remark
that the nature of motion proves that the infinite
divisibility of space implies the infinite divisibility of
time. Jacquette not only mentions it, but also offers a
plausible explanation of it:
Hume is unclear about why or how ‘the nature of
motion’ proves that the infinite divisibility of
space implies the infinite divisibility of time.
Here he need have nothing more in mind than the
fact that in classical kinematics motion, time,
and distance are mathematically interdefinable.
If distance or extension is infinitely divisible,
and if time is determined by the equations of
physics as distance divided by velocity as the
metric of extension in space, then the infinite
divisibility of time is equally logically
implicated (Jacquette 156).

Jacquette interprets the third reductio as ultimately
attempting to prove that space cannot be infinitely
divisible by proving that time cannot be infinitely
divisible. If space is infinitely divisible, so is time,
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but time is not infinitely divisible, so neither is space.
Jacquette’s interpretation seems to me to be very faithful
to Hume’s original intentions. Since my task in this
chapter concerns only why Hume thinks time is not
infinitely divisible, I will focus only on that part of the
third reductio. Hume’s comment about the nature of motion
is not directly relevant to my project here.
The one aspect of the third reductio that has received
the most attention is Hume’s insistence that the infinite
divisibility of time implies an infinite number of
coexistent moments. Why would these moments have to be
coexistent? A passage that appears later in the Treatise
helps shed some much-needed light on this obscure component
of Hume’s argument.
In T 2.3.7, Hume discusses the effects space and time
have on the passions. Many of his comments in this section
are highly relevant for understanding Hume’s denial of the
possibility of the infinite divisibility of time.
Consider, for example, the following passage:
……space or extension consists of a number of coexistent parts dispos’d in a certain order, and
capable of being at once present to the sight or
feeling. On the contrary, time or succession,
tho’ it consists likewise of parts, never
presents to us more than one at once; nor is it
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possible for any two of them to ever be coexistent……The parts of extension being
susceptible of an union to the senses, acquire an
union in the fancy; and as the appearance of one
part excludes not another, the transition or
passage of the thought thro’ the contiguous parts
is by that means render’d more smooth and easy.
On the other hand, the incompatibility of the
parts of time in their real existence separates
them in the imagination, and makes it more
difficult for that faculty to trace any long
succession or series of events. Every part must
appear single and alone, nor can regularly have
entrance into the fancy without banishing what is
suppos’d to have been immediately precedent (T
2.3.7.5).

Later Hume asserts that it is natural for the imagination
to pass “from one point in time to that which is
immediately posterior to it” (T 2.3.7.8).
Hume seems to be saying that time would cease to be
successive if it is infinitely divisible. It would cease to
be successive because the process by which the imagination
traces all of the subdivisions of a single moment would
never end, and hence the imagination could not pass from
that moment to the one immediately following it. A moment
must be completed before the next moment can appear, but if
the first moment is infinitely divisible, the second moment
would never occur, since the first moment would never end.
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As shown in Chapter One, successiveness is an
essential component of time as Hume understands it.

All

successions have parts. The passages quoted above indicate
that parts of successions must be distinguishable from each
other; otherwise, the imagination could not pass from one
part to the next, and the mind would not experience the
succession.
These reflections show that time could not be
successive if it were infinitely divisible. The infinite
divisibility of time entails that between any two moments,
there are an infinite number of other moments. If there are
an infinite number of moments between any two moments, then
no moment would have an immediate predecessor or immediate
successor. Succession could not be possible unless each
moment has an immediate predecessor and immediate
successor. Thus time cannot be successive if it is
infinitely divisible.
Consider, for example, moment A. If moment A is part
of a temporal succession, then there must be a moment that
immediately succeeds it, moment B. If time is infinitely
divisible, then there would be an infinite number of
moments between A and B, thus precluding B from being the
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immediate successor of A.34

It is impossible to identify

any moment as the immediate successor of A (or as the
immediate predecessor to B) because between A and the
moment identified, there would be an infinite number of
moments. As we saw above, the infinite number of moments
into which time would be divisible could not possibly exist
successively. If they exist at all, they would have to
coexist, since Hume’s ontology does not allow the parts of
any compound thing to be neither successive nor coexistent.
Hume’s assumption in the second reductio – that
single, unitary things are indivisible, and divisible
things are a plurality of things – provides another way to
explain the above arguments. The infinite divisibility of
time implies that each moment of time is infinitely
divisible into briefer moments. No moment could appear
“single and alone” to consciousness as T 2.3.7.5 requires,
because there would be no moments which were single and
alone; each moment would actually be a plurality of an
infinite number of briefer moments, each of which would
also be a plurality of an infinite number of briefer
moments. Moment A could not possibly immediately precede
moment B because, strictly speaking, there would be no
34

The same reasoning also shows that A cannot be the immediate predecessor of B.
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moment A; there would be an infinite number of moments.
Asserting that one moment precedes or follows another
presupposes that each of the moments in that relationship
is single and distinct, but no moment could be single and
distinct if every moment could be divided infinitely. Since
Hume believes that moments cannot succeed each other unless
they are single and distinct, and the infinite divisibility
of moments entails that moments cannot be single and
distinct, it is not hard to understand why Hume argues that
infinite divisibility is incompatible with successiveness.
At this point, one might raise an objection to the
third reductio.35 Is the crucial issue the idea that time
cannot consist of coexistent moments, or the idea that time
cannot consist of an infinite number of coexistent moments?
In other words, if it could be shown that a finite number
of moments could coexist, would this refute the argument?
Based on Hume’s remark above that even two moments could
not coexist, it seems that the primary concern Hume has is
the coexistence of moments, not the number of coexistent
moments. If so, the finite divisibility of time may not be
permitted either, because a finite number of moments
succeeding each other too quickly for the mind to
35

I wish to thank Dr. Tim Crockett of Marquette University for pointing this objection out to me.
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experience will also appear to be coexistent to the mind.
This is what happens in the burning coal example.
Developing a strong defense to this serious objection
requires one to realize that infinite divisibility has a
special feature that finite divisibility does not – with
the process of finite divisibility, the mind reaches a
limit both because of the number of parts, and because of
the natural limitations of the mind. If the mind were
structured differently, it is conceivable that the mind
might have been able to distinguish between moments at a
much higher rate of speed. With infinitely divisible
durations, however, the mind could never, even in theory,
be able to distinguish the temporal location or ordering of
the moments. This is because, for any two moments X and Y,
there are an infinite number of moments between X and Y.
Thus infinite divisibility necessarily entails coexistence,
but finite divisibility does not.
The claim that infinite divisibility necessarily
entails coexistent moments requires comment, not only
because it is hard to grasp in and of itself, but also
because it is absolutely crucial for Hume’s third reductio.
Hume’s third reductio contains many implicit premises,
which make the argument more complicated than the other
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two. In an attempt to comprehend and articulate Hume’s
thinking process in the third reductio as lucidly as
possible, I organized a 14 step proof showing how I think
Hume derives the concept of an infinite number of
coexistent moments from the concept of infinite
divisibility. Of course, there is an unavoidable level of
speculation here, but I am basing this argument off of
Hume’s own comments. The remainder of the argument consists
of premises that Hume needs in order for his reductio to
work. What follows is my interpretation of the kind of
reasoning Hume employed to arrive at the conclusion that if
time is infinitely divisible, an infinite number of moments
would coexist:
1. The parts of something either coexist or exist
successively.
2. Time consists of parts called moments.
3. These moments either coexist or exist
successively. (1)
4. For moments to exist successively, each moment
must have an immediate predecessor and
successor.
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5. If time is infinitely divisible, then there is
no briefest moment.
6. If there is no briefest moment, then any moment
can be subdivided into briefer moments.
7. If any moment can be subdivided into briefer
moments, no moment can have an immediate
predecessor or successor.
8. If no moment can have an immediate predecessor
or successor, then the moments of time cannot
exist successively. (4)
9. If time is infinitely divisible, its moments
cannot exist successively.
10.

If time is infinitely divisible, then its

moments coexist.
11.

(4-8)

(3,9)

To divide something is to divide it into

parts.
12.

To divide something infinitely is to divide

it into an infinite number of parts.
13.

If time is infinitely divisible, then time

consists of an infinite number of parts.

(12)
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14.

If time is infinitely divisible, then an

infinite number of moments coexist.

(10,13)

If the interpretation I proposed above is accurate,
Hume has a possible way of responding to the objection I
discussed earlier. That objection claimed that, since the
same psychological and cognitive limitations that prevent
us from experiencing time successively if it is infinitely
divisible also, in some cases, prevent us from experiencing
time successively if it is finitely divisible, Hume should
reject the finite divisibility of time as well as the
infinite divisibility of time. In other words, Hume should
deny the finite divisibility of time as well as the
infinite divisibility of time because the same cognitive,
psychological, and phenomenological limitations that
preclude us from experiencing infinitely divisible time as
successive also preclude us from experiencing finitely
divisible time as successive. Burning coal scenarios –
situations in which time is finitely divisible, but
successions occur too rapidly for the mind to distinguish
the individual parts which compose them – would be
phenomenologically equivalent to our experience of time if
time is truly infinitely divisible. In both cases, the mind

95

could not be aware of the passage of time because it would
not be able to experience time successively.
The objection is correct insofar as burning coal
scenarios and infinite divisibility would both prevent the
mind from experiencing time successively and, consequently,
would prevent the mind from experiencing time at all. From
a phenomenological standpoint, infinitely divisible time
and burning coal scenarios would be equivalent.
The objection ultimately fails, however, because it
does not consider the fact that the two situations are not
logically equivalent. In all burning coal scenarios, the
inability to experience time results directly from the
psychological and cognitive limitations of the mind. If the
human mind could process information faster, it could
experience time successively even in burning coal
scenarios. The limitations of the human mind are the only
reason why the finite divisibility of time would prevent
the experience of time; without these limitations, no
degree of finite divisibility would make the experience of
successive time impossible.
The mind’s inability to experience time successively
if the latter is infinitely divisible, however, is not due
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solely to the limitations of the mind. There are purely
logical reasons – reasons I summarized earlier in my
fourteen-step argument above - why the infinite
divisibility of time entails the coexistence of moments,
and, therefore, the non-successiveness of time. These
logical reasons are not dependent upon any limitations of
the mind or the means by which it experiences time. Nothing
could experience infinitely divisible time as successive
because the infinite divisibility of time makes it
impossible for it to be successive. Time can be successive
if and only if it is finitely divisible.
Hence the objection fails to challenge the third
reductio because it erroneously assumes that the only
factors that would prevent the mind from experiencing
infinitely divisible time as successive would be the same
psychological limitations that obtain in burning coal
scenarios. Such scenarios only prevent the mind from
experiencing time as successive. If time is infinitely
divisible, however, time could not be successive.
These reflections show why Hume needs the reductios to
provide a strong defense of his discrete view of time. The
phenomenological approach he employs only proves that there
are psychological temporal minima – in other words, that
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there is a minimum temporal threshold which moments must
reach in order for the mind to be aware of them and to
experience them. This fact alone, however, is insufficient
for proving that time cannot be infinitely divisible,
because the existence of distinct, successive moments
briefer than the minimum threshold – and hence impossible
to experience as successive - is consistent with the finite
divisibility of time. Hence if his only reason for
rejecting infinite divisibility is that it renders the
experience of time impossible, he would also have to reject
the finite divisibility of time in burning coal scenarios.
To avoid doing so, Hume must have critiques of infinite
divisibility that do not concentrate on the experience of
time.
The temporal minima argued for by the grain of sand
and inkspot experiments are phenomenological and cognitive
in nature. If the infinite divisibility of time is
logically consistent with the existence of these
phenomenological temporal minima, then Hume fails to
adequately refute the mathematicians whom he opposes. To
successfully refute them, Hume must show how the infinite
divisibility of time is not logically consistent with the
existence of the temporal minima, and he attempts to do
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this with the third reductio.

The third reductio

accomplishes this task by demonstrating that finite
divisibility is a necessary condition for temporal
successiveness. For time to be successive at all – whether
it is perceived as such or not – it must be finitely
divisible. If time is truly successive, there must be
temporal minima of a logical sort as well, even if these
logical temporal minima are much briefer than the
perceptual, phenomenological minima established by the
grain of sand and inkspot experiments.
Concluding Remarks
As we saw above, Hume defends the existence of
temporal minima in two different ways. His phenomenological
approach involves showing how the experience of time
requires temporal minima. His logical approach involves the
use of three reductios, each of which provides reasons for
thinking that the concept of time being infinitely
divisible is contradictory. Given the fact that Hume
devotes much more attention in T 1.2 to the arguments he
develops for the phenomenological approach, it is clear
that Hume is more interested in discussing the experience
of time than he is in speculating on the metaphysical
nature of time.
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Despite his greater interest in the phenomenology of
time, Hume’s attempts to prove the existence of temporal
minima require him to take a purely logical approach to the
issue as well, which he does in the form of the three
reductios. Without these reductios, Hume would, at best,
only be able to prove that the experience of time requires
temporal minima. Without the reductios, Hume has no way of
countering the possibility that his philosophical opponents
can consistently agree with the claim that the experience
of time requires temporal minima and still remain committed
to the infinite divisibility of time. In other words, his
opponents could agree that the mind experiences time
successively, and yet still insist that time is infinitely
divisible. To truly refute the continuous view of time
espoused by his opponents, Hume must provide reasons for
thinking that no finite duration could be infinitely
divisible. He attempts to do this via his three reductios.
The first two of these reductios apply also to space,
whereas the third reductio pertains exclusively to time. A
crucial theme running through the third reductio is that
time must consist of distinct, indivisible moments in order
to exist successively. Any number of coexistent moments
would preclude time from being successive. Thus coexistence
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contradicts the very nature of time. Hume also believes,
just as strongly, that coexistence contradicts the very
nature of causality. Causes also occur successively. In my
next chapter, I will explore the reason why Hume thinks
this must be the case.
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Chapter Three
The Temporal Priority Argument and its Implications
Introduction
In T 1.3.2, Hume tries to identify the impression that
gives rise to our idea of causation. To do this properly,
he needs to discover the relations that are essential to
causes and effects. As is well-known, the three relations
he identifies as essential to causes and effects are
contiguity, temporal priority, and necessary connection. Of
course, Hume believes the necessary connection relation is
much more important for his endeavor than contiguity and
temporal priority, because “an object may be contiguous and
[temporally] prior to another, without being consider’d as
its cause” (T 1.3.2.11). Obviously, Hume is right about
that, but he does not seem to realize that necessary
connection alone is not sufficient for his task either. The
purpose of this chapter is to provide reasons why the
temporal priority relation, the relation by which causes
precede their effects in time, is far more significant to
Hume’s project than Hume appreciates.
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The Temporal Priority Argument
At T 1.3.2.7, Hume develops an argument which purports
to demonstrate that all causes must precede their effects
in time. For the sake of simplicity and convenience, I will
refer to this argument as the Temporal Priority Argument
(TPA). The TPA appears in the following passage:

The second relation I shall observe as essential to
causes and effects, is not so universally
acknowledg’d, but is liable to some controversy.‘Tis
that of PRIORTY of time in the cause before the
effect. Some pretend that ‘tis not absolutely
necessary a cause shou’d precede its effect; but that
any object or action, in the very first moment of its
existence, may exert its productive quality, and give
rise to another object or action, perfectly cotemporary with itself. But beside that experience in
most instances seems to contradict this opinion, we
may establish the relation of priority by a kind of
inference or reasoning. ‘Tis an establish’d maxim both
in natural and moral philosophy, that an object, which
exists for any time in its full perfection without
producing another, is not its sole cause; but is
assisted by some other principle, which pushes it from
its state of inactivity, and makes it exert that
energy, of which it was secretly possest. Now if any
cause may be perfectly co-temporary with its effect,
‘tis certain, according to this maxim, that they must
all of them be so; since any one of them, which
retards its operation for a single moment, exerts not
itself at that very individual time, in which it might
have operated; and therefore is no proper cause. The
consequence of this wou’d be no less than the
destruction of that succession of causes, which we
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observe in the world; and indeed, the utter
annihilation of time. For if one cause were cotemporary with its effect, and this effect with its
effect, and so on, ‘tis plain there wou’d be no such
thing as succession, and all objects must be coexistent36(T 1.3.2.7).

I propose that the best way to decipher this cryptic
passage is to treat the “established maxim” (hereafter EM)
as a partial definition of a cause. It specifies a
necessary condition something must satisfy to be properly
referred to as a cause.
There are three main reasons why EM should be
construed as definitional. First, Hume’s main task in T
1.3.2 is to discover the essential components of the idea
of causation. The comments he makes throughout the section
strongly suggest that he is aiming to construct a
definition of causation. This is especially clear in
paragraphs nine and ten, where he argues that contiguity
and succession (temporal priority) are not sufficient by
themselves for such a definition – because one object may
be contiguous and prior to another without being the cause
of the latter - and then challenges the reader to

36

This last sentence supports an argument I made in Chapter 2, namely, that in Hume’s ontology, all
things are either coexistent or successive.
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articulate a better, non-circular definition. Hence the
passage in which TPA appears is a part of a section of the
Treatise in which Hume is clearly investigating a good way
to define causation. These considerations provide a good
reason to interpret TPA - and hence EM, since EM is the
logical basis for TPA - as being a component of that
investigation.
The second reason why EM should be read as offering a
partial definition of “cause” concerns the use of TPA
within the passage itself. Shortly before launching into
TPA, Hume makes clear that he intends to challenge those
who think “’tis not absolutely necessary a cause shou’d
precede its effect,” with TPA. The fact that Hume opposes
these people obviously means that he thinks the temporal
priority of a cause to an effect is absolutely necessary to
the concept of a cause, and, consequently, an indispensible
part of the definition of “cause.” Hence Hume clearly
thinks that the temporal relationship a cause has with its
effect must constitute part of the concept of a cause, and
since EM asserts that something cannot properly be labeled
a cause unless it exhibits a certain kind of temporal
relationship with its effect, it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that Hume intended EM to serve as a partial
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definition which lays out a necessary condition all causes
must satisfy.
The third reason one should interpret EM as a
definition is simply that refusing to do so renders the
most crucial inference of TPA – the idea that, if any cause
can be simultaneous with its effect, then every cause must
be simultaneous with its effect – unintelligible. Although
the argument cannot work without that inference, the
inference can be valid only if one takes EM to be offering
a definition of “proper cause.”
With these necessary preliminary remarks about EM out
of the way, we can now proceed to the argument itself. In
the following paragraphs, I offer my own paraphrase of the
TPA in which I include the implicit premises and
assumptions that play a crucial role in the argument. I
will also expand upon some of the premises that are
explicitly stated, in an attempt to elucidate them and make
Hume’s reasoning as I understand it more transparent.
My Paraphrase of the TPA
A cause that is perfectly co-temporary (that is,
simultaneous) with its effect is one in which both the
cause and its effect exist in the same moment.

There is no
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moment at which the cause exists but the effect does not.
The presence of the cause, C, at time t1, guarantees the
presence of the effect, E, at t1.
A cause that is successive and contiguous with its
effect is one in which the cause does not exist in the same
moment as the effect. There is at least one moment at which
the cause exists but the effect does not. Two moments are
required for successive causation to occur, one for the
cause and one for the effect. The presence of C at t1
guarantees the presence of E at t2. By definition,
successive causes precede their effects in time.
Obviously, successive causes require more time (two
moments) to produce their effects than causes that are
perfectly simultaneous with their effects, which only
require one moment.
Consequently, if any cause is able to be perfectly
simultaneous with its effect, then no successive cause
conforms to the definition of cause laid out in EM. Since
no cause can produce its effect in less time than a
simultaneous cause produces its effect, this must mean
that, if any cause can be perfectly simultaneous with its
effect, every cause must be simultaneous with its effect.
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If all causes are simultaneous with their effects,
then causal succession would not exist. Since all
successions are temporal, and time is successive, the
nonexistence of causal succession implies both the
nonexistence of time and the nonexistence of all
successions. It is an obvious fact that successions exist,
since we observe and experience them. Therefore, it is not
the case that all causes could be simultaneous with their
effects. It follows that no cause can be simultaneous with
its effect. Since causes exist, all causes are successive –
they precede their effects in time.
Critical Responses to TPA
In “Hume’s Argument that Causes Must Precede Their
Effects,” Munsat sets out to explain precisely why Hume
thinks that, if any cause is simultaneous with its effect,
then all causes must be. He summarizes Hume’s insight by
claiming, “In summary, the argument is this: if a cause
could be co-temporary with its effect, then anything short
of co-temporary counts as a ‘delay,’ and hence is in
violation of the maxim” (Munsat 342). I think Munsat’s
interpretation of this inference is correct, but Munsat’s
objection to the TPA indicates a lack of understanding on
his part of Hume’s theory of time.
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Munsat objects to the TPA on the grounds that it fails
to demonstrate that there would be no succession at all if
all causes were simultaneous with their effects. At the
very most, Munsat argues, Hume’s premises can only show
that there would be no causal succession. Munsat does not
seem to realize that a consequence of Hume’s conception of
time – a compound abstract idea of succession qua
successive – is that all successions are temporal.37 This is
an implicit assumption in the TPA, and Hume cannot derive
his conclusion from his premises without it. This is one
way in which Hume’s theory of time affects his TPA. There
is another, far more significant influence his theory of
time has on the TPA, however, and to explore this
influence, we must look at a potentially devastating
objection to Hume’s account of causation as contiguous.
In “On the Notion of Cause,” Russell constructed a
dilemma which he considered fatal to any theory of
causation which holds that causes are contiguous with their
effects. The dilemma is as follows:

37

For more information on this consequence of Hume’s conception of time, consult the first chapter of
this dissertation.
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No two instants are contiguous, since the time series
is compact; hence either the cause or the effect
must……endure for a finite time……but then we are faced
with a dilemma: if the cause is a process involving
change within itself, we shall require (if causality
is universal) causal relation between its earlier and
later parts; moreover, it would seem that only the
later parts can be relevant to the effect, since the
earlier parts are not contiguous to the effect, and
therefore……cannot influence the effect. Thus we shall
be led to diminish the duration of the cause without
limit, and however much we may diminish it, there will
still remain an earlier part which might be altered
without altering the effect, so the true cause……will
not have been reached……If, on the other hand, the
cause is purely static, involving no change within
itself, then, in the first place, no such cause is to
be found in nature, and in the second place, it seems
strange……that the cause, after existing placidly for
some time, should suddenly explode into the effect,
when it might just as well have done so at any earlier
time, or have gone unchanged without producing its
effect. This dilemma, therefore, is fatal to the view
that cause and effect can be contiguous in time”
(Russell 174-201).

The basic outline of the dilemma is as follows:
1. Time is infinitely divisible.
2. If causes are contiguous with their effects, then the
causes are either dynamic and undergo change, or they
are purely static and do not change.
3. If causes are dynamic, there must be causal
relationships between their earlier and later parts.
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4. Only the later parts of the causes can be contiguous
with the effects.
5. Only the later parts can be causally relevant to the
effects.
6. The duration of the later parts could always be
diminished in such a way that the truly causally
relevant part will never be identified.
7. No causes are purely static.
8. No causes can exist idly without producing their
effects.
9. If causes are contiguous with their effects, then they
either could never be identified, or they could not
exist as causes.
10.

Causes cannot be contiguous with their effects in

time.

Since Hume advocates a theory of causation in which cause
and effect can be contiguous in time, Russell’s dilemma
poses an extremely grave threat to that theory unless Hume
has the philosophical resources required to decisively

111

refute the dilemma. Before exploring possible defenses Hume
could use against the dilemma, it is important to dwell on
the dilemma to make sure the argument presented therein is
clear.
The first horn of the dilemma presupposes the
continuity of time. Given this assumption, the time during
which any cause that undergoes change within itself (the
change here is the act of producing the effect) is
infinitely divisible. According to any contiguous theory of
causation, the moment in which the effect exists
immediately follows and is contiguous with the moment in
which the cause exists; in other words, if C is a
contiguous cause that produces E, then if C exists at time
t1, then E exists at time t2. If time is infinitely
divisible, however, then there can be no moment which
immediately follows and is contiguous with the moment in
which C exists. C’s duration could always be divided into
briefer moments, and a contiguous theory of causation is
committed to the idea that only the temporal part of C
which immediately precedes E can generate E. Since time is
continuous, there is no temporal part of C which
immediately precedes E, and consequently the true cause of
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E will never be found. If causes are contiguous with their
effects and time is continuous, causes cannot exist.
The second horn of the dilemma represents a situation
which violates Hume’s “established maxim.” A static cause
is a cause which exists in its full perfection for a
certain period of time without producing its effect. Both
Hume and Russell think that no such static causes exist.
Since both horns of the dilemma attack the notion of
contiguous, successive causes, and both horns purport to
prove that no such causes can exist, one might interpret
the dilemma as an attempt to prove that all causes are
simultaneous with their effects. Beauchamp and Rosenberg,
in their extremely detailed analysis of the dilemma, resist
this interpretation. They claim:

The moral Russell and others apparently draw is not
that all causes and effects are contemporaneous.
Rather, they maintain that Hume’s criterion of
contiguity and his two assumed axioms38 are so rigid
that, when conjoined with normal assumptions about the
continuity of time, they entail that all causes and
effects are either contemporaneous or separated by a
finite time-interval – the very possibilities that

38

Given the context of the passage, it seems that the “two assumed axioms” are both components of the
established maxim.
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Hume denounces as absurd” (Beauchamp and Rosenberg
196).

Beauchamp and Rosenberg think Russell’s dilemma fails to
threaten Hume’s theory of causation. They employ two
different strategies to defend Hume’s theory from the
dilemma.
One strategy they employ exposes an inconsistency in
Russell’s reasoning: Russell assumes events exist, “yet one
consequence of his argument is a denial that events exist”
(Beauchamp and Rosenberg 197). They attempt to prove this
inconsistency by replacing the word “cause” in Russell’s
original argument with “event.” Since Russell’s dilemma is
internally inconsistent, it obviously cannot be used to
refute the possibility of contiguous causation.
The second strategy they employ to defend Hume’s
theory from Russell’s dilemma is much more complex and
obscure than the first. It involves an attempt to show that
successive, contiguous causation is compatible with
temporal continuity. The dilemma assumes that a lack of a
temporal interval between events makes those events
simultaneous. If I understand Beauchamp and Rosenberg’s
argument correctly, their solution seems to involve proving
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that non-simultaneous events can also lack a temporal
interval. They suggest that two events can be both
contiguous and successive without a temporal interval
between them if one event begins at exactly the same moment
when the other ends:
Since the series of point-instants is dense, there
exists an infinite number of instants between any two
instants. Accordingly, in order to avoid the problem
of temporal gaps, it must be maintained that, at a
minimum, contiguous causes perish and their effects
begin in the same instant. That is, the terminal
instant and the commencement instant must be identical
(Beauchamp and Rosenberg 190).

Suppose, for example, that a cause, C, begins at instant t1
and ends at instant t2. C can still be successive and
contiguous with its effect, E, if E begins at instant t2.
In that case, C would end at exactly the same instant E
begins. C and E would temporally overlap at t2.
In the above scenario, C and E are both contiguous and
successive. They are contiguous and successive in the sense
that a part of C happens before E begins at t2, and both C
and E exist for more than one instant. The only instant
they have in common is t2, at which the temporal history of
C and the temporal history of E overlap. If C and E were
completely simultaneous, all of the instants at which they
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exist would temporally overlap. Hence they are not
completely simultaneous. Since there is also no temporal
interval between C and E, this example illustrates a causeeffect pair which is contiguous and successive, lacks a
temporal interval between the cause and effect, and yet is
not completely simultaneous.
Closer examination of Beauchamp and Rosenberg’s
proposal indicates that it fails to defend Hume’s theory of
causation from Russell’s dilemma. For their “solution” to
work, both C and E must be divisible into temporal slices.
This poses a problem for them because they agree with
Russell that time is infinitely divisible. This means that,
between any two temporal slices, there are an infinite
number of other slices. For their solution to be coherent,
it must be possible to distinguish the overlapping slice
(in my example above, the overlapping temporal slice is t2)
from the non-overlapping temporal slices. Doing so involves
placing the temporal slices into an order such that one can
identify which slice precedes or succeeds another. If one
were to lay out all of the instants at which C and E exist
on a straight line to represent a temporal continuum, how
would be able to locate t2? It cannot be before or after any
other instant. It could not be located or identified. What
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evidence, then, could Beauchamp and Rosenberg produce to
establish that such an instant exists?
These reflections show that, even if Beauchamp and
Rosenberg’s solution works, it cannot be used as a way to
defend Hume, because Hume’s understanding of temporal
successiveness does not allow the moment at which one event
ends and the moment in which an event contiguous to and
distinct from the first event begins to be one and the same
moment. Recall that at T 2.3.7.5, Hume remarks, “every part
[of time] must appear single and alone, nor can regularly
have entrance into the fancy without banishing what is
suppos’d to have been immediately precedent.” Since there
can be no moment that is immediately precedent to the
overlapping moment, the overlapping moment cannot exist.
The obvious, and easy, way to defend Hume from
Russell’s dilemma is to deny that time is continuous.
Without the assumption that time is infinitely divisible,
the dilemma is impotent. As I discussed in Chapter Two,
Hume firmly believes that time is not infinitely divisible,
and attempted to prove it in multiple ways. By combining
Hume’s arguments against temporal continuity with his TPA,
a defender of Hume’s theory of causation can easily defend
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that theory against Russell’s dilemma and other similar
objections.
Ironically, although Beauchamp and Rosenberg are aware
that Hume opposed temporal continuity, they completely
dismiss Hume’s thoughts on the matter as insignificant. In
a footnote, they write, “Hume does defend a doctrine of
‘indivisible parts’ of space and time, though these
arguments are weak and hard to understand. The temporal
discontinuity thesis would now be almost universally
rejected by philosophers……we shall eventually show that
nothing of importance turns on these arguments” (Beauchamp
and Rosenberg 189, fn 21). Obviously, Hume’s arguments
supporting discrete time are much more important for his
theory of causation than Beauchamp and Rosenberg realize.
Kline also believes that Beauchamp and Rosenberg’s
solutions do not work. In “Humean Causation and the
Necessity of Temporal Discontinuity,” he points out that
Beauchamp and Rosenberg believe that events take time,
which must mean that they have beginnings and endings. If
time is infinitely divisible, however, events cannot have
beginnings and endings. Russell’s argument shows that “the
idea of a cause with some particular duration d is not
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defensible” because “the duration of the cause is
indefinitely diminishable” (Kline 554).
Kline argues that the other approach Beauchamp and
Rosenberg take to the dilemma, that of charging it with
internal inconsistency, also fails, but his reason for
thinking this is very unclear. If I am interpreting Kline
correctly, his position seems to be as follows. Russell’s
argument entails that events do not exist only because it
contains certain assumptions about what contiguity means –
assumptions with which Beauchamp and Rosenberg agree.
These assumptions, when combined with the presupposition
that events exist, lead to the claim that events do not
exist. Without these assumptions about contiguity, the
argument is not internally inconsistent. Instead of
indicating a problem for Russell’s argument, therefore, the
conclusion that events do not exist actually threatens the
position Beauchamp and Rosenberg defend!

The implication

that no events exist is “far from being logically
pernicious” and is, in fact, “quite an elegant attack on
contiguity” (Kline 554).
Kline discusses both horns of Russell’s dilemma and
explains how Hume’s view of causation can easily survive
both. The first horn only works if one assumes that time is
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infinitely divisible. As should be clear by now, Hume does
not share this assumption, so the first horn poses no
threat to Hume. The second horn focuses on a temporal gap
between the cause and the effect. Such a temporal gap
violates Hume’s “established maxim” and renders any causal
theory allowing such a gap vulnerable to Russell’s dilemma.
If time is discrete, however, there would be no such
temporal gap between the cause and the effect, the cause
and the effect would be perfectly contiguous, and Hume’s
theory survives the dilemma (Kline 552-553).
Russell’s dilemma is not the only philosophical threat
to Hume’s insistence that all causes are successive and
contiguous. Kant’s famous example of a lead ball resting on
a cushion, thereby denting the cushion, is often considered
to be an example of a situation in which a cause and its
effect are completely simultaneous. The ball causes the
indentation in the cushion, yet no time elapses at all
between the ball’s presence on the cushion and the
appearance of the indentation. Fogelin analyzes this famous
example and investigates the extent to which it undermines
Hume’s account of causation. Fogelin holds that the
possibility of simultaneous causation threatens Hume’s
position. On a regularity theory of causation, which Hume
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maintains, there must be a way of distinguishing causes
from effects. Hume distinguishes causes from effects by
invoking the notion of temporal priority. All causes always
precede their effects. If some causes can be simultaneous
with their effects, then there must be another way of
distinguishing causes from effects besides temporal
priority. Hume’s theory of causation cannot introduce
anything else to make the distinction possible, thus
revealing a weakness in his theory (Fogelin 331).
Fogelin reconstructs Hume’s TPA as follows:

(1)

Some causes are simultaneous with their effects.
– Assumption.

(2)

All causes could be simultaneous with their
effects. – A Generalization Argument.

(3)

All causes are simultaneous with their effects. –
Via the “established maxim.”

But since Hume holds (3) is manifestly false, he
concludes that we must deny the assumption (1) that
leads to it. We may therefore conclude: (4) No cause
is simultaneous with its effect (Fogelin 336).

Fogelin raises three objections to the TPA: he asserts that
the inference from (1) to (2) is invalid, he claims that
(4) is false, and he maintains that Hume was wrong to
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accept (2) because it threatens Hume’s argument (Fogelin
337).
Fogelin writes:

The inference from the first claim to the second
depends upon the assumption that simultaneous
causation and successive causation are
conceptually on a par. That is, we are asked to
think of two independent kinds of causal
relations, those where the cause and effect are
successive and those where they are simultaneous.
It is only on this assumption of conceptual
independence that the generalization argument
from some are to all could be is valid.
But……this assumption of conceptual independence
is false. Furthermore, the notion of a cause
simultaneous with its effect is parasitic on the
notion of a cause that precedes its effect, and
so even if we could have a world where all causes
precede their effects, we could not have a world
where all causes are simultaneous with them……in
such a world there would be no basis for
distinguishing causes and effects (Fogelin 334).

Fogelin believes very strongly that all causes could not be
simultaneous with their effects. After constructing and
analyzing two theoretical examples in which all causes are
simultaneous with their effects, Fogelin concludes that a
world in which all causes are simultaneous with their
effects is a world in which no causal relations exist.
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Understanding this apparently paradoxical conclusion
necessitates a close examination of his two examples.
In the first example, Fogelin asks his readers to
“take our world – with a lead ball resting on a cushion –
and stop all motion” (Fogelin 335). Fogelin argues that,
due to the cessation of all motion, “the law of gravity and
the laws of elasticity no longer hold in this world, and
once we recognize this, we simply give up the idea that the
ball causes a depression in the pillow” (Fogelin 335). The
physical laws which enable balls to dent cushions would
cease to function in the absence of motion.
The second example is also set in this world, with the
lead ball resting upon a cushion. Then “eliminate, for all
times, everything save the ball, the cushion, and the
earth. These three items remain forever in their fixed
relative positions. This is the only news concerning this
universe……there is nothing in this universe that provides a
basis for a distinction between cause and effect and,
therefore, causal relations do not obtain within it”
(Fogelin 335). Causal relations require certain facts about
the world to obtain; they presuppose that the world
possesses certain ontological features. These features do
not and cannot exist in a world devoid of motion.
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In both of these examples, Fogelin argues that a world
in which only simultaneous causation exists would be so
different from our world in terms of the physical laws that
obtain in that world that there would be no ontological
basis for distinguishing causes from effects. For this
reason, causal relations would not exist in such a world.
Fogelin’s comments very strongly suggest that
successive causation is the paradigm example of causation.
If Fogelin’s comments are correct, simultaneous causation
cannot really be considered ‘proper’ causation. In both of
Fogelin’s examples, no time elapses. No temporal succession
occurs in either example. His examples support the idea
that temporal succession could not exist in a world in
which all causes are simultaneous with their effects. Hume,
of course, completely agrees, and his TPA makes exactly the
same claim!
As Fogelin’s examples clearly show, simultaneous
causation is not just conceptually dependent upon
successive causation, but also ontologically dependent upon
successive causation. More precisely, it is dependent upon
the physical features (physical properties, physical laws,
etc) of the world which can only exist if temporal
successiveness exists. A world without temporal succession
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would lack these physical features, thus precluding causal
relations from existing.
If Fogelin’s examples work, they imply that gravity,
elasticity, and other such physical and structural
properties of the world cannot function without temporal
successiveness. The mere act of removing temporal
successiveness from the world (via the “universal freeze”)
in the first example resulted in the cessation of gravity
and elasticity. This seems to suggest that the physical
features of the world depend upon temporal successiveness,
but not vice-versa.
To understand how this is so, consider a world in
which everything that is thrown moves up instead of down
everywhere in the universe. Gravity either would not exist
or would not function in that world, but temporal
succession would clearly still exist, since the thrown
objects would move upward successively – the thrown objects
would not be able to move at all if temporal succession did
not exist.
There is good reason, therefore, to believe that
temporal succession is more basic than the other physical
laws and properties Fogelin mentions. If Fogelin is right
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that a world with only simultaneous causation would have no
true causal relations, one can explain this fact by
pointing to the lack of temporal succession in that world.
Causal power depends on a certain set of physical
properties and laws which, in turn, depend upon temporal
succession. This means that the causal power of causes that
are simultaneous with their effects also depends upon
temporal succession. Since simultaneous causes, by
definition, are not successive, this is tantamount to
claiming that causes simultaneous with their effects are
not genuine causes.
This poses a problem for Fogelin who, despite his
insistence that the concept of simultaneous causation is
dependent upon the concept of successive causation, and his
belief that a world in which all causes exist
simultaneously with their effects would lack all causal
relations, still believes that both successive and
simultaneous causation exist in the actual world. If my
arguments above are sound, there is reason to doubt that
causes simultaneous with their effects can be referred to
properly as “causes.” Such causes derive their causal power
from temporal succession. It is impossible by definition
for them to be successive. Hence they are either not causes
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at all, or are not causes the same way that successive
causes are. The word “cause” cannot be applied equally to
both successive causes and causes simultaneous with their
effects. They cannot both be considered proper causes. If
the word “cause” has the same meaning when applied to each
one, then they cannot both be causes.
This is the insight Hume is trying to express with his
remark that if any cause may be co-temporary with its
effect, every cause must be co-temporary with its effect.
If Hume is correct, whatever enables causes to operate as
causes – that is, whatever is the source of their causal
power – must be described, at least in part, by the
temporal relationship causes have with their effects. The
established maxim makes a cause’s temporal relationship
with its effect part of the very concept of a cause. Since
successive causes and causes simultaneous with their
effects have temporal relationships with their effects that
are mutually exclusive – the former always precede their
effects by definition, the latter always exist
simultaneously with their effects by definition – it is
impossible for both kinds of causes to be proper causes.
The above reflections indicate that Fogelin’s
interpretation of Hume’s TPA is not completely accurate.
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Hume does not seriously entertain the possibility that all
causes could be simultaneous with their effects. Hume would
agree with the arguments Fogelin presents as to why it is
impossible for all causes to be simultaneous with their
effects, especially since one implication of those
arguments is that time would not exist if all causes are
simultaneous with their effects, which is one of the very
same reasons Hume claims all causes cannot be simultaneous
with their effects!
The statement Fogelin interprets as a “generalization
argument”- “all causes could be simultaneous with their
effects”- is actually the consequent of a conditional
statement. This is clear not only from what has been said
above, but also from the way Hume explicitly stated the
premise in question: “If any cause may be perfectly cotemporary with its effect, ‘tis certain, according to this
maxim, that they must all of them be so” (T 1.3.2.7).
Fogelin interprets the premise as expressing two separate
propositions: “Some causes are simultaneous with their
effects” and “All causes could be simultaneous with their
effects.” By articulating the premise this way, he turns
the antecedent of a conditional statement into a particular
affirmative statement with existential import. He then
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claims that Hume accepts the second proposition but should
not, because it is false.
A more accurate way to read the premise is to construe
it as a conditional statement in an argument that takes the
form of modus tollens. I propose that the main inference of
this part of the TPA should be read as:
1. If any cause can be simultaneous with its
effect, then every cause must be simultaneous
with its effect.
2. It is impossible for every cause to be
simultaneous with its effect.
3. Therefore, it is not the case that any cause
can be simultaneous with its effect.
The problems with Fogelin’s three objections are now clear.
His claim that the inference from “some causes are
simultaneous with their effects” to “all causes could be
simultaneous with their effects” is invalid presupposes
that Hume asserts both propositions and uses them as
premises in his TPA. As we have seen, this is not the case.
It is just as fallacious to interpret “if any cause can be
simultaneous with its effect, then every cause must be
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simultaneous with its effect” as asserting both “any cause
can be simultaneous with its effect” and “every cause must
be simultaneous with its effect” as it would be to
interpret the proposition “If I am a mother, then I have
children” as asserting “I am a mother” and “I have
children.”

The sentence “If any cause can be simultaneous

with its effect, then every cause must be simultaneous with
its effect” expresses a single proposition, not two.
Hume never infers the proposition “all causes could be
simultaneous with their effects” from any statement in his
argument, because no such premise appears in his argument!
In fact, a crucial part of the TPA consists in negating
that proposition. Obviously, then, the claim that Hume
fallaciously inferred that false proposition is mistaken in
multiple ways; Hume never uses that proposition as a
premise, and therefore cannot be accused either of
invalidly inferring it or of assenting to it.
As for the claim that the conclusion of TPA - that no
causes are simultaneous with their effects – is false, one
must specify what definition of “cause” one is using. One
way to paraphrase the conclusion in a very Humean spirit
would be to articulate it as “No cause that is co-temporary
with its effect can properly be called a ‘cause’.” As we
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have seen, Fogelin’s own arguments lend support to this
position!
Lennon criticizes the TPA and makes a mistake similar
to Fogelin’s. He thinks Hume’s TPA suffers from two
ambiguities which undermine its effectiveness. The first
ambiguity concerns the best way to interpret the
established maxim. Lennon thinks the maxim can be
interpreted in two different ways. It can be interpreted as
“an imposition of a priori constraints on what can be
constantly conjoined” (Lennon 348), or it can be
interpreted as “an a posteriori methodological precept
concerning the discovery of what as a matter of fact are
constant conjunctions” (Lennon 348). Lennon argues that the
first interpretation of the established maxim “is
inconsistent with all Hume’s arguments that causal claims
are founded only in experience” (Lennon 348), and
consequently favors the second interpretation.
When I first discussed my interpretation of the
established maxim, I explained why I think the maxim should
be read as specifying a necessary condition that all true
causes must satisfy. Thus I am much more sympathetic to the
first interpretation Lennon mentions than the second.
Lennon approaches the established maxim in a way that would
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make it a strictly empirical proposition, one that can be
denied without resulting in a contradiction. The arguments
I presented earlier in this chapter reveal the problems
involved with interpreting the maxim that way.
The second ambiguity Lennon finds in the TPA is that
it “equivocates on the notions of cause and sufficiency”
(Lennon 349). This objection is itself ambiguous, since
Lennon never clarifies the distinction between cause and
sufficiency, and, in the paragraph in which he introduces
this objection, spends far more time discussing Russell’s
dilemma than he does developing the objection. Despite
this, several comments he makes throughout his essay
strongly suggest that his objection is as follows. Hume
uses interchangeably two rival, incompatible notions of
what causal sufficiency entails. The first notion assumes
that a cause sufficing for its effect entails that if the
cause, C, is at time t1, then the effect, E, is also at t1.
The second notion assumes that a cause sufficing for its
effect entails that if C is at t1, then E is at t2.39

39

Lennon’s discussion of an objection Stroud raises to the TPA leads me to reconstruct Lennon’s
equivocation charge this way. The discussion in question occurs on page 350 of Lennon’s “Veritas Filia
Temporis: Hume on Time and Causation.”
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By insinuating that Hume seriously assented to the
first conception of causal sufficiency, Lennon makes a
mistake which closely resembles Fogelin’s belief that Hume
thought all causes could be simultaneous with their
effects. Hume does not advocate the first notion of causal
sufficiency and cannot, because that notion is identical to
the description of a cause that is simultaneous with its
effect! If C is a cause that is simultaneous with its
effect, then it would be true by definition to claim that,
if C is at t1, then E is at t1. Claiming that C is
simultaneous with E and then denying that E is present
whenever C is present would lead to a contradiction.
Consequently, while Hume does not and cannot interpret
causal sufficiency as entailing “If C is at t1, then E is at
t1,” anyone who believes that genuine causes truly can be
simultaneous with their effects must interpret causal
sufficiency in just that way. Analyzing causal sufficiency
in this manner, however, leads to a serious problem – the
inability to distinguish a cause from an effect.
To see why this is the case, consider this passage
from Daniton’s Time and Space:
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……in any given concrete situation where a cause c
produces an effect e, if we say that in the given
circumstances, c is both necessary and sufficient for
e, then since the relationship “necessary and
sufficient” is symmetrical, we are clearly committed
to holding that e is necessary and sufficient for c.
For example, suppose a spark ignites a fire. In the
circumstances (oxygen present, water absent, no other
flames, etc) the fire would not have occurred if the
spark had been absent, so the spark was necessary for
the fire. It is also true that, in the circumstances,
the spark was sufficient for the fire (nothing else
was needed). Now look at the situation in another way.
In these circumstances, for the fire to ignite the
spark had to occur, so the fact that the fire did
ignite guarantees that the spark occurred: the fire is
sufficient for the spark. Also, since the occurrence
of the spark guarantees the fire will ignite, the
spark couldn’t occur without the fire, so the fire is
necessary for the spark. These two events, the cause
and the effect, are thus related to one another in a
perfectly symmetrical way. If this applies generally,
what could possibly distinguish any cause c from an
effect e other than the fact that c occurs earlier
than e? (Dainton 52-53).

Since “necessary and sufficient” clearly is a symmetrical
relationship, and Dainton’s reasoning is valid if
“necessary and sufficient” is a symmetrical relationship,
there is good reason to suspect that his arguments do apply
generally.
In particular, they would apply especially well to
cases where causes are simultaneous with their effects.
Consider, for example, the famous Kantian example of a lead
ball resting on a cushion. While this example is often
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interpreted as refuting Hume’s conclusion that all causes
precede their effects in time, Dainton’s insight regarding
the symmetrical nature of the “necessary and sufficient”
relationship illuminates key aspects of the example which
make it, and all other examples like it, completely unable
to threaten Hume’s position on successive causation.
The Kantian example is constructed in such a way that
the ball is sufficient for the dent in the cushion. In
other words, if the lead ball is present, the dent is also
present. Nothing else was needed for the dent to appear
besides the ball. The ball is also necessary for the dent,
since, given the circumstances described in the example,
the dent in the cushion could not have formed without the
ball. Hence the lead ball is both necessary and sufficient
for the dent in the cushion.
Since the necessary and sufficient relationship is
symmetrical, however, exactly the same reasoning shows that
the dent in the cushion is also necessary and sufficient
for the ball. The circumstances described in the example
indicate that the very presence of the ball on the cushion
guarantees that the dent in the cushion will form. If the
ball is present, so is the dent. This means that if the
dent in the cushion is not there, the lead ball is not
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there either. The ball could not appear without the dent
(otherwise, it would be false to say that the presence of
the ball guarantees the dent in the cushion). Thus the dent
is necessary for the ball.

Under the conditions specified

by the example, the ball cannot be resting on the cushion
without the dent appearing, which implies that the presence
of the dent in the cushion guarantees the presence of the
ball. If the dent is present, so is the ball. Since the
dent is present, the ball is also present. It necessarily
follows that the dent is sufficient for the ball. Hence
both the ball and the dent in the cushion are necessary and
sufficient for each other.
As discussed above, any description of a cause that is
simultaneous with its effect necessarily entails that if
the cause is present at time t1, then the effect is present
at t1. This implies, however, that the cause is necessary
and sufficient for its effect. Since the necessary and
sufficient relationship is symmetrical, if the cause is
necessary and sufficient for the effect, the effect is also
necessary and sufficient for the cause. If one describes
the productive power of a cause solely in terms of
sufficiency, it would be impossible to distinguish a cause
from its effect. Exactly the same reasons one would use to
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argue that a certain object or event is a cause and the
other an effect also enable one to argue that the other
object or event is the cause and the initial one is the
effect. It is very unclear what distinguishing factor one
can identify in such a situation that would enable one to
identify the cause and the effect. If no such
distinguishing factor exists or can be found, there would
be no way to differentiate between the relata in a
simultaneous causal relationship, and if there is no way to
distinguish the relata, what evidence would one have that
the causal relation truly is a causal relation?
Obviously, in the absence of any means for
distinguishing the relata in a simultaneous causal
relationship, there would be no evidence that the relation
is a causal relation. Any defender of simultaneous
causation, then, must have a way to differentiate causes
and effects. Dainton’s analysis of the symmetrical nature
of necessity and sufficiency reveals that any attempt to
explain causal relationships in terms of necessity and
sufficiency will suffer from an inability to distinguish
between causes and effects.
Such an inability to distinguish between causes and
effects is not restricted just to the necessary and
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sufficient relationship, however. It is a problem which
affects any theory of causation which attempts to explain
causation in terms of any symmetrical relationship. The
necessary and sufficient relationship is symmetrical, as
Dainton showed, but it is not the only symmetrical
relationship, and it is not the only symmetrical
relationship philosophers have used to analyze causation.
Hence any philosopher who develops a theory of causation
that relies solely on symmetrical relationships to explain
causation will encounter difficulty in distinguishing
between causes and effects. Consequently, even theories
which do not allow simultaneous causation will still suffer
from that problem, unless they can identify a
nonsymmetrical relationship which can serve as the means of
distinguishing between causes and effects. As I will now
show, Hume does not appear to fully appreciate this fact.
Concluding Remarks
The inability to distinguish between causes and
effects poses a particularly severe challenge to accounts
of causation which allow causes to exist simultaneously
with their effects, because what enables causes to act as
causes when they exist simultaneously with their effects
can only be explained in terms of symmetrical relationships
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that would obtain between the causes and the effects
equally. Distinguishing a cause from an effect requires an
asymmetrical relationship, one which causes and effects do
not partake in equally. The temporal priority of causes to
their effects is one such asymmetrical relationship, and it
is the factor Hume uses to distinguish between causes and
effects. It is extremely unclear what other asymmetrical
relationship besides temporal priority Hume or anyone else
could use in developing an account of what enables causes
to be causes.
Consequently, the temporal priority relation is much
more important to Hume’s causal theory than he realizes.
Hume believes that the necessary connection relation is the
most important relation that composes the concept of a
cause, and so devotes far more time discussing it and
exploring it than he does with the relations of contiguity
and temporal priority. The problem, however, is that the
necessary connection relation is a symmetrical relation
insofar as, for any cause C, and for any effect, E, if C is
necessarily connected to E, then E is also necessarily
connected to C. Claiming that a cause has a necessary
connection with its effect while also claiming that the
effect does not have a necessary connection with its cause
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results in a contradiction. The necessary connection
relation, while obviously crucial to Hume’s conception of
causation, is not sufficient, because he cannot use it to
explain the difference between causes and effects.40
Hume’s quest to identify the origin of the idea of
causation cannot succeed unless he can distinguish between
causes and effects. After all, “’Tis impossible to reason
justly, without understanding perfectly the idea concerning
which we reason” (T 1.3.2.4), and perfectly understanding
the idea of causation requires an understanding of the
distinction between causes and effects.
These considerations strongly suggest that the
Temporal Priority Argument (TPA), the argument by which
Hume attempts to establish that all causes precede their
effects in time, is much more significant the Hume
acknowledges. Immediately after he presents the TPA, he
tells the reader, “If this argument [TPA] appears
satisfactory, ‘tis well. If not, I beg the reader to allow
me the same liberty, which I have us’d in the preceding

40

Contiguity, another relation Hume believes constitutes the concept of causation, is also a symmetrical
relation, and therefore cannot be used to distinguish between causes and effects either.
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case41, of supposing it such. For he shall find, that the
affair is of no great importance” (T 1.3.2.8). Such a
remark clearly indicates that Hume was not aware that he
must argue for the temporal priority of causes to their
effects, or his project will fail. There are many other
reasons why Hume should not dismiss his TPA as nonchalantly
as he does.
For example, a crucial implicit premise in the TPA is
that all successions are temporal. Without this assumption,
he cannot infer the “utter annihilation of time,” and of
succession in general, from the lack of causal
successiveness. The idea that all successions are temporal
is a consequence of his conception of time, since he views
time as a compound abstract idea of succession qua
successiveness. Hume never abandons this conception of time
in the Treatise or his other texts, so it is obviously
important to him.
Russell’s dilemma and the challenge it poses to any
proponent of successive, contiguous causation – such as
Hume himself – reveals yet another reason why Hume should
not dismiss his TPA so carelessly. The dilemma clearly
41

The “preceding case” refers to the argument in which Hume tries to prove that all causes are
contiguous with their effects.
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shows that if time is continuous, then it would be
impossible to distinguish causes from effects. Defending a
conception of causes as successive and contiguous – another
conception Hume never abandons in the Treatise necessitates advocating a discrete view of time. As we saw
in the previous chapter, Hume does exactly that. Hume
believes in the discrete view of time so confidently that
he thinks denying it leads to contradictions and logical
absurdities. His TPA rests upon that discrete view of time.
Clearly, the TPA contains assumptions and concepts
that are absolutely crucial to Hume’s project regarding the
idea of causation and its origin. Far from being “of no
great importance,” the argument is of the utmost
importance!
Unfortunately for Hume, his immensely important TPA
suffers from a major problem that has not been discussed by
commentators, and appears to have gone entirely unnoticed.
This problem is that the TPA is inconsistent with Hume’s
critique of the causal maxim, which is another crucial
aspect of Hume’s theory of causation. The next chapter will
discuss the ways in which the TPA contradicts the critique
of the causal maxim.
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Chapter Four
Hume’s Critique of the Causal Maxim
Introduction
The last chapter focused on the Temporal Priority
Argument (TPA), the argument by which Hume attempts to
prove that all causes precede their effects in time. That
argument requires time and causation to be very closely
connected. This close connection between temporality and
causality poses a serious difficulty for Hume’s critique of
the causal maxim, a principle which states that whatever
begins to exist must have a cause. This critique requires
time and causation to be separable and distinct in ways
that violate Hume’s claims in TPA. Understanding the ways
in which Hume’s critique of causal maxim is inconsistent
with his TPA, however, requires a detailed analysis of the
critique itself, as well as the epistemic and ontological
principles Hume uses to develop it.
Hume thinks the causal maxim is true, but he also
thinks it is neither self-evident nor demonstrable, meaning
that it can be denied without contradiction. There is
historical evidence that Hume agrees with the causal maxim.
In 1754, Hume wrote a letter to Dr. John Stewart, a
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Professor of Natural Philosophy at the University of
Edinburgh. In a volume published by the Philosophical
Society of Edinburgh, Stewart accused Hume of arguing that
something can begin to exist without a cause. Hume
responded:

Allow me to tell you, that I never asserted so absurd
a Proposition as that any thing might arise without a
cause: I only maintain’d, that our Certainty of the
Falsehood of the Proposition proceeded neither from
Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another Source.
That Caesar existed, that there is such an Island as
Sicily; for these Propositions, I affirm, we have no
demonstrative nor intuitive Proof. Would you infer
that I deny their Truth, or even their Certainty?
There are many different kinds of Certainty; and some
of them as satisfactory to the mind, tho perhaps not
so regular, as the demonstrative kind.42

Hume’s critique of the causal maxim, then, does not consist
in proving that the maxim is false. It does, however,
involve arguing that the concept of a beginning of
existence (which is a particular kind of effect) and the
concept of a cause of existence are distinct and separable
in specific ways. If these concepts are not distinct and

42

Norman Kemp Smith devotes the Appendix to the eighteenth chapter of his The Philosophy of David
Hume to a discussion of this letter. The appendix contains the entire letter. The quoted passage appears
on page 413 of Smith’s text.
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separable in the ways Hume thinks they are, Hume’s critique
of the causal maxim fails. A careful analysis of the
critique reveals that the concepts of a beginning of
existence and a cause of existence are not separable and
distinct they way Hume thinks they are, and if they were,
that fact would render his critique of the causal maxim
inconsistent with his TPA.
Hume’s Critique of the Causal Maxim
There are two main arguments Hume uses to show that
the causal maxim is neither self-evident nor demonstrable.
The first, much simpler argument begins with Hume’s
assertion that “All certainty arises from the comparison of
ideas, and from the discovery of such relations as are
unalterable, so long as the ideas continue the same” (T
1.3.3.2). The relations of which Hume speaks are
resemblance, proportions in quantity and number, degrees of
any quality, and contrariety.
A natural relation is a quality by which two ideas are
connected together in the imagination, and the one
naturally introduces the other (T 1.1.5.1). A philosophical
relation is “any particular subject of comparison, without
a connecting principle” (T 1.1.5.1). The causal maxim does
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not imply any of these relations, so it is not intuitively
certain (T 1.3.3.2).
The second argument Hume uses to show that the causal
maxim is neither self-evident nor demonstrable is much more
complex and significant for Hume’s overall project, and so
has received far more attention from commentators than the
first argument. For this reason, I will focus exclusively
on the second argument for the remainder of this chapter.
This second argument, which I shall call the Critique of
the Causal Maxim (hereafter CCM), proceeds as follows:

But here is an argument, which proves at once, that
the foregoing proposition [the causal maxim] is
neither intuitively nor demonstrably certain. We can
never demonstrate the necessity of a cause to every
new existence, or new modification of existence,
without showing at the same time the impossibility
there is, that any thing can ever begin to exist
without some productive principle; and where the
latter proposition cannot be prov’d, we must despair
of ever being able to prove the former. Now that the
latter proposition is utterly incapable of a
demonstrative proof, we may satisfy ourselves by
considering, that as all distinct ideas are separable
from each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect
are evidently distinct, ‘twill be easy for us to
conceive any object to be non-existent this moment,
and existent the next, without conjoining to it the
distinct idea of a cause or productive principle. The
separation, therefore, of the idea of a cause from
that of a beginning of existence, is plainly possible
for the imagination; and consequently the actual
separation of these objects is so far possible, that
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it implies no contradiction nor absurdity; and is
therefore incapable of being refuted by any reasoning
from mere ideas; without which ‘tis impossible to
demonstrate the necessity of a cause (T 1.3.3.3).

When simplified and clarified, Hume’s CCM can be
reconstructed as follows:
(1)

The truth of the causal maxim can be demonstrated if
and only if the impossibility of something beginning
to exist without a cause can be demonstrated.

(2)

All distinct ideas are separable from each other.
[Separability Principle]

(3)

The idea of a cause and the idea of an effect are
distinct.

(4)

It is possible to conceive of an object beginning to
exist without a cause.

(5)

The imagination can separate the idea of a cause
from the idea of a beginning of existence.

(6)

Whatever is conceivable is possible. [Conceivability
Principle, operating as an implicit premise]

(7)

The actual separation of a beginning of existence
from a cause of existence is possible. (5,6)
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(8)

Separating a beginning of existence from a cause of
existence implies no contradiction.

(9)

The separation of a beginning of existence from a
cause of existence cannot be refuted from mere
ideas. (8)

(10) The causal maxim cannot be demonstrated.

The CCM employs two principles which are extremely
important for Hume’s philosophy as a whole: the
Conceivability Principle and the Separability Principle.
Although I mentioned these principles briefly in Chapter
One, the pivotal role they play in the CCM warrants a much
more thorough discussion of each principle. Examining each
principle in detail will illuminate both how the CCM is
supposed to work and why it does not.
The Conceivability and Separability Principles
Hume’s first description of the Conceivability
Principle occurs at T 1.2.2.8, where he writes,

‘Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, that
whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea
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of possible existence, or, in other words, that
nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. We can
form the idea of a golden mountain, and from thence
conclude that such a mountain may actually exist. We
can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, and
therefore regard it as impossible.

Hume provides a much briefer description of the
Conceivability Principle at T 1.4.5.35, where he claims
“’Tis an evident principle, that whatever we can imagine,
is possible.”
These articulations of the Conceivability Principle
indicate that there are limitations on what the mind can
conceive. The mind cannot conceive of or imagine anything
that would involve a contradiction. The very concept of a
mountain contains within it the concept of a valley, and
consequently it is not possible to conceive of a mountain
existing without a valley. According to the Conceivability
Principle, this implies that the existence of a mountain
without a valley is impossible. Nothing about the concept
of mountain requires the mind to imagine it being golden or
any other specific color, so it is possible to
conceptualize a mountain having whatever color one wishes.
Because there is nothing contradictory about the concept of
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a golden mountain, it is possible for golden mountains to
exist.
Hume formulates his Separability Principle as follows:
…whatever objects are different are distinguishable,
and…whatever objects are distinguishable are separable
by thought and imagination. And we may here add, that
these propositions are equally true in the inverse,
and that whatever objects are separable are also
distinguishable, and that whatever objects are
distinguishable are also different (T 1.1.7.3).

After stating his Separability Principle, Hume provides an
example of how it works by invoking it to prove that there
is no difference between the length of a line and the line
itself. “The precise length of a line,” Hume writes,

…is not different nor distinguishable from the line
itself… nor the precise degree of any quality from the
quality. These ideas, therefore, admit no more of
separation than they do of distinction and difference.
They are consequently conjoin’d with each other in the
conception; and the general idea of a line,
notwithstanding all our abstractions and refinements,
has in its appearance in the mind a precise degree of
quantity and quality (T 1.1.7.3).

Hume’s discussion of the precise length of a line indicates
that the Separability Principle is closely connected to the
Conceivability Principle. Because a line cannot be
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distinguished or separated from its particular length, it
cannot be conceived without that length. This means that it
is not possible for a line to exist separately from its
precise length, or from any length at all. A similar
situation occurs with mountains and valleys. A mountain
cannot be conceived to exist without a valley because the
concept of a mountain and the concept of a valley are not
separable. These reflections show that, whenever two
concepts are separable, it is possible for their referents
to exist separately in reality, and whenever two concepts
are not separable, it is not possible for their referents
to exist separately in reality.
In his discussion of personal identity, Hume uses this
consequence of the Conceivability Principle and the
Separability Principle to show that perceptions are
substances. The passage in which he develops this argument
employs both the Conceivability Principle and the
Separability Principle in a way that makes their
ontological implications clear:

Whatever is clearly conceiv’d may exist; and whatever
is clearly conceiv’d, after any manner, may exist
after the same manner. This is one principle [the
Conceivability Principle], which has already been
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acknowledged. Again, every thing, which is different,
is distinguishable, and every thing which is
distinguishable, is separable by the imagination.
This is another principle [the Separability
Principle]. My conclusion from both is, that since all
our perceptions are different from each other, and
from everything else in the universe, they are also
distinct and separable, and may be consider’d as
separately existent, and may exist separately, and
have no need of anything else to support their
existence. They are, therefore, substances, as far as
this definition explains a substance (T 1.4.5.5).

Hume uses the Separability Principle to support his
contention that perceptions “may exist separately” and do
not require “anything else to support their existence.”
Thus the Separability Principle clearly entails that if two
things are separable, each one can exist without the other.
The Conceivability Principle claims that the two distinct
things can be conceived to exist separately from each
other. Hence both principles have conceptual and
ontological implications which can be articulated as
follows. If A and B are separate concepts, then:
1. A can be conceived without conceiving B.
2. The referent of A can be conceived to exist without
conceiving the referent of B to exist.
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3. It is possible for the referent of A to exist without
the referent of B.
4. B can be conceived without conceiving A.
5. The referent of B can be conceived to exist without
conceiving the referent of A to exist.
6. It is possible for the referent of B to exist without
the referent of A.

Understanding these implications of the Conceivability
Principle and the Separablity Principle is essential for
comprehending not only the CCM itself, but also some common
objections to it. Noonan’s objection,43 for example,
mentions the two principles explicitly, and argues that
they are not sufficient to support the conclusion of the
CCM.
Noonan’s Objection to the CCM, and Possible Humean
Responses
Noonan does not agree with the CCM.

43

The objection appears on pages 61 to 62 of his 2007 book Hume.

He claims that:
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The argument is fallacious. Given the Separability and
Conceivability Principles any object X, whose coming
into existence is the effect of a particular cause C,
might have come into existence in the absence of C.
But it does not follow that X might have come into
existence without any cause. For it is compatible with
the argument that in order for X to exist some cause
must bring it into existence even if there is no
particular cause which must bring X into existence if
X is brought into existence (Noonan 61-62).

Noonan’s objection can be articulated in a different way.
Suppose that X comes into existence by C1, a specific,
particular cause. Noonan interprets the Separability and
Conceivability Principles as implying that X can be
conceived to exist without C1, and therefore it is possible
for X to exist without C1. Noonan argues, however, that this
does not entail that X could come into existence without
any cause at all. At most, Hume’s critique of the causal
maxim proves that X and C1 are both conceptually and
ontologically separable, but it does not follow from this
that X is conceptually and ontologically separable from
every cause. Perhaps another cause, C2, would have brought X
into existence if C1 did not.
For example, suppose I fall off my bike one day and,
by doing so, bruise my arm. According to Noonan’s
objection, Hume’s reasoning would allow me to infer that
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the bruise on my arm could have come into existence even if
I did not fall off my bike, but it would not allow me to
infer that the bruise could have no cause at all. The same
bruise could have resulted from me being accidentally hit
by a bad pitch in a baseball game, for instance. The bruise
could have resulted from many different causes. Merely
proving that it could have come into existence without one
of these causes does not entail that it could have come
into existence without any of them. Hume’s argument shows
only that X could exist and be conceived to exist without
the particular cause that actually produced it. It does not
show that X could exist and be conceived to exist without
any cause whatsoever. Hence insofar as the critique of the
causal maxim attempts to prove that any object or event
could exist and be conceived to exist without any cause,
the critique fails.
Although Noonan is correct that proving that X may
exist or be conceived to exist without the cause which
actually produced it is not sufficient for proving that X
could exist or be conceived to exist without any cause at
all, his objection does not successfully refute Hume’s
critique of the causal maxim. The main problem with
Noonan’s objection occurs in its final sentence: “For it is
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compatible with the argument [the critique of the causal
maxim] that in order for X to exist some cause must bring
it into existence even if there is no particular cause
which must bring X into existence if X is brought into
existence.” There are two possible ways of interpreting
this sentence. The first way is to interpret Noonan as
claiming that Hume’s critique of the causal maxim (CCM)
fails to demonstrate the ontological and conceptual
separability and independence of X from each and every
particular cause that may have produced it if the cause
that actually produced it did not. The second way is to
interpret Noonan as claiming both that it is possible to
form an idea of “some cause” which is not the idea of any
particular cause, and that the existence of this nonparticular, indeterminate, “some cause” is compatible with
the CCM.
The final sentence in Noonan’s objection is false
under both possible interpretations. Noonan concedes that,
given the Separability Principle and the Conceivability
Principle, the CCM shows that the idea of a beginning of
existence can be separated from the idea of a particular
cause of existence. That one concession undermines Noonan’s
objection. If CCM works, it works when applied to the idea
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of any particular cause. If C1 is the one particular cause
which brought X into existence, and C2 is another particular
cause which could have brought X into existence if C1 did
not, the same reasoning which proves the separability of X
and C1 also proves the separability of X and C2.
My example above about the cause of the bruise on my
arm when I fall off my bike makes this point clear. If it
is true that the bruise could have existed separately and
independently of the event in which I fall off my bike,
then it is also true that it could have existed separately
and independently of the event in which I get hit by a
baseball. In the example, the bruise already comes into
existence without the baseball hitting my arm, which
obviously shows that that the bruise is both conceptually
and ontologically separable from the act of being hit by a
baseball. The same reasoning proves the separability of X
and C3, X and C4, and X and any other particular cause that
could have produced X. Since none of them are the actual
cause of X, it is obviously true to say that X could exist
and be conceived to exist without them. Hence if the CCM
successfully proves that X is separable from the particular
cause which actually produced it, by that very fact the CCM
also successfully proves that X is separable from any other
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particular cause. Therefore, if one interprets the final
sentence of Noonan’s objection as implying that Hume’s CCM
fails to demonstrate the ontological and conceptual
separability and independence of X from each and every
particular cause that may have produced it if the cause
that actually produced it did not, then the sentence is
false.
The sentence is also false if one interprets it as
claiming that CCM permits the existence of “some cause” of
X that is not any particular, specific cause. Just as,
given Hume’s Conceivability and Separability Principles,
one cannot think of a line without thinking of it having a
particular length, one cannot think of “cause” in general,
but can only think of a particular cause. The only kind of
cause one can conceive is a particular cause. Hume’s
philosophy does not allow for the idea of a cause in
general, considered separately from any determinate
qualities. Any cause one conceives must be a particular
cause with determinate properties. When Noonan claims that
“in order for X to exist some cause must bring it into
existence even if there is no particular cause which must
bring X into existence,” and that this is compatible with
the CCM, he clearly assumes that it is possible to form the
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idea of “some cause” that is not the idea of any particular
cause; this cause would be a non-particular cause with
indeterminate properties. The existence of such a cause, as
well as the mere idea of such a cause, is not consistent
with some of the very same epistemic and metaphysical
principles – the Conceivability Principle and the
Separability Principle – which serve as the foundation of
the CCM. Thus Noonan is clearly wrong to suggest that the
existence of such an indeterminate, non-particular cause is
compatible with the CCM.
Noonan’s objection uses the Separability and
Conceivability Principles, but does not challenge them.
Instead, it assumes they are true, and attempts to show
that they do not provide sufficient support for the CCM’s
conclusion. Other commentators, however, attack the
principles directly, often in a variety of ways. Stroud is
one such commentator.
Stroud’s Objections to the CCM and Dicker’s Responses
Stroud claims that Hume’s argument is circular.
According to Stroud, Hume uses the concept of
contradictoriness to explain the distinctness of ideas, but
also uses the concept of distinctness to explain
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contradictoriness. Hume uses the term “distinct” in a way
which suggests that two ideas are distinct if and only if
they can be separated without a contradiction. This leads
to a problem: when interpreted in this way, Hume’s claim
that the idea of a beginning of existence and the idea of a
cause of existence are distinct means only that they can
separated without contradiction – but that is the very
thing Hume is trying to prove! He needs an argument which
proves that those ideas can be separated without
contradiction; clearly, if the only proof he provides for
this assertion is that the ideas are distinct, and if that
means the ideas are distinct only because they can be
separated without contradiction, then Hume is arguing in a
circle (Stroud 47).
Stroud thinks that Hume’s conception of
contradictoriness is just as ambiguous as his conception of
distinctness. He discusses the example of a proposition
Hume thinks cannot be denied without contradiction: “Every
husband has a wife.” Stroud acquired this example from T
1.3.4.8, where Hume examines an argument often given to
prove the causal maxim. The argument is simply that every
event must have a cause because every effect, by
definition, must have a cause. Hume agrees that every
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effect has a cause by definition, but he argues that this
fact does not allow one to infer that every event must have
a cause. Hume claims it is true by definition that every
husband has a wife, but this truth does not imply that
every man has a wife, since not every man is a husband. In
the same way, Hume argues, the fact that every effect has a
cause by definition does not imply that every event must
have a cause. Instead of using the assertion that every
husband has a wife to reject attempted proofs of the causal
maxim, Stroud explores the reasons why it is impossible to
deny this proposition without contradiction, but the
proposition “every beginning of existence must have a
cause” can be denied without contradiction. “Every husband
has a wife” cannot be denied without contradiction because
the very concept of a husband must include within it the
notion of a having a wife. In other words, the idea of
being a husband and the idea of having a wife are not
distinct concepts. They cannot be separated, for they are
the same concepts. This means, however, that the sameness
or distinctness of ideas is being used to explain
contradictoriness. The problem with doing so is obvious:
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……the notion of sameness or distinctness of ideas is
being used in the test for contradictoriness, whereas
contradictoriness was originally invoked to explain
the sameness or distinctness of ideas. Hume really has
no non-circular argument on his part at all. He thinks
that he can start from the “evident” distinctness of
two ideas, but he never says how he can recognize that
distinctness (Stroud 48).

After criticizing Hume’s concept of distinctness –
which obviously is essential for the Separability Principle
- Stroud attempts to show that the Conceivability Principle
is false. This particular objection is very common in the
literature on Hume’s Conceivability Principle and appears
in different versions. All of them use Goldbach’s
Conjecture to challenge the Conceivability Principle.
Goldbach’s Conjecture asserts that every even number
greater than two can be expressed as the sum of two primes.
Mathematicians have been unable to either prove or disprove
Goldbach’s Conjecture, even after centuries of trying. Due
to the kind of proposition it is, however, if the
Conjecture is true, it is necessarily true, and if it is
false, it is necessarily false.
Stroud’s version of the objection focuses on the
provability of Goldbach’s Conjecture. If it is true, then
it cannot possibly be false, and hence it would be
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impossible to disprove it. If it is false, then it cannot
possibly be true, in which case proving it would be
impossible. While the truth value of Goldbach’s Conjecture
is currently unknown, it is possible to conceive of someone
proving it to be true, and equally possible to conceive of
someone disproving it by finding a counterexample. In one
of those instances, however, what one conceives is, in
fact, impossible. Thus the idea that whatever is
conceivable is possible is false (Stroud 50).
Stroud speculates a possible defense Hume could
provide to this objection, and argues that it would not
work. Hume might, Stroud claims, plausibly respond that the
Conceivability Principle asserts only that whatever can be
conceived without contradiction is possible. If Goldbach’s
Conjecture is true, then conceiving it being disproven
would involve a contradiction, and therefore disproving it
would not be conceivable after all. Likewise, if Goldbach’s
Conjecture is false, then conceptualizing it being proven
true would involve a contradiction, and therefore could not
be conceived. Stroud thinks this approach would not help
Hume, because Hume has not provided a non-circular account
of contradictoriness (Stroud 50).
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In Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics, Dicker
attempts to defend Hume’s CCM from Stroud’s objections.
Before he does so, however, he develops his own
reconstruction of the CCM. Since he repeatedly refers back
to this reconstruction in his responses to Stroud, it is
necessary to reproduce Dicker’s reconstruction of the CCM
here. Dicker interprets the CCM as follows:

(1)

All distinct ideas are separable from each other
(premiss).

(2)

The idea of a cause of existence is a distinct idea
from the idea of a beginning of existence (premiss).

(3)

We can conceive of something beginning to exist
without a cause (from (1) & (2)).

(4)

Nothing that we can conceive implies a contradiction
(suppressed premiss).44

(5)

“X began to exist and X had no cause” does not imply a
contradiction (from (3) & (4)).

(6)

If p does not imply a contradiction, then we cannot
demonstrate that p is impossible (suppressed premiss).

(7)

We cannot demonstrate that a beginning of existence
without a cause of existence is impossible (from (5) &
(6)).

(8)

We can demonstrate that whatever has a beginning of
existence must have a cause of existence only if we
can demonstrate the impossibility of a beginning of
existence without a cause of existence (premiss).

44

This is one way to formulate Hume’s Conceivability Principle.
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(9)

We cannot demonstrate that whatever has a beginning of
existence must have a cause of existence (from (7) &
(8)).45

After reconstructing Hume’s argument this way, Dicker
proceeds to summarize Stroud’s objections to it. Dicker
claims Stroud argues both that Hume’s reasoning by which he
supports (7) is circular, and that (4), the Conceivability
Principle, is actually false (Dicker 140). An analysis of
Dicker’s responses to Stroud indicates that they do not
completely succeed in defending Hume from them.
When discussing Stroud’s first objection, that Hume’s
support of (7) is circular, Dicker asserts:

He [Stroud] has certainly shown that
sameness/distinctness of ideas, conceivability,
contradiction, and possibility are interdependent
notions……it is questionable, however, that there is a
vicious circularity in using some of these notions to
clarify the others……Hume’s case for (7) would be
viciously circular only if none of (2) or (3) or (5)
had any independent plausibility; but in fact each of
them is independently plausible, and so steps (1) –
(7) are better seen as exhibiting the interconnections
between the notions involved than as a linear defense
of (7) (Dicker 141-142).

45

Dicker, p. 140.
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Dicker never explains why he thinks (2), (3), or (5) are
independently plausible. Perhaps what he means is simply
that Hume has other methods at his disposal to support
those problematic premises besides invoking the notion of
contradictoriness. If this is what Dicker means, he is
correct. Stroud’s first objection is based entirely upon a
particular interpretation of the Separability Principle.
In particular, Stroud interprets the Separability Principle
in strictly conceptual terms – two ideas are distinct if
and only if conceiving one without the other does not
result in a contradiction. By interpreting Hume this way,
it is no wonder why he thinks Hume argues in a circle by
using the distinctness of ideas to explain
contradictoriness and vice-versa. As we have seen earlier,
however, the Separability Principle has an ontological
component as well. Hume could also claim that two ideas are
distinct if and only if their referents can exist
separately from each other, or if the existence of either
referent does not presuppose or guarantee the existence of
the other. The idea of a mountain and the idea of a valley
are not distinct in this sense; the actual objects
themselves are not separable in reality, so the ideas of
those objects are not distinguishable, and therefore not
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distinct. This way of characterizing the distinctness of
ideas does not involve contradictoriness. Dicker is right,
then, that the premises have plausibility which does not
rely on the notion of contradictoriness – the ontological
aspects of the Separability Principle can be used to
support them.
Focusing on the ontological dimensions of the
Separability Principle may save Hume’s argument from the
particular circularity charge that Stroud raises, but only
at the cost of making the argument vulnerable to another
kind of circularity. How does one know if two objects are
separable in reality? If the answer is simply that two
objects are separable in reality if and only if the ideas
of those objects are distinguishable, the question then
becomes how one can tell if the ideas of those objects are
distinguishable. Without invoking contradictoriness, the
only other option would be to claim that the ideas of those
objects are distinguishable only if the objects themselves
can exist separately from each other – which, of course,
leads to a circularity. Thus even though Dicker is right
that Hume can support the problematic premises without
using the notion of contradictoriness, the other means Hume
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has available to him to do so leads to another kind of
circularity.
As with his response to Stroud’s claim that Hume’s
justification for (7) is circular, Dicker’s response to
Stroud’s attack of the Conceivability Principle is only
partially successful. In his response, Dicker argues that
Stroud focuses exclusively on conceiving someone claiming
to have proven or disproven Goldbach’s Conjecture, and not
on the truth or falsity of Goldbach’s Conjecture. There is
a difference, Dicker claims, between conceiving someone
claiming to have proven Goldbach’s Conjecture and
conceiving Goldbach’s Conjecture being true. One can
conceive of a person claiming to have proven that 1 + 1 =
3, for example, “but it does not follow that one can
conceive that 1 + 1 = 3” (Dicker 142).
Dicker is correct both that Stroud’s objection focuses
on the conceivability of someone claiming to have proven
Goldbach’s Conjecture true or false, and that there is a
difference between conceiving someone claiming to have
proven Goldbach’s Conjecture and conceiving Goldbach’s
Conjecture being true. In fact, there is a significant
difference between conceiving someone claiming to have
proven p to be true and conceiving p to actually be true.
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Consequently, Stroud’s objection does not work. It is
perfectly possible, and consistent, to imagine someone
claiming to have proven Goldbach’s Conjecture to be true
and to also conceive of Goldbach’s Conjecture being false.
The truth value of Goldbach’s Conjecture is not dependent
upon one’s claims to have proven or disproven it. After
all, one can claim to have proven it, and be mistaken.
Dicker’s response to Stroud’s Goldbach’s Conjecture
argument, however, only works against Stroud’s particular
version of that objection. Many philosophers have used
Goldbach’s Conjecture in attempt to refute Hume’s
Conceivability Principle, and many of their arguments do
not focus on one’s claiming to have proven or disproven the
conjecture at all. Consider, for example, Jacquette’s
discussion of this method of refuting the Conceivability
Principle:

The standard objections to conceivability or
imagination as a test for possibility are those
involving a priori, and especially mathematical,
ideas. In a version of the criticism originally owing
to Thomas Reid and revived by Saul A. Kripke, it is
supposed to be possible to conceive or imagine both
that Goldbach’s unproven conjecture that every even
number greater than 2 is the sum of two primes is
true, and alternatively that the conjecture is false.
All that is needed is to imagine both that the
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generalization holds for every such even number, and
that somewhere on the distant reaches of the number
line there is an unknown even number that is not the
sum of two primes. Yet, since presumably either
Goldbach’s conjecture or its negation is impossible,
either the conjecture or its negation is conceivable
but not possible. It seems to follow that
conceivability or imaginability, especially in
mathematical and other synthetic a priori matters, is
a faulty criterion of possibility (Jacquette 163).

This version of the objection clearly does not rely on any
person claiming to have proven or disproven anything, and
thus is not vulnerable to Dicker’s response to Stroud’s
version of the same objection. A strong defense of Hume
from Stroud’s Goldbach Conjecture objection would work
against every version of the objection, not just Stroud’s.
Dicker does not provide such a defense.
Anyone familiar with Hume’s epistemology, however,
could easily provide this type of defense. Neither the
truth nor the falsity of Goldbach’s Conjecture are
conceivable on Humean grounds. In order to conceptualize
the conjecture being false, one must be able to imagine an
even number greater than two that cannot be expressed as
the sum of two primes. One must have an impression of, or
at least form an image of, this special number. To date, no
one has ever been able to do this, so Hume would claim that
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it is not possible to conceptualize the conjecture being
false. Furthermore, the mere ability to imagine a number
that contradicts the conjecture would, by itself, be
sufficient to actually disprove the conjecture! For that
reason, it would be impossible to conceptualize the
conjecture being false if it is actually true. Similar
reasoning reveals why Hume would doubt that it is possible
to conceptualize the conjecture being proven true. How
could one conceive of it being proven true without also
imagining the actual proof? Since no such proof has ever
been developed, there is no way one can acquire the
impression of, and therefore the idea of, that proof.
Hume’s epistemological principles would lead him to deny
that it is possible to conceive either the truth or the
falsehood of Goldbach’s Conjecture, and without granting
that possibility, any version of that objection cannot
refute the Conceivability Principle.46
The above discussion illustrates the ways in which
Dicker’s responses to Stroud’s objections are not fully
adequate. Dicker is right that the most important premises
46

Jacquette develops a simpler, but very similar, defense of Hume. He also suggests that Hume could
avoid the objection by adopting an intuitionist approach to mathematics, but mentions that there is no
textual evidence that Hume would be amicable to such a strategy. See David Hume’s Critique of Infinity,
pp. 163 – 164.
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in the CCM have independent plausibility, but the only
Humean way to give them plausibility besides relying on the
notion of contradictoriness only leads to a different kind
of circularity. Dicker is also correct that Stroud’s
version of the Goldbach’s Conjecture objection centers
around the possibility of conceiving someone claiming to
have proven the conjecture, but as we have seen, there are
versions of the objection which do not suffer from this
problem. Hume can be successfully defended against the
Goldbach’s Conjecture objection, but not through Dicker’s
response alone. It is very unclear how Hume could defend
himself against the modified circularity objection I
discussed earlier. Even if Hume can successfully defend his
position against that objection and all others like it,
however, another major difficulty remains with his CCM that
neither he nor any other commentator have even recognized,
let alone attempted to resolve – his critique of the causal
maxim is inconsistent with his Temporal Priority Argument.
How the Critique of the Causal Maxim is Inconsistent
with the Temporal Priority Argument
The Separability Principle and the Conceivability
Principle both play an extremely important role in Hume’s
Critique of the Causal Maxim (CCM). As I have shown
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earlier, these principles imply that, if A and B are
distinct and separable ideas, then it must be possible to
conceive of A without B and vice-versa. If B could not be
conceived independently of A, and could not be conceived to
exist independently of A, then A and B are not separable
and distinct in the Humean sense of those terms.
This simple fact has profound implications for the
CCM. That argument focuses on the distinction between the
concept of a beginning of existence and the concept of a
cause of existence. Hume firmly believes that it is
possible to conceptualize a beginning of existence without
conceptualizing a cause of existence. He thinks it is
logically possible for something to begin to exist without
a cause, and that asserting this does not result in a
contradiction. In other words, Hume would claim that the
following three propositions are consistent with each
other:
(1)

X did not exist at time t1.

(2)

X began existing at time t2.

(3)

The beginning of X’s existence never had a cause.
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If Hume’s CCM works, (3) does not contradict (1) and (2).
I will assume for the sake of argument that the CCM works.
This means that it is possible to conceptualize something
beginning to exist without a cause or, in other words, a
beginning of existence that is not associated with a cause
of existence.
If beginning of existence and cause of existence are
truly separable and distinct concepts, however, it must
also be possible to conceptualize something being caused to
exist without beginning to exist. When applied to the
concepts of a beginning of existence and a cause of
existence, the Separability Principle and the
Conceivability Principle entail that the following three
propositions are also consistent with each other:
(4)

X did not exist at time t1.

(5)

X was caused to exist at time t2.

(6)

The existence of X never had a beginning.

The obvious problem, of course, is that propositions
(4) through (6) are clearly not consistent! If X was caused
to exist at t2, then X’s existence began at t2, since it is
obviously absurd to suggest that something can remain non-
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existent once it is caused to exist. Hence (6) contradicts
(5). When Hume discusses the concept of a beginning of
existence in his CCM, he describes it in such a way that
the contradiction between (6) and (4) and (5) becomes
crystal clear and impossible to avoid. Recall that
immediately after explaining what the Conceivability and
Separability Principles mean, Hume asserts that since “the
ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, ‘twill be
easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this
moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the
distinct idea of a cause or productive principle” (T
1.3.3.3). With this remark, Hume obviously identifies a
beginning of existence as a process by which an object is
non-existent one moment, and existent the next, which is
exactly the situation described in (4) and (5).
Hume’s description of a beginning of existence
illustrates the way in which his CCM is inconsistent with
his Temporal Priority Argument (TPA). For Hume, if
something begins to exist, it did not exist at one moment,
and then exists at the following moment. In order for an
object to be non-existent one moment and existent the next,
there must be at least two moments which exist in
succession. A beginning of existence requires temporal
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succession. The Separability Principle states not only that
distinct things can be conceptually separated, but also
that they can be ontologically separated as well. If A and
B are separable, both can exist completely separately from
each other. If Hume is correct that beginnings of existence
and causes of existence are separate concepts, then it must
be possible for there to be beginnings of existence even if
there are no causes of existence. As discussed in chapter
3, for Hume all causes must be successive. One of the
crucial premises in the TPA states that the complete
absence of causal succession entails “the utter
annihilation” of temporal succession. Consequently, if
there were no causes of existence, there would be no
beginnings of existence either. Obviously, if the TPA is
sound, beginnings of existence and causes of existence are
not nearly as separable as Hume requires them to be for his
CCM to work.
The CCM entails that time and causation are
ontologically independent of each other. The TPA entails
that they are not. The two arguments are clearly not
consistent with each other, but Hume cannot abandon either
one without rejecting epistemological principles which are
crucial for his entire philosophy.
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Clearly, Hume’s assertion that “the separation,
therefore, of the idea of a cause from that of a beginning
of existence, is plainly possible for the imagination” is
inconsistent with his TPA. If the premise is true, the TPA
must be unsound; if TPA is sound, the premise must be
false.
Hume cannot resolve the difficulty by merely rejecting
the TPA. In the previous chapter, I presented several
reasons why Hume cannot trivialize the TPA as lightly as he
does in the Treatise. Even if Hume dismisses his own TPA in
spite of those reasons, however, another problem remains
for his CCM. In the CCM, he describes a beginning of
existence in terms of an object being non-existent one
moment and existent the next. By interpreting a beginning
of existence in this way, he precludes the possibility of
conceptualizing a cause of existence without a beginning of
existence. The “actual separation” of a cause and a
beginning of existence is not “plainly possible for the
imagination,” because the very concept of a cause of
existence as Hume characterizes it contains the concept of
a beginning of existence. This would remain true even if
Hume completely discards the TPA, or never developed the
TPA in the first place.
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Concluding Remarks
Hume’s critique of the causal maxim relies on the
assumption that the idea of a cause and the idea of an
effect are distinct from each other. In the context of the
causal maxim, the kind of effect Hume is most interested in
is a beginning of existence. Hume’s critique of the causal
maxim stands or falls with his belief that the idea of a
cause of existence is distinct from, and therefore can
exist separately from, the idea of a beginning of
existence. If these ideas truly are as separable as Hume
requires them to be for his CCM to work, then his CCM
contradicts his TPA. Another problem facing Hume is that he
characterizes a beginning of existence in such a way that
the concept of a cause of existence necessarily entails the
concept of a beginning of existence, making the kind of
distinction Hume wants between them impossible. Hence
Hume’s problematic premise that the idea of a cause of
existence is separable from the idea of a beginning of
existence is either true but incompatible with his TPA, or
false.
While it is true that the idea of a cause and the idea
of an effect are not nearly as distinct as Hume thinks they
are, the ideas are still distinguishable from each other.
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As seen in the previous chapter, all causes qua causes
precede their effects in time. All causes exhibit this
asymmetrical temporal relationship with their effects. When
the effect in question is a beginning of existence, this
means that the cause of that beginning of existence must
precede the beginning of existence in time. In other words,
if a cause, C, causes an object to begin existing at time
t2, then C must have existed at time t1. This method of
distinguishing a cause of existence from a beginning of
existence involves placing them within a temporal order.
Such an approach does not allow causes of existence and
beginnings of existence to possess the kind of separability
they would have to have for the CCM to work. Hume was
correct that the idea of a cause of existence and the idea
of a beginning of existence are distinct, but he was wrong
about what that distinctness consists in, and what it
entails.
This chapter and the previous chapter investigated the
relationship between Hume’s theory of time and his theory
of causation. The following chapter will explore the
connection between Hume’s conception of time and his theory
of induction.
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Chapter Five
The Phenomenal Succession of Time and its Influence on
Induction
Introduction
Hume’s theory of induction is one of the most famous
aspects of his entire philosophy. The vast literature on
Hume’s account of induction tends to focus on his discovery
of the problems concerning the epistemic justification of
induction. Although such issues are unquestionably
important and worthy of study, not enough emphasis has been
given to the role Hume’s theory of time plays in the
formation of inductive inferences. The relationship between
Hume’s theory of time and his theory of induction is also
important and worthy of study, because the mind must
experience time in a very specific way in order for it to
engage in the mental operations required for induction.
More specifically, for the mind to form inductive
inferences the way Hume thinks it does, the mind must
experience time discretely, successively, and flowing from
the past to the present and from the present to the future.
This successive, unidirectional manner of experiencing time
makes induction possible.
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Understanding why the process of induction as Hume
describes it requires and presupposes a particular way of
experiencing time necessitates an analysis of T 2.3.7 and T
2.3.8, in which Hume discusses the manner in which people
experience time, why they experience it that way, and what
effects that manner of experiencing time has on the
imagination and the passions. For the purposes of clarity
and convenience, I will refer to this mode of experiencing
time as the phenomenal succession of time (PST) in order to
distinguish it from the natural succession of time, the
nature of time considered independently of the mind’s
experience of it. What is important for Hume is not just
the fact that people experience time successively, but also
that this phenomenal succession of time has a certain
direction: it moves from the past to the present to the
future. As will become clear later in this chapter, the
mental processes employed in induction require PST to have
this direction.
The Phenomenal Succession of Time
At T 2.3.7 and T 2.3.8, Hume investigates the effects
contiguity in space and time has on the passions. What is
contiguous has a stronger impact, in terms of force and
vivacity, than what is remote. Remote things exert a weaker
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influence on the passions “by reason of the interruption in
our manner of conceiving them” (T 2.3.7.3). Observation of
human behavior indicates that this is true:

...we find in common life, that men are principally
concern’d about those objects, which are not much
remov’d either in space or time, enjoying the present,
and leaving what is afar off to the care of chance and
fortune. Talk to a man of his condition thirty years
hence, and he will not regard you. Speak of what is to
happen tomorrow, and he will lend you attention” (T
2.3.7.3).

When Hume speaks of something being “remov’d either in
space or time,” he is referring to something being removed
in space or time from one’s present position in space and
time. One’s current condition in the present is, for the
lack of a better term, the mind’s default mode, and when
the mind imagines anything at a certain point in time, it
always does so relative to the present.
Many of Hume’s comments illustrate this principle. For
example, at T 2.3.7.1, Hume writes:

There is an easy reason, why every thing contiguous to
us, either in space or time, shou’d be conceiv’d with
a peculiar force and vivacity, and excel every other
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object, in its influence on the imagination. Ourself
is intimately present to us, and whatever is related
to self must partake of that quality47……where an object
is so far remov’d as to have lost the advantage of
this relation……[the idea of the object] becomes still
fainter and more obscure” (T 2.3.7.1).

Hume makes the same idea even more explicit in the next
paragraph, where he claims, “the imagination can never
totally forget the points of space and time, in which we
are existent; but receives such frequent advertisements of
them from the passions and the senses, that however it may
turn its attention to foreign and remote objects, it is
necessitated every moment to reflect on the present” (T
2.3.7.2).
When the imagination does “turn its attention to
foreign and remote objects,” it does so successively, in a
way which always refers back to the present. Hume describes
the process as follows:

……in the conception of those objects, which we regard
as real and existent, we take them in their proper
47

By making this claim, Hume reiterates a virtually identical assertion he establishes earlier in Book 2 of
the Treatise: “’Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present
with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that ‘tis not
possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it. Whatever object, therefore, is
related to ourselves must be conceiv’d with a like vivacity of conception” (T 2.1.11.4).
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order and situation, and never leap from one object to
another, which is distant from it, which are
interpos’d betwixt them. When we reflect, therefore,
on any object distant from ourselves, we are oblig’d
not only to reach it at first by passing thro’ all the
intermediate space betwixt ourselves and the object,
but also to renew our progress every moment; being
every moment recall’d to the consideration of
ourselves and our present situation. ‘Tis easily
conceiv’d, that this interruption must weaken the idea
by breaking the action of the mind, and hindering the
conception from being so intense and continu’d, as
when we reflect on a nearer object. The fewer steps we
make to arrive at the object, and the smoother the
road is, this diminution of vivacity is less sensibly
felt, but still may be observ’d more or less in
proportion to the degrees of distance and difficulty”
(T 2.3.7.2).

The fewer steps the mind must pass through to arrive at the
object, the closer it is, and the more intense and
vivacious the imagination’s idea of that object will be.
The more steps the mind passes through, the more remote the
object is, and the weaker the idea of that object will be.
Thus the larger the distance between a person and the
object, the fainter the mind’s ideas of that object will
be.
A great distance in time weakens ideas and passions
much more than an equal distance in space. Hume claims that
this is due to the different properties of space and time.
Since the points of space are coexistent, the mind can
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easily experience many of them at once. Temporal parts
cannot coexist; they must be successive. The longer the
succession, the harder it is for the imagination to trace
all of the steps. Each temporal part (moment) must be
completed before the next one can appear in the
imagination. Hume concludes that “By this means any
distance in time causes a greater interruption in the
thought than an equal distance in space, and consequently
weakens more considerably the idea, and consequently the
passions; which depend in a great measure, on the
imagination, according to my system”(T 2.3.7.5).
After explaining why a distance in time has a greater
effect on the imagination and passions than an equal
distance in space, he asserts that that a distance in the
past weakens the passions more than a distance in the
future does (T 2.3.7.6). The past weakens the passions more
than the future because “We always follow the succession of
time in placing our ideas, and from the consideration of
any object pass more easily to that, which follows
immediately after it, than to that which went before it” (T
2.3.7.7). Hume thinks historical narratives illustrate this
phenomenon. If event A occurred prior to B in reality,
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historians will very rarely “break the order of time” and
discuss B prior to discussing A (T 2.3.7.7).
When conceiving any object, the imagination always
begins with “the present situation of the person.” If the
object the imagination considers is in the past,

……the progression of the thought in passing to it from
the present is contrary to nature, as proceeding from
one point of time to that which is preceding, and from
that to another preceding, in opposition to the
natural course of the succession. On the other hand,
when we turn our thought to a future object, our fancy
flows along the stream of time, and arrives at the
object by an order, which seems most natural, passing
always from one point in time to that which is
immediately posterior to it. This easy progression of
ideas favors the imagination, and makes it conceive
its object in a stronger and fuller light, than when
we are continually oppos’d in our passage, and are
oblig’d to overcome difficulties arising from the
natural propensity of the fancy. A small degree of
distance in the past has, therefore, a greater effect,
in interrupting and weakening the conception, than a
much greater [degree of distance] in the future. From
this effect of it on the imagination is deriv’d its
influence on the will and passions”(T 2.3.7.8).

The above passage implies that temporal succession exists
independently of the mind. Hume explicitly acknowledges
this at T 1.3.14.28, where he writes, “As to what may be
said, that the operations of nature are independent of our
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thought and reasoning, I allow it; and accordingly have
observ’d, that objects bear to each other the relations of
contiguity and succession……and that all this is independent
of, and antecedent to the operations of the understanding.”
The phenomenal succession of time (PST) follows the natural
succession of time. Because of this, any mental operation
which requires the reversal of PST is inherently more
difficult for the mind to execute than a mental operation
which conforms to it.
Hume uses this principle to explain why it is the case
that, when the mind considers two points in time equally
distant from each other, one in the future and one in the
past, the point in future will exert greater influence over
the imagination than the point in the past. When we imagine
ourselves situated at a point between the present and the
future, we experience the future approaching towards us and
the past retreating from us, and becoming more distant.
Since the mind naturally likes to progress from one moment
to the next moment following it, “we rather choose to fix
our thought on the point of time interpos’d betwixt the
present and the future, than on that betwixt the present
and the past. We advance, rather than retard our existence;
and following what seems the natural succession of time,
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proceed from past to present, and present to future” (T
2.3.7.9). Consequently, “we conceive the future as flowing
every moment nearer us, and the past as retiring” (T
2.3.7.9). We consider the future as constantly advancing
and the past as constantly retreating, becoming more
distant. This is because “the fancy anticipates the course
of things, and surveys the object in that condition, to
which it tends, as well as in that, which is regarded as
the present” (T 2.3.7.9).
As shown above, it is more difficult for the
imagination to situate itself at a point in the past than
at a point in the future, since the natural progression of
temporal succession flows from the past, to the present, to
the future, and the imagination follows this natural
succession of time. A mental operation which opposes this
natural order of time will weaken the imagination, as well
as the passions. In the very next section, T 2.3.8, Hume
adds that this weakening effect is limited to short
distances in the past. Very long distances in the past have
the opposite effect upon the imagination – they strengthen
it!48

48

Hume is well aware of the fact that his claim that very long distances in the past strengthen the
imagination appears to be inconsistent with his comments in the previous section. When he introduces
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Hume explains this unexpected result in terms of
people’s natural responses to difficult challenges. “’Tis a
quality very observable in human nature,” he claims, “that
any opposition, which does not entirely discourage or
intimidate us, has rather a contrary effect, and inspires
us with a more than ordinary grandeur and magnanimity.”
This is because “In collecting our force to overcome the
opposition, we invigorate the soul, and give it an
elevation with which otherwise it would never have been
acquainted” (T 2.3.8.4).
While Hume never explicitly states precisely how one
can determine what counts as a small distance in the past
and what counts as a great distance in the past, the
examples he uses to support his points strongly suggest
that, by a great distance in the past, he means antiquity.
Hume observed that people tend to venerate ancient artwork
and artifacts much more than they do contemporary ones, and
he thinks this phenomenon is due to the fact that the sheer
difficulties involved with conceptualizing points in time
so far removed from the present that the soul is
invigorated by the challenge, and rises to meet it. A great
section 8, he states that he intends to study the “reverse” of the phenomena he explored in section 7. He
also remarks that “the curiousness of the subject” – the effects a long distance in the past has on the
imagination – allows him to digress and investigate it in more detail.
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distance in the past, then, clearly seems to involve a
point in the past long before any of one’s contemporaries
existed.
Veneration for our ancestors and ancient artifacts is
not the only psychological process that requires the mind
to experience time in a specific way. Induction, as Hume
characterizes it, also requires the mind to experience time
successively, in a particular order: from the past to the
present to the future.
The Relationship between the Phenomenal Succession of
Time and Induction
Induction, as Hume describes it in the Treatise, is a
psychological process that is based upon past experience,
and involves inferring the existence or condition of one
object that is not present from an object that is present.
Hume describes this process and provides an example of it
at T 1.3.6.2, where he writes:

We remember to have had frequent instances of the
existence of one species of objects; and also
remember, that the individuals of another species of
objects have always attended them, and have existed in
a regular order of contiguity and succession with
them. Thus we remember to have seen that species of
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object we call flame, and to have felt that species of
sensation we call heat. We likewise call to mind their
constant conjunction in all past instances. Without
any farther ceremony, we call the one cause and the
other effect, and infer the existence of the one from
the other. In all those instances, from which we learn
the conjunction of particular causes and effects, both
the causes and effects have been perceiv’d by the
senses, and are remember’d: But in all cases, wherein
we reason concerning them, there is only one perceiv’d
or remember’d, and the other is supply’d in conformity
to our past experience.”

There is an undeniable temporal dimension to induction.
PST, the property by which the imagination projects itself
from the past to the present and from the present to the
future, shares many similarities with the psychological
process by which the mind makes inductive inferences. In
his Abstract to the Treatise, Hume claims that “all our
reasonings in the conduct of life,” and “all our belief in
history” as well as “all philosophy,” are based upon “the
inference from cause to effect” (Abstract 10). As mentioned
above, Hume argues that historical narratives support his
claim that the imagination naturally tends to pass from one
object to one that immediately follows it, instead of the
object immediately preceding it. This suggests that the
inference from cause to effect and the passage of the
imagination from an object to its successor are similar
processes.
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Another similarity consists in the fact that, when
engaged in inductive reasoning, the mind “anticipates” the
future. As an example, Hume discusses a hypothetical man,
such as Adam from the bible, who has never previously
experienced a billiard ball colliding with another billiard
ball. Upon seeing such a collision for the first time, Adam
would not infer that the second ball will move. Only
experience could make him expect the second ball to move in
such situations. “If he had seen a sufficient number of
instances of this kind,” Hume claims, “whenever he saw the
ball moving towards the other, he would always conclude
without hesitation that the second would acquire motion.”
This is because “his understanding would anticipate his
sight, and form a conclusion suitable to his past
experience” (Abstract 12). Hume repeats the same idea three
paragraphs later when he remarks, “When I see a billiardball moving towards another, my mind is immediately carried
by habit to the usual effect, and anticipates my sight by
conceiving the second ball in motion” (Abstract 15).
In the above examples of induction from the Abstract,
the mind projects itself into the future by conceptualizing
a condition of the second ball that has not yet happened,
and hence is not yet perceivable to the senses. PST as Hume
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describes it involves exactly the same process. Recall
that, when Hume explained why a distance in the past does
not have the same effect on the mind than an equal distance
in the future, he claimed that “the fancy anticipates the
course of things, and surveys the object in that condition,
to which it tends, as well in that, which is regarded as
the present” (T 2.3.7.9). Obviously, “the course of things”
is the future, and the condition to which the object tends
will be instantiated in the future, or at least is expected
to be instantiated in the future. Thus in both the examples
of inductive inferences regarding the billiard balls and
PST, the mind directs itself toward the future and
conceptualizes an event or condition that is currently
inaccessible to the senses.
Such a process, which plays such a crucial role in
induction, involves a psychological transfer from the past
to the future. Hume explicitly acknowledges this several
times. Consider, for example, his remark that “All our
reasonings concerning the probability of causes are founded
on the transferring of past to future” (T 1.3.12.19).
Another example occurs in the section “Of the Probability
of Causes,” where Hume writes:
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We may observe, that the supposition, that the future
resembles the past, is not founded on arguments of any
kind, but is deriv’d entirely from habit, by which we
are determin’d to expect for the future the same train
of objects, to which we have been accustom’d. This
habit or determination to transfer the past to the
future is full and perfect; and consequently the first
impulse of the imagination in this species of
reasoning is endow’d with the same qualities” (T
1.3.12.9).

In this passage, Hume claims that the assumption that the
future resembles the past results from the process by which
the mind transfers the past to the future, which clearly
means that the latter is more fundamental and basic than
the former.
Transferring the past to the future is the process
involved with all inductive inferences, and works as
follows. After experiencing multiple instances of A-type
objects followed by B-type objects in the past, the mind
comes to expect that every A-type object it experiences
from that point on will continue to be followed by a B-type
object. In the present, an A-type object appears, alone and
unaccompanied by a B-type object. The mind will then
“anticipate the sight” and believe that a B-type object
will appear as well. By doing so, the mind transfers the
past to the future – it “transfers” the constant
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conjunction of A-type objects and B-type objects it has
experienced in the past to the future.
Notice how, in the process described above, the mind
progresses from the past to the present to the future. That
is the same direction in which PST flows. Clearly, then,
inductive reasoning exemplifies and requires PST. It is
important to note, however, that while induction
exemplifies PST, it is not identical to PST. PST is more
basic and fundamental than induction. This is because the
mind does not need to experience a constant conjunction of
anything, or make any inferences about anything, to
experience time successively from the past to the present
to the future.
Suppose A occurs at time t1, B occurs at time t2, and C
occurs at time t3. When the mind experiences A, B, and C, it
experiences A first, then B, then C, in that order. By
doing so, it moves from one point in time to the next and
then to the one after that, successively. The mind does not
need to experience a constant conjunction of A-type
objects, B-type objects, and C-type objects for this
process to take place. In fact, it can move from A to B to
C even if A, B, and C never appear again. Moreover, A, B,
and C may not be causally related to each other in any way,
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yet the mind can still experience them successively in this
manner. This is what makes PST more basic than the mental
process of transferring the past to the future, which
occurs during induction. Induction is a more complicated
process that requires PST but also requires other things
besides PST. Hence PST is a necessary condition for
induction, but not a sufficient condition. One cannot
engage in inductive reasoning without experiencing time
successively, but one can experience time successively
without engaging in induction.
Careful analysis of Hume’s comments regarding
induction helps explain precisely why PST is a necessary
condition for the possibility of inductive inferences. At
its most basic level, induction involves inferring the
existence of objects that are not currently present to the
senses or the imagination from objects which are. According
to Hume, “’tis therefore by EXPERIENCE49 only, that we can
infer the existence of one object from that of another” (T
1.3.6.2). As I discussed in Chapter 2, in Hume’s ontology,
all existing things either coexist or exist successively.
Likewise, our experience of objects also comes in two
different modes: we can experience things coexisting, or
49

This word is capitalized in the original text.
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experience them successively. Induction requires us to
experience things successively. Hume explicitly
acknowledges this fact when he describes the role
experience plays in the formation of inductive inferences.
He claims that “We remember to have had frequent instances
of the existence of one species of objects; and also
remember, that the individuals of another species of
objects have always attended them, and have existed in a
regular order of contiguity and succession with them” (T
1.3.6.2). At T 2.3.7, Hume claims that we experience the
points of space as coexistent, but we can only experience
time successively. Since every succession, for Hume, is
temporal, induction requires a successive experience of
time.
Further evidence that induction requires successive
experience concerns the fact that the object about which we
infer is not currently present to the senses or the
imagination. Hume makes this point clear when he writes:

In all those instances, from which we learn the
conjunction of particular causes and effects, both the
causes and effects have been perceiv’d by the senses,
and are remember’d: But in all cases, wherein we
reason concerning them, there is only one perceiv’d or
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remember’d, and the other is supply’d in conformity to
our past experience” (T 1.3.6.2)

For the mind to engage in induction, it must experience
only one type of object that it has repeatedly experienced
being accompanied by another type of object in the past,
which means that the accompanying object is not currently
present, either to the senses or the imagination. Such a
situation could never happen without successive
experiences. If the mind experienced all objects as
coexistent, there would never be a scenario in which an
object typically accompanied by another type of object in
the past would fail to accompany it in the present. The act
of experiencing any objects or spatial points as coexistent
entails that all of the objects or points are present to
the mind at once. If the mind’s experience of all objects
were coexistent, then an object’s “usual attendant” must be
present before the mind, but if it is, there is no reason
for the mind to make any inductive inferences about it!
Induction requires the mind to make an inference about
something it has not yet experienced or perceived based
upon what it already has experienced or perceived. If A and
B coexist, both would be present in the mind at once. That
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one single instance of A and B accompanying each other
would not be sufficient for the mind to experience a
constant conjunction of A-type objects and B-type objects.
Such a constant conjunction necessitates repetition of Atype objects and B-type objects. Since repetition of
anything obviously requires succession, constant
conjunction also requires succession.
The fact that constant conjunction requires repetition
and repetition requires succession reveals another way in
which induction is dependent upon PST. For the mind to form
inductive inferences properly, the objects it repeatedly
experiences must be as temporally contiguous to each other
as possible. The greater the temporal distance between one
pair of accompanying objects and the next pair of similar
accompanying objects, the more difficult it is for the mind
to experience a constant conjunction between them. Hume
recognizes this:

……’twill readily be allow’d, that the several
instances we have of the constant conjunction of
resembling causes and effects are in themselves
entirely independent, and that the communication of
motion, which I see result at present from the shock
of two billiard balls, is totally distant from that
which I saw result from such an impulse a twelve-month
ago. These impulses have no influence on each other.
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They are entirely divided by time and place; and the
one might have existed and communicated motion, tho’
the other never been in being (T 1.3.14.18).

In the above example, Hume experiences one billiard ball
communicating motion to another, and then has a similar
experience a year later. Neither instance could possibly
influence the other, due to the temporal distance
separating them. This is exactly what one would expect,
given Hume’s remarks in T 2.3.7 regarding the inherent
difficulty of tracing any long succession, and the fact
that when tracing any succession of events, the mind must
pass through each intermediate step in that succession in
sequential order(T 2.3.7.2). Considering the number of
intermediate steps Hume’s mind would have to pass through
in a year-long succession, it is not surprising that he
would not consider the two instances of one billiard ball
moving another to be conjoined in any way. If the only
examples Hume ever experienced of billiard balls moving
each other were the two discussed in the above passage;
separated by a year-long succession in which many other
events occurred, it is clear he would never be able to make
any inductive inferences about billiard balls moving each
other.
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A year-long succession is too far removed from the
present to influence the imagination strongly enough for
induction to occur. Recall that at T 2.3.7.1, Hume claims
that spatially and temporally contiguous objects exert a
strong affect on the imagination because they are close to
– that is, they relate to or serve as a matter of concern
for - our present condition, which is always inevitably
something the imagination contemplates. Remote objects have
a far weaker effect upon the imagination because they
exhibit a much fainter and weaker relation to the present
than contiguous objects do. At T 2.3.7.2, Hume claims that
the reason for this is that the imagination must not only
pass through each intermediate step in a succession, but
also relate back to, and contemplate, the present with each
intermediate step. Needless to say, the more steps a
succession contains, the more difficult it will be for the
mind to carry out this process, and so the more remote an
object is from the present, the weaker its effects upon the
imagination will be. Conversely, the fewer steps a
succession contains, the more contiguous it is with the
present, and the stronger its influence on the imagination
will be.
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How this process of constantly tracing each step of a
temporal succession and comparing it to the present
influences induction should now be clear. “All kinds of
reasoning from causes to effects,” Hume asserts, “are
founded on two particulars, viz. the constant conjunction
of any two objects in all past experience, and the
resemblance of a present object to any one of them” (T
1.3.12.25). Hume then proceeds to claim,

The effect of these two particulars is, that the
present object invigorates and enlivens the
imagination; and the resemblance, along with the
constant union, conveys this force and vivacity to the
related idea; which we are therefore said to
believe……If you weaken either the union or
resemblance, you weaken the principle of transition,
and of consequence that belief, which arises from it
(T 1.3.12.25).

Temporally remote objects weaken both the constant union
and the resemblance of the past objects to the present
object. The more temporally remote objects are, the harder
it is for the imagination to relate the steps of the
succession from the present to the objects back to the
present, and thus the harder it is for the mind to
recognize the resemblance between the past objects and the
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present object. The more contiguous objects are with the
present, the easier it is for the imagination to identify a
resemblance between those objects and an object in the
present, and hence the easier it is for the mind to
construct inductive inferences.
While analyzing the mental processes required for
induction in terms of the mind’s experience of time helps
illuminate these processes, it also reveals some unresolved
tensions in Hume’s thought which have not been fully
appreciated or recognized. One of these problems involves a
potential inconsistency concerning the future’s
relationship to the present and our attitude toward this
relationship. The other concerns an unexpected consequence
of Hume’s analysis of PST which contradicts some of his
beliefs about causal inferences.
Unresolved Tensions
Hume’s remarks about our attitudes regarding the
future in Book One of the Treatise are not always
consistent with his claims regarding the same topic in Book
Two. An excellent example of this discrepancy concerns the
influence a point in time has on the passions by virtue of
its closeness or remoteness to the present. In “Of
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contiguity and distance in space and time,” T 2.3.7, Hume
explicitly argues that the more remote something is from
the present, the weaker its effect will be on the
imagination and the passions:

Here then we are to consider two kinds of objects, the
contiguous and the remote; of which the former, by
means of their relation to ourselves, approach an
impression in force and vivacity; the latter by reason
of the interruption in our manner of conceiving them,
appear in a weaker and more imperfect light. This is
their effect on the imagination. If my reasoning be
just, they must have a proportionate effect on the
will and passions. Contiguous objects must have an
influence much superior to the distant and remote.
Accordingly we find in common life, that men are
principally concern’d about those objects, which are
not much remov’d either in space and time, enjoying
the present, and leaving what is afar off to the care
of chance and fortune. Talk to a man of his condition
thirty years hence, and he will not regard you. Speak
of what is to happen to-morrow, and he will lend you
attention” (T 2.3.7.3)50

In the above passage, Hume explains our lack of regard and
concern for the future in terms of the remoteness of the
future relative to the present. The more distant the future
date is, the less concern we will have for it, due to its
lack of contiguity with the present.

50

This is a longer excerpt of a passage I quoted earlier in this chapter.
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Much earlier in the Treatise, at T 1.3.9.13, Hume also
discusses people’s lack of interest in the distant future,
but he provides a very different explanation for this
phenomenon:

As resemblance, when conjoin’d with causation,
fortifies our reasonings; so the want of it in any
very great degree is able almost entirely to destroy
them. Of this there is a remarkable instance in the
universal carelessness and stupidity of men in regard
to a future state, where they show as obstinate an
incredulity, as they do a blind credulity on other
occasions……the vulgar……have nothing like what we can
call a belief of the eternal duration of their
souls……as belief is an act of the mind arising from
custom, ‘tis not strange the want of resemblance
shou’d overthrow what custom has establish’d, and
diminish the force of the idea, as much as that latter
principle increases it. A future state is so far
remov’d from our comprehension, and we have so obscure
an idea of the manner, in which we shall exist after
the dissolution of the body, that all the reasons we
can invent, however strong in themselves, and however
much assisted by education, are never able with slow
imaginations to surmount this difficulty, or bestow a
sufficient authority and force on the idea. I rather
choose to ascribe this incredulity to the faint idea
we form of our future condition, deriv’d from its want
of resemblance to the present life, than to that
deriv’d from its remoteness. For I observe, that men
are every where concern’d about what may happen after
their death, provided it regard this world; and that
there are few to whom their name, their family, their
friends, and their country are in any period of time
entirely indifferent.
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In this passage, Hume explains incredulity in and lack of
concern for a distant future state – in this case, the
afterlife – in terms of its lack of resemblance to the
present life. He explicitly denies that the remoteness of
that future state is the reason for the incredulity. Hume
argues that, in spite of the obvious remoteness of the next
life in comparison to the present life, most people still
care deeply about what will happen to their reputation,
their friends, their family, and their country after they
die. According to Hume, people care about these things
because they are all a part of, and therefore, resemble,
the present life.
By refusing to attribute incredulity in the afterlife
to latter’s remoteness from the present life, Hume offers
an explanation that conflicts with the one he provides in T
2.3.7.3 and other paragraphs in that section, where he
posits remoteness from the present as the reason for our
indifference regarding the far future. His claim that
people do care about their post-mortem condition to the
extent that it resembles the present life is problematic,
because Hume’s comments in T 2.3.7 all pertain to the
present life, yet he still attributes indifference about
the future to its remoteness.
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Hume unknowingly makes this problem more acute at T
2.3.7.9, where he explores whether two points of time
equally distant from the present have the same effect on
the imagination, and ultimately concludes that they do not.
He argues that different points in time equally distant
from the present would have the same effect on the
imagination if PST did not exist:

When from the present instant we consider two points
of time equally distant in the future and in the past,
‘tis evident, that, abstractly consider’d, their
relation to the present is almost equal. For as the
future will sometime be present, so the past was once
present. If we cou’d, therefore, remove this quality
of the imagination [PST], an equal distance in the
past and in the future, wou’d have a similar
influence.

Without PST, two points of time equally distant in the
future and the past would have the same effect upon the
imagination. This is because both points would be equally
removed from the present; they would both exhibit the same
relation to the present. By asserting that the equally
distant points in time would have the same effect, Hume
clearly assumes that remoteness in relation to the present
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determines the strength or weakness of a point in time’s
influence on the imagination.
A possible way to resolve the difficulty might be to
claim that remoteness causes a lack of resemblance; the
more remote a point in time is, the less it will resemble
the present. Some support for this claim comes from the
fact that, as I argued earlier, large distances in time
disrupt the mental processes involved with induction, and
consequently, make the mind far less likely to assume that
the future will resemble the past. Although it is not clear
if this completely resolves the problem, it seems to be a
good place to start.
Another unresolved problem concerns the relationship
between PST and causal inferences. Hume repeatedly claims
throughout T 2.3.7 that mental operations which require the
imagination to oppose PST and project itself from the
present to a short distance in the past are much more
difficult for the imagination than mental operations which
conform to PST. As discussed in Chapter 3, Hume believes
that all causes must precede their effects in time, and
causal succession presupposes temporal succession. This
means that any mental operation by which the mind begins
with a cause and then infers or moves its consideration to
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the effect necessarily involves a psychological movement
from one moment to the moment immediately following it,
which is exactly the order in which the mind experiences
time when it functions in accordance with PST.
Since all causes qua causes temporally precede their
effects, all effects qua effects temporally succeed their
causes. This obviously means that an inference from an
effect to a cause must involve a psychological movement
from one moment in time (the moment at which the effect
exists) to a moment immediately preceding it (the moment at
which the cause exists). Such a mental act directly opposes
PST, as well as the natural succession of time. As
mentioned above, all mental acts done in conformity with
PST are much easier to perform than mental acts which do
not. Inferences from causes to effects conform to PST.
Inferences from effects to causes, however, do not. For
Hume’s remarks regarding PST in T 2.3.7 to be consistent
with his belief that all causes temporally precede their
effects, it must necessarily be the case that inferences
from effects to causes are much more difficult for the mind
to perform than inferences from causes to effects.
Hume, however, does not recognize this consequence of
his own theories. Many of his comments throughout the
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Treatise – especially at T 1.3.6.2, T 1.3.6.7, and T
1.3.12.25 – very strongly suggest that inferences from
effects to causes are just as easy for the mind to perform
as inferences from causes to effects. He seems to assume
that the same psychological and phenomenological processes
are involved with each type of inference, and that each
type of inference exerts the same degree of power over the
imagination and passions. Of course, the processes involved
are not the same – inferences from causes to effects
conform to PST, inferences from effects to causes oppose it
– and the imagination and passions are affected differently
to different degrees in each kind of inference; moving from
cause to effect is easier for the imagination than moving
in the opposite direction. Hume not only fails to realize
this, but also makes comments which directly contradict
this inescapable consequence of his theories. An excellent
example of this occurs in Hume’s twentieth footnote in the
Treatise, where he claims, “We infer a cause immediately
from its effect; and this inference is not only a true
species of reasoning, but the strongest of all others” (T
1.3.7.5). To be consistent, Hume would have to say that the
inference from effects to causes is not the strongest kind
of inference, but rather one of the weakest, due to the
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fact that such an inference opposes PST, which makes all
mental operations easier to perform.
It is not clear if Hume could liberate himself from
this problem without sacrificing a major component of his
philosophy. The problem arises out of an incompatibility
between his theory of induction, his belief that all causes
temporally precede their effects, and his belief that any
mental operations which conform to PST are easier to
conduct than mental operations which do not. Of these, the
first is by far the best-known, and is one of the major
crowning achievements of Hume’s philosophical career. His
belief that all causes precede their effects, as well as
the argument he uses to support this belief, is not nearly
as well-known, but – as I argued in Chapter 3 – nonetheless
constitutes a very significant component of his philosophy.
Hume’s beliefs regarding the mind’s experience of and
attitude toward the past, present, and future is very
rarely discussed, even by Hume scholars. This does not mean
that Hume could jettison these beliefs about time without
sacrificing something he might consider far more important,
however. As I tried to show in this chapter, Hume’s account
of the process by which the mind produces inductive
inferences presuppose certain beliefs about the phenomenal
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succession of time, and some of these beliefs are the very
same ones which give rise to the problem.
Concluding Remarks – How This Chapter Relates to the
Previous Chapters
This chapter focused primarily on the experience of
time, and how that experience of time influences inductive
reasoning. In particular, it discussed how the imagination
has a natural tendency to progress from the past to the
present and from the present to the past, and how the
processes required for inductive reasoning function better
when they proceed in harmony with this tendency. In
carrying out this task, I made reference to some of the
concepts discussed and analyzed in Chapter Three, such as
Hume’s belief that all causes must precede their effects in
time, as well as a concept that was introduced in Chapter
One yet continued to play an important role in Chapter
Three – the idea that all successions are temporal in
Hume’s philosophy. The ideas presented in Chapter Two
regarding the finite divisibility of time are also
pertinent for the topic of this chapter, however.
As I discussed in Chapter Two, the mind cannot
experience time successively if time is infinitely
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divisible. This is because the infinite divisibility of
time entails that between any two moments are an infinite
number of other moments. No moment would have an immediate
predecessor or an immediate successor, which would
obviously preclude the mind from experiencing moments
successively, since doing so presupposes that each moment
has an immediate predecessor and an immediate successor.
Since the mind must experience time successively to
form inductive inferences, this means induction cannot
occur unless time is discrete and discontinuous. To
understand why this is the case, consider one of Hume’s
example of an inductive inference: repeatedly experiencing
one billiard ball moving another, being presented with an
instance of one ball approaching another, and then
concluding without hesitation that the second ball will
move. If time is infinitely divisible, then between the
moment at which ball A collides with ball B and the moment
at which ball B begins to move, there would be an infinite
number of moments. When the mind experiences any temporal
succession, it must not only trace all of the individual
steps of the succession, but also compare them to the
present. How could it ever possibly accomplish this task if
the succession it is experiencing contains an infinite
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number of steps? Furthermore, how would the mind ever join
together ball A and ball B, since there would be an
infinite number of moments between them? Obviously, it
could not ever complete its tracing of the succession, and
it would never associate the balls, and every other pair of
billiard balls which resemble them, in a way it would need
to for induction to be possible.
These reflections provide a reason why Hume could not
escape from the second unresolved problem mentioned above
by rejecting his beliefs about the mind’s experience of
time. The idea that time is discrete and discontinuous –
and therefore, only finitely divisible – is extremely
important to him, and he never abandoned that belief. That
specific property of time determines how the mind
experiences it, and the manner in which the mind
experiences time plays a crucial role in the formation of
inductive inferences.51

51

While the literature on Hume’s account of induction is very vast, I have not yet come across any source
that seemed to even notice that Hume’s theory of induction requires a particular conception of, and a
specific mode of experiencing, time. Many commentators, however, have argued that Hume’s purposes
for discussing inductive reasoning were more psychological than epistemological. These commentators –
such as Craig, Livingstone, Strawson, Wright, as well as many others – tend to depict Hume as a naturalist
instead of a skeptic. Exploring the arguments they give to support their naturalized vision of Hume is far
beyond the scope of my project; a thorough examination of all the interpretative issues involved would
require a dissertation in and of itself. Dicker’s analysis of induction in Hume’s Epistemology and
Metaphysics acknowledges both the naturalist and the more traditional, skeptical interpretations of
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One issue discussed in my first chapter that was
conspicuous by its absence in this chapter was the Humean
account of memory. Hume never discusses the role memory
plays on our attitudes regarding the past in T 2.3.7 and
2.3.8 This is an extremely strange omission on Hume’s part,
since memory undeniably exerts a tremendous influence over
our experience of time, and those sections pertain
specifically to our experience of and attitudes toward the
past, present, and future. An exciting area of additional
research would be to investigate whether Hume’s account of
memory can help solve some of the unresolved tensions I
discussed earlier. Such an investigation would require some
degree of speculation about the strength of memory’s impact
on the imagination and passions in comparison to PST.
The relationship between PST and memory is just one
unanswered question left over from my study of Hume’s
theory of time. I will discuss some other unanswered
questions in my concluding chapter.

Hume, refuses to support either one, and then argues for an interpretation which combines aspects of
both. Dicker spends a significant amount time exploring the psychological aspects of Hume’s account of
induction. Inasmuch as my discussion of Hume’s theory of induction also focuses on the psychological
dimensions of induction, I am still contributing something of value to the endless debates in Hume
scholarship over Hume’s naturalism and skepticism.
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Chapter Six
Conclusion
The Philosophical Motivations behind this Dissertation
Despite Hume’s significant contributions to the
history of philosophy, many dimensions of his thought have
not been sufficiently explored. His theory of time is one
such rarely-studied aspect of his philosophy. Even wellknown commentators on Hume have not given Hume’s theory of
time all of the attention and consideration it deserves.
When these commentators do discuss Hume’s philosophy
of time, they always focus on particular aspects of it and
fail to even mention others. For example, Jacquette’s David
Hume’s Critique of Infinity provides extremely detailed
analyses of the arguments Hume develops to prove that time
is finitely divisible, but never discusses how contiguity
and distance in time affects the passions and the
imagination, or why Hume believes every cause must
temporally precede its effect. In contrast, Beauchamp and
Rosenberg’s Hume and the Problem of Causation, which is a
very influential book in Hume scholarship, does study
Hume’s reasons for thinking that all causes must be prior
to their effects, but explicitly dismisses Hume’s arguments
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against the infinite divisibility time as too weak and
esoteric to deserve serious consideration from
philosophers. After stating their reasons for ignoring
Hume’s arguments for the discreteness of time – arguments
which constitute the subject matter of an entire chapter in
Jacquette’s book - in a footnote, Beauchamp and Rosenberg
never discuss them again.
This disdain for Hume’s arguments against the infinite
divisibility of time also occurs in Flew’s “Infinite
Divisibility in Hume’s Treatise,” which, like Hume and the
Problem of Causation, has also exerted a strong influence
over Hume scholarship, as evidenced by the sheer number of
responses it has received. Although Flew fiercely opposes
Hume’s positions regarding the infinite divisibility of
time, he does consider them important enough to examine in
detail. By focusing primarily on Hume’s arguments against
the continuity of time, he never even considers how Hume’s
belief in temporal discontinuity affects other aspects of
Hume’s philosophy, such as Hume’s theory of causation and
induction.
Even Hume scholars who mostly agree with or are
sympathetic to Hume’s stance on temporal discreteness
completely neglect equally important components of Hume’s
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theory of time. Baxter exemplifies this phenomenon in his
Hume’s Difficulty: Time and Identity in the Treatise.
Because of the sheer number of pages Hume’s Difficulty
devotes to the idea of time, how Hume thinks we acquire it,
the arguments against infinite divisibility, and the
relationship between time and identity in Hume’s thought,
one can argue that Hume’s Difficulty is the most in-depth
and detailed study of Hume’s conception of time currently
in publication. Baxter is aware of this himself, as he
remarks that since “there has been no in-depth study of
Hume’s view of identity,” and “there has been no in-depth
study of Hume’s account of time,” he intends Hume’s
Difficulty “to supply these deficiencies by being the first
focused study of Hume on time and identity” (Baxter 1).
Despite his intense and protracted focus on time, however,
Baxter’s primary concern in Hume’s Difficulty is Hume’s
account of identity, not Hume’s account of time. Baxter’s
main argument is that Hume discovered a serious, unresolved
problem with the very concept of numerical identity, and
that understanding this problem necessitates an
understanding of Hume’s theory of time. Thus Baxter
subordinates his discussion of Hume’s theory of time to his
analysis of Hume’s conception of identity and the problem
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with that conception. Baxter only discusses the components
of Hume’s philosophy of time that are directly relevant to
numerical identity. Consequently, he leaves several
important issues in Hume’s temporal theory completely
unexplored, such as the link between time and causation,
and the effects of temporal contiguity and remoteness on
the imagination.52
This brief excursion into the secondary literature
regarding Hume’s conception of time should have made clear
to the reader that no text currently in publication
features a detailed analysis of both the fundamental
aspects of Hume’s theory of time and the influence that
said theory exerts on other, far better-known components of
Hume’s overall philosophy, especially his descriptions of
causation and induction. The literature which even bothers
to mention that Hume has a theory of time tends to either
dismiss it as unimportant, or focus extensively on one
aspect of it and neglect the others. One of my intentions
in writing this dissertation was to rectify this problem by
providing a detailed, in-depth study of all of the major
components of Hume’s theory of time, so that anyone
52

Baxter does quote a sentence from T 2.3.7.5 on page 29, but he does so only to support an implicit
premise in Hume’s third reductio argument against infinite divisibility. He never discusses or even
mentions what the topic of that section of the Treatise is.
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conducting research on this underappreciated aspect of
Hume’s thought would be able to have access to a much
fuller, more complete picture of Hume’s temporal theory
than is currently available in other texts.
Synopsis of Dissertation
I carried out my goal of establishing this more
thorough study of Hume’s philosophy of time over the course
of five chapters. My first chapter begins with a brief
discussion of crucial principles of Hume’s epistemology.
Doing so is necessary because the arguments presented in
the later chapters presuppose knowledge of those
principles. My next task in Chapter One involves clarifying
precisely what time is for Hume. I argue that time for Hume
is a compound abstract idea of succession qua succession.
An important consequence of this view, which is a recurring
theme in subsequent chapters, is that all successions are
temporal for Hume. Another consequence of this conception
of time is that a persistent worry raised by many
commentators on Hume – that Hume’s conception of time
violates his Copy Principle, one of Hume’s most important
epistemic principles – is unnecessary. Hume explicitly
claims that the Copy Principle does not apply to compound
ideas, only simple ones. Hence the common concern that
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Hume’s notion of time contradicts his own Copy Principle is
ill-founded.
A significant portion of Chapter One features my
response to Baxter, who interprets Hume as arguing that
distinct moments of differing temporal lengths can coexist.
Baxter, well aware of Hume’s repeated insistence that the
parts of time do not and cannot coexist, defends his
interpretation of Hume by claiming that the members of a
succession (the moments constituting the succession) cannot
coexist with other members of the same succession, but they
can coexist with the members of another succession. Baxter
thinks this qualification is consistent with Hume’s
numerous denials that moments can coexist.
I strongly disagree with Baxter’s interpretation, and
raise a series of arguments against it. The most important
one concerns the fact that any two successions can easily
be reinterpreted as being members of a larger succession
which contains them both. Since the members of both subsuccessions would be members of the same, larger
succession, and both Hume and Baxter explicitly state that
moments in the same succession can never coexist, Baxter
must deny the possibility that distinct moments of
differing temporal lengths could coexist.
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In the second chapter, I analyze Hume’s arguments for
temporal minima, which are discrete, indivisible “parts” of
time. Hume calls these temporal minima “moments,” and he
employs two different strategies to argue for their
existence. The first is a phenomenological approach, in
which he uses thought experiments to present reasons for
thinking that our experience of time requires temporal
minima. The second strategy is primarily logical, and
consists of three arguments by which Hume attempts to prove
that the very concept of the infinite divisibility of any
finite thing – either spatial or temporal – is
contradictory. These arguments take the form of reductio ad
absurdums. I defend the first and third of these arguments
from objections which have commonly be raised against them
in the secondary literature. By far the most important
objection, made famous by Flew, accuses Hume of
misunderstanding what infinite divisibility entails. I
discuss arguments developed by authors who disagree with
Flew, and then raise my own objections to his position.
Throughout the chapter, I explain how infinite divisibility
is incompatible with succession, and consequently how time
cannot be successive if it is infinitely divisible.
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Hume’s belief that time is not and cannot be
infinitely divisible plays a pivotal role in his theory of
causality. In Chapter Three, I elucidate the link between
temporal discreteness and causation. I do this by analyzing
the Temporal Priority Argument, an argument Hume gives to
prove that all causes, qua causes, must precede their
effects in time. Hume believes causation is successive, and
because all successions are temporal, causal successions
and temporal successions are very closely connected for
Hume – so much so that one could not exist without the
other. Since causal succession implies temporal succession,
and temporal succession requires an atomistic conception of
time, causal succession requires discrete, atomistic time.
After discussing Hume’s Temporal Priority Argument, I
explain why the temporal priority of causes to their
effects is much more important for Hume’s project than Hume
realizes. Hume thinks that temporal priority, contiguity,
and necessary connection are the three essential components
of the concept of a cause, but repeatedly emphasizes that
necessary connection is the most important of the three. I
argue that the temporal priority of causes to their effects
is at least as important as necessary connection, if not
more so, for the following reasons. A crucial part of
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Hume’s theory of causation is that causes and effects must
be conceptually distinct. If there is no way to distinguish
between causes and effects, his theory of causation does
not work. Both contiguity and necessary connection are
symmetrical relationships; both causes and effects exhibit
both relationships the same way to the same degree. If all
of the relationships between causes and effects are
symmetrical, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to distinguish between them. Temporal priority of causes to
their effects, however, is an asymmetrical relationship.
The asymmetrical nature of the relationship makes a
distinction between causes and effects possible. Hume does
not have other means of distinguishing causes from effects
at his disposal, so he must rely on temporal priority.
Hume’s belief that causes and effects are conceptually
distinguishable also features prominently in his critique
of the causal maxim. The causal maxim states that whatever
begins to exist must have a cause. In Chapter Four, I
discuss Hume’s critique of this maxim, and reveal a problem
with it. Although Hume agrees with the maxim, he thinks it
can be denied without contradiction. He claims that the
concept of a cause of existence is distinct from the
concept of a beginning of existence, and so the two
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concepts can be separated from each other. This means that
asserting that something began existing without a cause is
not self-contradictory.
To support this position, Hume uses his Separability
Principle and his Conceivability Principle, which are two
important principles in his epistemology and ontology. By
examining Hume’s descriptions and uses of these principles,
I show how they entail that if X is separable from Y, then
Y must be equally separable from X. When applied to the
critique of the causal maxim, this means that if the
concept of a beginning of existence is separable from the
concept of a cause of existence, then the concept of a
cause of existence must be equally separable from the
concept of a beginning of existence. The Separability and
Conceivability principles imply that something can be
caused to exist without beginning to exist. Based upon
Hume’s descriptions of a cause of existence, however, it is
self-contradictory to claim that something can be caused to
exist without beginning to exist. The concept of a cause of
existence as Hume articulates it contains the concept of a
beginning of existence. Hume does not use the word “cause”
in a way that would enable something to be caused to exist
without beginning to exist. Consequently, a beginning of
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existence and a cause of existence are not nearly as
separable from each other as they need to be for the
critique of the causal maxim to work. Neither Hume nor his
commentators in the secondary literature seem to have
realized this.
In Chapter Five, I explore the link the between Hume’s
theory of time and his account of induction. I begin the
chapter by examining T 2.3.7 and T 2.3.8, sections of the
Treatise in which Hume describes what I call the Phenomenal
Succession of Time (PST), which is the imagination’s
natural tendency to progress from the past to the present
and from the present to the future. I explain how PST
influences the imagination and the passions. I then argue
that the mental processes required for the production of
inductive inferences need PST in order to function
properly. PST is a necessary condition for the possibility
of induction. One unexpected consequence of induction’s
reliance upon PST is that inferences from effects to causes
must be much more difficult for the mind to perform than
inferences from causes to effects. This is due to the fact
that all causes temporally precede their effects, so when
the mind begins with an effect and then shifts its
attention to the cause of that effect, the mind opposes
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PST. Hume claims that any mental operation which opposes
PST is much more difficult to perform than mental
operations which conform to it.
Hume is not aware of this consequence of his own
theory, as evidenced by numerous passages in which he very
strongly suggests that both types of inferences are equally
easy. The secondary literature is not aware of this problem
either. Virtually everything written about Hume and
induction tends to focus on the famous problem of induction
which Hume discovered. Very few sources mention anything
even remotely relevant to the influence Hume’s theory of
time has on his account of induction. This is unfortunate,
because the relationship between time and induction in
Hume’s thought raises several questions which deserve
careful consideration and exploration.
Possibilities for Further Research
One aspect of this relationship between time and
induction in Hume’s thought which warrants further research
is what effect, if any, reversing the direction of PST
would have on the formation of inductive inferences. If we
experienced time moving into the past instead of the
future, would this reversed experience of time affect our
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ability to generate inductive inferences, and if so, how? A
related issue concerns whether or not it is possible for
the phenomenal succession of time that we experience to be
in opposition to the natural succession of time. Hume
distinguishes between the natural succession of time and
PST, remarks that the latter conforms to the former, yet
never contemplates the possibility that the two successions
of time could be opposed. Since Hume himself remained
silent on these issues, any investigation into what his
philosophy has to say about them will obviously be purely
speculative. From a metaphysical standpoint, however, these
sorts of issues are too important to ignore.
It is not completely surprising that Hume said nothing
about the possibility of a reversed PST, since the
naturalistic and empiricist tendencies in his philosophy
would not give him a reason to inquire into that topic.
What is truly surprising, however, is that Hume never
discusses the role memory plays in PST. Memory obviously
exerts a tremendous influence over our beliefs in and
attitude toward the past. For this reason, Hume should have
discussed memory vis-à-vis PST.53 The very same naturalistic
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Hume does mention the relationship between memory and time very briefly in T 1.1.3 and 1.3.5, but
his main goal in these sections is to explore the differences between memory and the imagination. For
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and empirical tendencies which precluded him from
contemplating possible worlds in which the direction of PST
is reversed should have compelled him to explore the link
between memory and PST. Attempting to determine what that
link may possibly be would be difficult, but it would also
be important, because it would help to illuminate some
poorly-understood and under-studied aspects of Hume’s
thought.

reasons I tried to make clear in both the present chapter and the previous chapter, the relationship
between memory and the order of time deserves a more thorough analysis than the extremely brief
treatment he gives this topic in these sections.
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